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Kenneth Aizawa & Carl Gillett (2009). Levels, Individual Variation and Massive Multiple Realization in Neurobiology.

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  1.  5
    The Multiple Realization Book.Danny Booth - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (3):431-445.
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  2.  12
    The Case for Multiple Realization in Biology.Wei Fang - 2018 - Biology and Philosophy 33 (1-2):3.
    Polger and Shapiro argue that their official recipe, a criterion for judging when the phenomenon of multiple realization exists, renders MR less widespread than its proponents have assumed. I argue that, although Polger and Shapiro’s criterion is a useful contribution, they arrive at their conclusion too hastily. Contrary to Polger and Shapiro, I claim that the phenomenon of multiple realization in the biological world, judged by their criterion, is not as scarce as they suggest. To show this, an updated official (...)
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    Multiple Realization and the Commensurability of Taxonomies.John Zerilli - 2016 - Synthese:1-17.
    The past two decades have witnessed a revival of interest in multiple realization and multiply realized kinds. Bechtel and Mundale’s :175–207, 1999) illuminating discussion of the subject must no doubt be credited with having generated much of this renewed interest. Among other virtues, their paper expresses what seems to be an important insight about multiple realization: that unless we keep a consistent grain across realized and realizing kinds, claims alleging the multiple realization of psychological kinds are vulnerable to refutation. In (...)
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  4.  53
    Introduction to “The Material Bases of Cognition”.Kenneth Aizawa - 2013 - Minds and Machines 23 (3):277-286.
  5.  72
    Constitution, and Multiple Constitution, in the Sciences: Using the Neuron to Construct a Starting Framework. [REVIEW]Carl Gillett - 2013 - Minds and Machines 23 (3):309-337.
    Inter-level mechanistic explanations in the sciences have long been a focus of philosophical interest, but attention has recently turned to the compositional character of these explanations which work by explaining higher level entities, whether processes, individuals or properties, using the lower level entities they take to compose them. However, we still have no theoretical account of the constitution or parthood relations between individuals deployed in such explanations, nor any accounts of multiple constitution. My primary focus in this paper is to (...)
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  6.  73
    Multiply Realizing Scientific Properties and Their Instances.Carl Gillett - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):727-738.
    Thomas Polger and Lawrence Shapiro (or P&S) have recently (2008) criticized ?causal-mechanist? views of realization that dominate research in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics of science. P&S offer the internal criticism that any account of realization focusing upon property instances, as views of causal-mechanist realization routinely do, must lead to incoherence about multiple realization. P&S's argument highlights important issues about property instances that have recently been neglected, as well as raising a challenge to the standard approach to understanding the (...)
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    What's on Your Mind? A Brain Scan Won't Tell.Yakir Levin & Itzhak Aharon - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (4):699-722.
    Reverse Inference ( RI ) is an imaging-based type of inference from brain states to mental states, which has become highly widespread in neuroscience, most especially in neuroeconomics. Recent critical studies of RI may be taken to show that, if cautiously used, RI can help achieve research goals that may be difficult to achieve by way of behavior-based procedures alone. But can RI exceed the limits of these procedures and achieve research goals that are impossible for them to achieve alone? (...)
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  8.  45
    Moving Beyond the Subset Model of Realization: The Problem of Qualitative Distinctness in the Metaphysics of Science.Carl Gillett - 2010 - Synthese 177 (2):165 - 192.
    Understanding the 'making-up' relations, to put things neutrally, posited in mechanistic explanations the sciences is finally an explicit topic of debate amongst philosophers of science. In particular, there is now lively debate over the nature of the so-called 'realization' relations between properties posited in such explanations. Despite criticism (Gillett, Analysis 62: 316-323, 2002a), the most common approach continues to be that of applying machinery developed in the philosophy of mind to scientific concepts in what is known as the 'Flat' or (...)
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  9. The (Multiple) Realization of Psychological and Other Properties in the Sciences.Kenneth Aizawa & Carl Gillett - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (2):181-208.
    Abstract: There has recently been controversy over the existence of 'multiple realization' in addition to some confusion between different conceptions of its nature. To resolve these problems, we focus on concrete examples from the sciences to provide precise accounts of the scientific concepts of 'realization' and 'multiple realization' that have played key roles in recent debates in the philosophy of science and philosophy of psychology. We illustrate the advantages of our view over a prominent rival account ( Shapiro, 2000 and (...)
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