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The Systematicity Arguments

Kluwer Academic Publishers (2003)

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  1. Two Problems with the Socio-Relational Critique of Distributive Egalitarianism.Christian Seidel - 2013 - In Miguel Hoeltje, Thomas Spitzley & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), Was dürfen wir glauben? Was sollen wir tun? Sektionsbeiträge des achten internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie e.V. DuEPublico.
    Distributive egalitarians believe that distributive justice is to be explained by the idea of distributive equality (DE) and that DE is of intrinsic value. The socio-relational critique argues that distributive egalitarianism does not account for the “true” value of equality, which rather lies in the idea of “equality as a substantive social value” (ESV). This paper examines the socio-relational critique and argues that it fails because – contrary to what the critique presupposes –, first, ESV is not conceptually distinct from (...)
     
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  • Explaining How to Perceive the New: Causal-Informational Teleosemantics and Productive Response Functions.Fabian Hundertmark - forthcoming - Synthese:1-16.
    According to Karen Neander’s causal-informational teleosemantics, the contents of perceptual states depend on the etiological response functions of sensory-perceptual systems. In this paper, I argue that this theory is, despite its virtues, unable to explain how humans and other animals are capable of perceiving properties with which no sensory-perceptual system has ever been confronted. After rejecting Neander’s own proposal in terms of second-order similarity and a proposal inspired by Ruth Millikan in terms of simplicity, I offer a solution which equates (...)
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  • Some Theoretical and Empirical Background to Fodor’s Systematicity Arguments.Kenneth Aizawa - forthcoming - Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science.
    This paper aims to clarify certain features of the systematicity arguments by a review of some of the largely underexamined background in Chomsky’s and Fodor’s early work on transformational grammar.
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  • Why Are There Failures of Systematicity? The Empirical Costs and Benefits of Inducing Universal Constructions.Steven Phillips, Yuji Takeda & Fumie Sugimoto - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
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  • The Boundaries Still Stand: A Reply to Fisher.Kenneth Aizawa - 2010 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 31 (1):37.
    In his recent critical notice of The Bounds of Cognition in this journal, Justin Fisher advances a set of concerns that favor the hypothesis that, under certain circumstances, cognitive processes span the brain, body, and world. One is that it is too much to require that representations in cognitive process must have non-derived content. A second is that it is possible that extended objects bear non-derived content. A third is that extended cognition might advocate the extension of certain general categories (...)
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  • Defending Non-Derived Content.Ken Aizawa & Fred Adams - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):661-669.
    In ‘‘The Myth of Original Intentionality,’’ Daniel Dennett appears to want to argue for four claims involving the familiar distinction between original (or underived) and derived intentionality. 1. Humans lack original intentionality. 2. Humans have derived intentionality only. 3. There is no distinction between original and derived intentionality. 4. There is no such thing as original intentionality. We argue that Dennett’s discussion fails to secure any of these conclusions for the contents of thoughts.
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  • The Mind as Neural Software? Understanding Functionalism, Computationalism, and Computational Functionalism.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):269-311.
    Defending or attacking either functionalism or computationalism requires clarity on what they amount to and what evidence counts for or against them. My goalhere is not to evaluatc their plausibility. My goal is to formulate them and their relationship clearly enough that we can determine which type of evidence is relevant to them. I aim to dispel some sources of confusion that surround functionalism and computationalism. recruit recent philosophical work on mechanisms and computation to shed light on them, and clarify (...)
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  • Defending Non-Derived Content.Kenneth Aizawa & Frederick R. Adams - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):661-669.
    In ‘‘The Myth of Original Intentionality,’’ Daniel Dennett appears to want to argue for four claims involving the familiar distinction between original (or underived) and derived intentionality.
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  • La composicionalidad del lenguaje revisitada.Mariela Destefano - 2017 - Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 53:51-84.
    En este trabajo intentaré mostrar que el lenguaje es composicional desde la perspectiva del programa minimalista. Desde este enfoque adoptaré la noción de “lengua-I”. Específicamente, intentaré sostener que, si el minimalismo es correcto, el producto de la lengua-I es composicional en virtud de restricciones generales de arquitectura cognitiva y restricciones intrínsecas al mecanismo computacional de la lengua-I. Mi argumento puede entenderse como una inferencia a la mejor explicación. La mejor explicación de que la lengua-I, en tanto sistema de expresiones que (...)
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  • Systematicity Redux.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2009 - Synthese 170 (2):251-274.
    One of the main challenges that Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn (Cognition 28:3–71, 1988) posed for any connectionist theory of cognitive architecture is to explain the systematicity of thought without implementing a Language of Thought (LOT) architecture. The systematicity challenge presents a dilemma: if connectionism cannot explain the systematicity of thought, then it fails to offer an adequate theory of cognitive architecture; and if it explains the systematicity of thought by implementing a LOT architecture, then it fails to offer an (...)
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  • Connectionist Semantic Systematicity.Stefan L. Frank, Willem F. G. Haselager & Iris van Rooij - 2009 - Cognition 110 (3):358-379.
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  • Epistemic Virtues and Theory Choice in Economics.Ivan Moscati - unknown
    When economists have to choose between competing theories, they evaluate not only the theories’ empirical relevance, but also qualities like their simplicity, tractability, parsimony and unifying power. These are called the epistemic virtues of a theory. The present paper proposes a formal definition for some epistemic virtues and investigates their role for theory choice in economics.
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  • Wherein is Human Cognition Systematic?Antoni Gomila, David Travieso & Lorena Lobo - 2012 - Minds and Machines 22 (2):101-115.
    The “systematicity argument” has been used to argue for a classical cognitive architecture (Fodor in The Language of Thought. Harvester Press, London, 1975, Why there still has to be a language of thought? In Psychosemantics, appendix. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 135–154, 1987; Fodor and Pylyshyn in Cognition 28:3–71, 1988; Aizawa in The systematicity arguments. Kluwer Academic Press, Dordrecht, 2003). From the premises that cognition is systematic and that the best/only explanation of systematicity is compositional structure, it concludes that cognition is (...)
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  • The Systematicity Challenge to Anti-Representational Dynamicism.Víctor Verdejo - 2015 - Synthese 192 (3):701-722.
    After more than twenty years of representational debate in the cognitive sciences, anti-representational dynamicism may be seen as offering a rival and radically new kind of explanation of systematicity phenomena. In this paper, I argue that, on the contrary, anti-representational dynamicism must face a version of the old systematicity challenge: either it does not explain systematicity, or else, it is just an implementation of representational theories. To show this, I present a purely behavioral and representation-free account of systematicity. I then (...)
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  • Computationalism in the Philosophy of Mind.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (3):515-532.
    Computationalism has been the mainstream view of cognition for decades. There are periodic reports of its demise, but they are greatly exaggerated. This essay surveys some recent literature on computationalism. It concludes that computationalism is a family of theories about the mechanisms of cognition. The main relevant evidence for testing it comes from neuroscience, though psychology and AI are relevant too. Computationalism comes in many versions, which continue to guide competing research programs in philosophy of mind as well as psychology (...)
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  • Grounding Action Representations.Arne M. Weber & Gottfried Vosgerau - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):53-69.
    In this paper we discuss an approach called grounded action cognition, which aims to provide a theory of the interdependencies between motor control and action-related cognitive processes, like perceiving an action or thinking about an action. The theory contrasts with traditional views in cognitive science in that it motivates an understanding of cognition as embodied, through application of Barsalou’s general idea of grounded cognition. To guide further research towards an appropriate theory of grounded action cognition we distinguish between grounding qua (...)
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