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  1. How Not to Change the Theory of Theory Change: A Reply to Tennant.Sven Ove Hansson & Hans Rott - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (3):361-380.
    A number of seminal papers on the logic of belief change by Alchourrön, Gärden-fors, and Makinson have given rise to what is now known as the AGM paradigm. The present discussion note is a response to Neil Tennant's [1994], which aims at a critical appraisal of the AGM approach and the introduction of an alternative approach. We show that important parts of Tennants's critical remarks are based on misunderstandings or on lack of information. In the course of doing this, we (...)
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  • Preferential Belief Change Using Generalized Epistemic Entrenchment.Hans Rott - 1992 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 1 (1):45-78.
    A sentence A is epistemically less entrenched in a belief state K than a sentence B if and only if a person in belief state K who is forced to give up either A or B will give up A and hold on to B. This is the fundamental idea of epistemic entrenchment as introduced by Gärdenfors (1988) and elaborated by Gärdenfors and Makinson (1988). Another distinguishing feature of relations of epistemic entrenchment is that they permit particularly simple and elegant (...)
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  • Belief Contraction in the Context of the General Theory of Rational Choice.Hans Rott - 1993 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 59 (4):1426-1450.
    This paper reorganizes and further develops the theory of partial meet contraction which was introduced in a classic paper by Alchourron, Gardenfors, and Makinson. Our purpose is threefold. First, we put the theory in a broader perspective by decomposing it into two layers which can respectively be treated by the general theory of choice and preference and elementary model theory. Second, we reprove the two main representation theorems of AGM and present two more representation results for the finite case that (...)
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  • A Nonmonotonic Conditional Logic for Belief Revision.Hans Rott - 1991 - In André Fuhrmann & Michael Morreau (eds.), The Logic of Theory Change. Berlin: Springer. pp. 135–181.
    Using Gärdenfors's notion of epistemic entrenchment, we develop the semantics of a logic which accounts for the following points. It explains why we may generally infer `If ~A then B´ if all we know is AvB while must not generally infer `If ~A then B´ if all we know is {AvB, A}. More generally, it explains the nonmonotonic nature of the consequence relation governing languages which contain conditionals, and it explains how we can deduce conditionals from premise sets without conditionals. (...)
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  • Three Floors for the Theory of Theory Change.Hans Rott - 2014 - In Vít Punčochář & Michal Dančák (eds.), The Logica Yearbook 2013. London: College Publications. pp. 187–205.
    The theory of theory change due to Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson ("AGM") has been widely known as being characterized by two sets of postulates, one being very weak and the other being very strong. Commenting on the three classic constructions of partial meet contraction, safe contraction and entrenchment-based construction, I argue that three intermediate levels can be distinguished that play decisive roles within the AGM theory.
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  • Prioritized and Non-Prioritized Multiple Change on Belief Bases.Marcelo A. Falappa, Gabriele Kern-Isberner, Maurício D. L. Reis & Guillermo R. Simari - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):77-113.
    In this article we explore multiple change operators, i.e., operators in which the epistemic input is a set of sentences instead of a single sentence. We propose two types of change: prioritized change, in which the input set is fully accepted, and symmetric change, where both the epistemic state and the epistemic input are equally treated. In both kinds of operators we propose a set of postulates and we present different constructions: kernel changes and partial meet changes.
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  • Belief Change as Change in Epistemic Entrenchment.Abhaya C. Nayak, Paul Nelson & Hanan Polansky - 1996 - Synthese 109 (2):143 - 174.
    In this paper, it is argued that both the belief state and its input should be represented as epistemic entrenchment (EE) relations. A belief revision operation is constructed that updates a given EE relation to a new one in light of an evidential EE relation, and an axiomatic characterization of this operation is given. Unlike most belief revision operations, the one developed here can handle both multiple belief revision and iterated belief revision.
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  • Iterated Belief Change Based on Epistemic Entrenchment.Abhaya C. Nayak - 1994 - Erkenntnis 41 (3):353-390.
    In this paper it is argued that, in order to solve the problem of iterated belief change, both the belief state and its input should be represented as epistemic entrenchment (EE) relations. A belief revision operation is constructed that updates a given EE relation to a new one in light of an evidential EE relation. It is shown that the operation in question satisfies generalized versions of the Gärdenfors revision postulates. The account offered is motivated by Spohn's ordinal conditionalization functions, (...)
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  • Structured Belief Bases.Reinhard Kahle - 2002 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 10:45.
  • Kernel Contraction.Sven Ove Hansson - 1994 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 59 (3):845-859.
    Kernel contraction is a natural nonrelational generalization of safe contraction. All partial meet contractions are kernel contractions, but the converse relationship does not hold. Kernel contraction is axiomatically characterized. It is shown to be better suited than partial meet contraction for formal treatments of iterated belief change.
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  • New Operators for Theory Change.Svenove Hansson - 1989 - Theoria 55 (2):114-132.
  • Epistemology in Latin America.Diego E. Machuca - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    After presenting the current situation of epistemological research in Latin America and part of its history, this entry will address five topics: skepticism (especially in its Pyrrhonian stripe), core epistemology, formal epistemology, Wittgenstein’s thought in connection with epistemology and skepticism, and epistemology of law. It should be noted from the outset that the entry does not purport to provide a comprehensive account of epistemology in Latin America, but rather to paint a general picture of it by focusing on the main (...)
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