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Knowledge, intuition and implicature

Synthese 195 (6):2821-2843 (2018)

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  1. Refined Invariantism.Jacques‐Henri Vollet - 2020 - Theoria 86 (1):100-127.
  • Knowledge, Belief, and Egocentric Bias.Paul Dimmock - 2019 - Synthese 196 (8):3409-3432.
    Changes in conversationally salient error possibilities, and/or changes in stakes, appear to generate shifts in our judgments regarding the correct application of ‘know’. One prominent response to these shifts is to argue that they arise due to shifts in belief and do not pose a problem for traditional semantic or metaphysical accounts of knowledge. Such doxastic proposals face familiar difficulties with cases where knowledge is ascribed to subjects in different practical or conversational situations from the speaker. Jennifer Nagel has recently (...)
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  • Three Things to Do With Knowledge Ascriptions.Tammo Lossau - forthcoming - Episteme:1-12.
    Any good theory of knowledge ascriptions should explain and predict our judgments about their felicity. I argue that any such explanation must take into account a distinction between three ways of using knowledge ascriptions: (a) to suggest acceptance of the embedded proposition, (b) to explain or predict a subject’s behavior or attitudes, or (c) to understand the relation of knowledge as such. The contextual effects on our judgments about felicity systematically differ between these three types of uses. Using such a (...)
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