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  1. Atemporalism and Dependence.Taylor W. Cyr - 2020 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 87 (2):149-164.
    It is widely thought that Atemporalism—the view that, because God is “outside” of time, he does not foreknow anything —constitutes a unique solution to the problem of freedom and foreknowledge. However, as I argue here, in order for Atemporalism to escape certain worries, the view must appeal to the dependence of God’s timeless knowledge on our actions. I then argue that, because it must appeal to such dependence, Atemporalism is crucially similar to the recent sempiternalist accounts proposed by Trenton Merricks, (...)
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  • If You Can't Change What You Believe, You Don't Believe It.Grace Helton - 2020 - Noûs 54 (3):501-526.
    I develop and defend the view that subjects are necessarily psychologically able to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Specifically, subjects can revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence, given their current psychological mechanisms and skills. If a subject lacks this ability, then the mental state in question is not a belief, though it may be some other kind of cognitive attitude, such as a supposi-tion, an entertained thought, or a pretense. The result is a moderately revisionary (...)
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  • Restricted Omniscience and Ways of Knowing.T. Ryan Byerly - 2014 - Sophia 53 (4):427-434.
    Recently, several philosophers have moved from a classical account of divine omniscience according to which God knows all truths to a restricted account of divine omniscience according to which God knows all knowable truths. But an important objection offered by Alexander Pruss threatens to show that if God knows all knowable truths, God must also know all truths. In this paper, I show that there is a way out of Pruss’s objection for the advocate of restricted omniscience if she will (...)
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  • Future Freedom and the Fixity of Truth: Closing the Road to Limited Foreknowledge Open Theism. [REVIEW]Benjamin H. Arbour - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73 (3):189-207.
    Unlike versions of open theism that appeal to the alethic openness of the future, defenders of limited foreknowledge open theism (hereafter LFOT) affirm that some propositions concerning future contingents are presently true. Thus, there exist truths that are unknown to God, so God is not omniscient simpliciter. LFOT requires modal definitions of divine omniscience such that God knows all truths that are logically knowable. Defenders of LFOT have yet to provide an adequate response to Richard Purtill’s argument that fatalism logically (...)
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  • Infallible Divine Foreknowledge Cannot Uniquely Threaten Human Freedom, but its Mechanics Might.T. Ryan Byerly - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (4):73-94.
    It is not uncommon to think that the existence of exhaustive and infallible divine foreknowledge uniquely threatens the existence of human freedom. This paper shows that this cannot be so. For, to uniquely threaten human freedom, infallible divine foreknowledge would have to make an essential contribution to an explanation for why our actions are not up to us. And infallible divine foreknowledge cannot do this. There remains, however, an important question about the compatibility of freedom and foreknowledge. It is a (...)
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  • Acquaintance.Matt Duncan - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (3):e12727.
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  • The Kalam Cosmological Argument and Divine Omniscience: an Evaluation of Recent Discussions in Sophia.Andrew Ter Ern Loke - 2020 - Sophia 59 (4):651-656.
    This article evaluates the discussion concerning the relationship between the Kalām Cosmological Argument and Divine Omniscience in recent articles in Sophia, 263–272, 2016; Erasmus Sophia, 57, 151–156, 2018a). I argue that, in his latest article, Erasmus is guilty of shifting the focus of the discussion from the KCA to the Infinity Argument. I contribute to the discussion by replying to the four difficulties Erasmus Sophia, 57, 151–156, mentions against my defence of the notion that God has an undivided intuition of (...)
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  • Endless Future: A Persistent Thorn in the Kalām Cosmological Argument.Yishai Cohen - 2015 - Philosophical Papers 44 (2):165-187.
    Wes Morriston contends that William Lane Craig's argument for the impossibility of a beginningless past results in an equally good argument for the impossibility of an endless future. Craig disagrees. I show that Craig's reply reveals a commitment to an unmotivated position concerning the relationship between actuality and the actual infinite. I then assess alternative routes to the impossibility of a beginningless past that have been offered in the literature, and show that, contrary to initial appearances, these routes similarly seem (...)
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  • Foreknowledge, Accidental Necessity, and Uncausability.T. Ryan Byerly - 2014 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 75 (2):137-154.
    Foreknowledge arguments attempt to show that infallible and exhaustive foreknowledge is incompatible with creaturely freedom. One particularly powerful foreknowledge argument employs the concept of accidental necessity. But an opponent of this argument might challenge it precisely because it employs the concept of accidental necessity. Indeed, Merricks (Philos Rev 118:29–57, 2009, Philos Rev 120:567–586, 2011a) and Zagzebski (Faith Philos 19(4):503–519, 2002, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2011) have each written favorably of such a response. In this paper, I aim to show that (...)
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  • Freedom, Foreknowledge, and Dependence.Ryan Wasserman - forthcoming - Noûs.
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  • Divine Freedom and Free Will Defenses.W. Paul Franks - 2015 - Heythrop Journal 56 (1):108-119.
    This paper considers a problem that arises for free will defenses when considering the nature of God's own will. If God is perfectly good and performs praiseworthy actions, but is unable to do evil, then why must humans have the ability to do evil in order to perform such actions? This problem has been addressed by Theodore Guleserian, but at the expense of denying God's essential goodness. I examine and critique his argument and provide a solution to the initial problem (...)
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  • God Knows: Acquaintance and the Nature of Divine Knowledge.Travis M. Dickinson - forthcoming - Religious Studies:1-16.
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  • Agency and Omniscience.Tomis Kapitan - 1991 - Religious Studies 27 (1):105-120.
    It is said that faith in a divine agent is partly an attitude of trust; believers typically find assurance in the conception of a divine being's will, and cherish confidence in its capacity to implement its intentions and plans. Yet, there would be little point in trusting in the will of any being without assuming its ability to both act and know, and perhaps it is only by assuming divine omniscience that one can retain the confidence in the efficacy and (...)
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