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William P. Alston (1976). Has Foundationalism Been Refuted?

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  1. Religious Epistemology.Trent Dougherty & Chris Tweedt - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (8):547-559.
    Religious epistemology is the study of how subjects' religious beliefs can have, or fail to have, some form of positive epistemic status and whether they even need such status appropriate to their kind. The current debate is focused most centrally upon the kind of basis upon which a religious believer can be rationally justified in holding certain beliefs about God and whether it is necessary to be so justified to believe as a religious believer ought. Engaging these issues are primarily (...)
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  2. Arbitrary Foundations? On Klein’s Objection to Foundationalism.Coos Engelsma - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (4):389-408.
    This paper evaluates Peter Klein’s objection to foundationalism. According to Klein, foundationalism fails because it allows arbitrariness “at the base.” I first explain that this objection can be interpreted in two ways: either as targeting dialectical foundationalism or as targeting epistemic foundationalism. I then clarify Klein’s concept of arbitrariness. An assertion or belief is assumed to be arbitrary if and only if it lacks a reason that is “objectively and subjectively available.” Drawing on this notion, I evaluate Klein’s objection. I (...)
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    Introduction: “Epistemic Coherentism”.Ted Poston - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):1-4.
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    Epistemic Friction: Reflections on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic.Gila Sher - 2010 - Erkenntnis 72 (2):151-176.
    Knowledge requires both freedom and friction . Freedom to set up our epistemic goals, choose the subject matter of our investigations, espouse cognitive norms, design research programs, etc., and friction (constraint) coming from two directions: the object or target of our investigation, i.e., the world in a broad sense, and our mind as the sum total of constraints involving the knower. My goal is to investigate the problem of epistemic friction, the relation between epistemic friction and freedom, the viability of (...)
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    Serendipity and Vision: Two Methods for Discovery Comments on Nickles.Scott A. Kleiner - 1999 - Biology and Philosophy 14 (1):55-63.
    Thomas Nickles challenges my thesis that innovative discoveries can be based on deliberately chosen problems and research strategies. He suggests that all significant innovation can be seen as such only in retrospect and that its generation must be serendipitous. Here I argue in response that significant innovations can and do often arise from self conscious critical appraisal of orthodox practice combined with regulated though speculative abductive argumentation to alternative explanatory schemata. Orthodox practice is not based upon monolithic systems of belief (...)
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    Is Foundationalism Indefinable?James A. Martin - 1988 - Metaphilosophy 19 (2):128–142.
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  7. What's Wrong with Immediate Knowledge?William P. Alston - 1983 - Synthese 55 (April):73-96.
    Immediate knowledge is here construed as true belief that does not owe its status as knowledge to support by other knowledge (or justified belief) of the same subject. The bulk of the paper is devoted to a criticism of attempts to show the impossibility of immediate knowledge. I concentrate on attempts by Wilfrid Sellars and Laurence Bonjour to show that putative immediate knowledge really depends on higher-level knowledge or justified belief about the status of the beliefs involved in the putative (...)
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  8. Foundationalism, Epistemic Dependence, and Defeasibility.Robert Audi - 1983 - Synthese 55 (1):119 - 139.
    This paper is an examination of modest foundationalism in relation to some important criteria of epistemic dependence. The paper distinguishes between causal and epistemic dependence and indicates how each might be related to reasons. Four kinds of reasons are also distinguished: reasons to believe, reasons one has for believing, reasons for which one believes, and reasons why one believes. In the light of all these distinctions, epistemic dependence is contrasted with defeasibility, and it is argued that modest foundationalism is not (...)
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  9. Foundationalism, Coherentism, and the Levels Gambit.David Shatz - 1983 - Synthese 55 (1):97 - 118.
    A central problem in epistemology concerns the justification of beliefs about epistemic principles, i.e., principles stating which kinds of beliefs are justified and which not. It is generally regarded as circular to justify such beliefs empirically. However, some recent defenders of foundationalism have argued that, within a foundationalist framework, one can justify beliefs about epistemic principles empirically without incurring the charge of vicious circularity. The key to this position is a sharp distinction between first- and second-level justifiedness.In this paper I (...)
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    Foundationalism and Epistemic Rationality.John Heil - 1982 - Philosophical Studies 42 (2):179 - 188.
    Some foundationalists have argued that epistemic warrant may be in some measure determined by features of a doxastic agent's circumstances that are not necessarily accessible to the agent. 'externalist' views of this sort have been attacked recently by laurence bonjour on the grounds that they are at odds with the ordinary notion of "epistemic rationality". I suggest that this need not be so and argue that bonjour fails to provide convincing reasons for the rejection of externalist forms of foundationalism.
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    Chisholm's Approach to Scepticism.Douglas Odegard - 1981 - Metaphilosophy 12 (1):7–12.