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  1. Locke on the Propria of Body.Michael Jacovides - 2007 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 15 (3):485 – 511.
    Seth Pringle-Pattison (233n1) observed that Locke “teaches a twofold mystery—in the first place, of the essence (‘for the powers or qualities that are observable by us are not the real essence of that substance, but depend upon it or flow from it’), and in the second place, of the substance itself (‘Besides, a man has no idea of substance in general, nor knows what substance is in itself.’ Bk. II.31.13).” In this paper, I’ll explain the relation between the two mysteries. (...)
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  • Tarski et la suppositio materialis.Claude Panaccio - 2004 - Philosophiques 31 (2):295-309.
    Dans son article de 1944, « The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics », Alfred Tarski réfère en propres termes à la notion médiévale de « suppositio materialis ». L’interprétation qu’il en suggère, cependant, est historiquement trompeuse et l’inexactitude historique se double, en l’occurrence, de ce que l’on peut tenir pour une malencontreuse erreur philosophique. Dans « “la neige est blanche” est vraie », Tarski voit l’expression « la neige est blanche » comme le nom d’une certaine (...)
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  • Descartes, Passion, and the Ability to Do Otherwise.Christopher Gilbert - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Research 38:275-298.
    What does Descartes regard as necessary for human freedom? I approach this topic from a distinctive angle by focusing on the role of the passions in Descartes’s account of free will. My goal is to show that Descartes takes us to have the ability to do otherwise when we judge or choose under the influence of the passions, and that while such ability does not constitute freedom in the fullest Cartesian sense, it does ensure that the judgments and choices we (...)
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  • Physics of Brain-Mind Interaction.John C. Eccles - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):662-663.
  • Do Experiences Represent?Michael Jacovides - 2010 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):87-103.
    The paper contains four arguments to show that experiences don't represent. The first argument appeals to the fact that an experience can't occur without what the experience is of; the second appeals to the fact we can have an experience without having any awareness of what it is of, the third argument appeals to the fact that long experiences, such as the experience of being kidnapped, don't represent anything; and the fourth appeals to the fact that experiences often leave physical (...)
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  • Experiences as Complex Events.Michael Jacovides - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):141-159.
    It is argued that experiences are complex events that befall their subjects. Each experience has a single subject and depends on the state or the event that it is of. The constituents of an experience are its subject, its grounding event or state, and everything that the subject is aware of during that time that's relevant to the telling of the story of how it was to participate in that event or be put in that state. The experience occurs where (...)
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