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  1. The Composition of Thoughts.Richard Heck & Robert May - 2011 - Noûs 45 (1):126-166.
    Are Fregean thoughts compositionally complex and composed of senses? We argue that, in Begriffsschrift, Frege took 'conceptual contents' to be unstructured, but that he quickly moved away from this position, holding just two years later that conceptual contents divide of themselves into 'function' and 'argument'. This second position is shown to be unstable, however, by Frege's famous substitution puzzle. For Frege, the crucial question the puzzle raises is why "The Morning Star is a planet" and "The Evening Star is a (...)
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  • How Many Thoughts Can Fit in the Form of a Proposition?Susan Sterrett - unknown
    I argue here that Frege’s eventual view on the relation between sentences and the thoughts they express is that, ideally, a sentence expresses exactly one thought, and a thought is expressed by exactly one (canonical) sentence. This may clash with some mainstream views of Frege, for it has the consequence of de-emphasizing the philosophical significance of the question of how it is possible for someone to regard one sentence as true yet regard another sentence that expresses the same thought as (...)
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  • Frege on Judging as Acknowledging the Truth.Mark Textor - 2010 - Mind 119 (475):615-655.
    According to Frege, judgement is the ‘logically primitive activity’. So what is judgement? In his mature work, he characterizes judging as ‘acknowledging the truth’ (‘Anerkennen der Wahrheit’). Frege’s remarks about judging as acknowledging the truth of a thought require further elaboration and development. I will argue that the development that best suits his argumentative purposes takes acknowledging the truth of a thought to be a non-propositional attitude like seeing an object; it is a mental relation between a thinker, a thought, (...)
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  • The Methodology and Structure of Gottlob Frege's Logico-Philosophical Investigations.Kazuyuki Nomoto - 2006 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 14 (2):73-97.
  • Gingerbread Nuts and Pebbles: Frege and the Neo-Kantians–Two Recently Discovered Documents.Sven Schlotter & Kai F. Wehmeier - 2013 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (3):591 - 609.
    (2012). Gingerbread Nuts and Pebbles: Frege and the Neo-Kantians – Two Recently Discovered Documents. British Journal for the History of Philosophy. ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09608788.2012.692665.
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  • Remarks on Independence Proofs and Indirect Reference.Günther Eder - 2013 - History and Philosophy of Logic 34 (1):68-78.
    In the last two decades, there has been increasing interest in a re-evaluation of Frege’s stance towards consistency- and independence proofs. Papers by several authors deal with Frege’s views on these topics. In this note, I want to discuss one particular problem, which seems to be a main reason for Frege’s reluctant attitude towards his own proposed method of proving the independence of axioms, namely his view that thoughts, that is, intensional entities are the objects of metatheoretical investigations. This stands (...)
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  • Frege’s ‘On the Foundations of Geometry’ and Axiomatic Metatheory.Günther Eder - 2016 - Mind 125 (497):5-40.
    In a series of articles dating from 1903 to 1906, Frege criticizes Hilbert’s methodology of proving the independence and consistency of various fragments of Euclidean geometry in his Foundations of Geometry. In the final part of the last article, Frege makes his own proposal as to how the independence of genuine axioms should be proved. Frege contends that independence proofs require the development of a ‘new science’ with its own basic truths. This paper aims to provide a reconstruction of this (...)
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  • The Applicability of Mathematics as a Philosophical Problem: Mathematization as Exploration.Johannes Lenhard & Michael Otte - 2018 - Foundations of Science 23 (4):719-737.
    This paper discerns two types of mathematization, a foundational and an explorative one. The foundational perspective is well-established, but we argue that the explorative type is essential when approaching the problem of applicability and how it influences our conception of mathematics. The first part of the paper argues that a philosophical transformation made explorative mathematization possible. This transformation took place in early modernity when sense acquired partial independence from reference. The second part of the paper discusses a series of examples (...)
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  • Hume’s Principle and Axiom V Reconsidered: Critical Reflections on Frege and His Interpreters.Matthias Schirn - 2006 - Synthese 148 (1):171-227.
    In this paper, I shall discuss several topics related to Frege's paradigms of second-order abstraction principles and his logicism. The discussion includes a critical examination of some controversial views put forward mainly by Robin Jeshion, Tyler Burge, Crispin Wright, Richard Heck and John MacFarlane. In the introductory section, I try to shed light on the connection between logical abstraction and logical objects. The second section contains a critical appraisal of Frege's notion of evidence and its interpretation by Jeshion, the introduction (...)
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  • Consistency, Models, and Soundness.Matthias Schirn - 2010 - Axiomathes 20 (2-3):153-207.
    This essay consists of two parts. In the first part, I focus my attention on the remarks that Frege makes on consistency when he sets about criticizing the method of creating new numbers through definition or abstraction. This gives me the opportunity to comment also a little on H. Hankel, J. Thomae—Frege’s main targets when he comes to criticize “formal theories of arithmetic” in Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884) and the second volume of Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (1903)—G. Cantor, L. E. (...)
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  • Frege’s Begriffsschrift as a Lingua Characteristica.Tapio Korte - 2010 - Synthese 174 (2):283-294.
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