The mechanical view on the human body may be considered as the context in which the highly technological medicine of these days originated. Organ transplantation is certainly one of the most impressive possibilities of this new evolution in medical technology. It exists by the grace of the paradigm of the body as a “Körper” : this paradigm leads to a self-evident acceptance of transplantation medicine in its most brilliant applications. Refinement of surgical techniques, better preservation of organs, the development of (...) more effective immunosuppressives, better procedures for the establishment of brain death criteria and better criteria for the selection and matching of donors and receptors are immanent goals of this type of medicine. Meanwhile the lives of many thousands of patients are saved and these patients even receive the chance for a new life, with much more quality. The ethical reflection on organ transplantation has followed rather rapidly this technical discourse and sounds as a kind of “moral engineering”. This is certainly connected with the upcoming success of “Principlism” , whereby medical decision making is oriented by applying four major principles to medical cases . It is also connected with the ethical approach of utilitarianism, which fits almost perfectly in this technological atmosphere. The authors question this approach and suggest that a more relational understanding of the human body as “Leib” would be a better paradigm for the promotion of solidarity in the context of organ donation and transplantation. Human beings do not only ‘have’ a body, but ‘are’ also their body. The body of the deceased refers to the life of a loved one. Technical procedures surrounding organ removals sometimes hinder the possibility for the family to bereave adequately around their loved one. The authors are convinced that the urging problem of organ shortage is not only caused by lack of solidarity or laziness, but also by the reductionist discourse of transplantation medicine itself. They suggest that we have to find – eventually with the help of poets and writers – an adequate new language to replace the alienating discourse of current transplantation medicine. They see also in communitarianism and personalist care ethics a better ethical approach for touching the peculiar sensitivities of eventual donors and receptors. (shrink)

This paper situates the public debate over the use of living animal organs and tissue for human therapies within the history of experimental islet transplantation. Specifically, the paper compares and contrasts the Canadian and Australian responses on xenotransplantation to consider what lessons can be learnt about the regulation of a complex and controversial biotechnology. Sobbrio and Jorqui described public engagement on xenotransplantation in these countries as ‘important forms of experimental democracy.’ While Canada experimented with a novel nation-wide public consultation, Australia (...) sought public input within the context of a national inquiry. In both instances, the outcome was a temporary moratorium on all forms of clinical xenotransplantation comparable to the policies adopted in some European countries. In addition, the Australian xenotransplantation ban coincided with a temporary global ban on experimental islet allotransplantation in 2007. Through historical and comparative research, this paper investigates how public controversies over organ and tissue transplantation can inform our understanding of the mediation of interspeciality and the regulation of a highly contested technoscience. It offers an alternative perspective on the xenotransplantation controversy by exploring the ways in which coinciding moratoriums on islet allograft and xenograft challenge, complicate and confound our assumptions regarding the relationships between human and animal, between routine surgery and clinical experimentation, between biomedical science and social science, and between disease risks and material contagion. (shrink)

Humanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces warfare; humanity installs each of its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination. (Foucault, 1984, 85)In this essay, I take a note from Michel Foucault regarding the notion of biopolitics. For Foucault, biopolitics has both repressive and constitutive properties. Foucault's claim is that with the rise of modern government, the state became exceedingly (...) concerned about the body politic, the bodies that make up the polis, including the health of those bodies. However, Giorgio Agamben claims that Foucault and all western political philosophy misses the relationship between power and Sovereignty, with disastrous results and totalizing tendencies. I explore the case of Terri Schiavo claiming that the social conservatives have attempted to politicize bare life in its legal maneuverings, but I also show how the social liberals open an uncontrollable space between life and death. Both the left and the right miss the aporia at the heart of western political philosophy, and bioethics is complicit in the totalizing effects of contemporary medicine. (shrink)