Switch to: References

Citations of:

A Materialist Theory of the Mind

Routledge (1968)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Intentionality, Mind and Folk Psychology.Winand H. Dittrich & Stephen E. G. Lea - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):39-41.
    The comment addresses central issues of a "theory theory" approach as exemplified in Gopnik' and Goldman's BBS-articles. Gopnik, on the one hand, tries to demonstrate that empirical evidence from developmental psychology supports the view of a "theory theory" in which common sense beliefs are constructed to explain ourselves and others. Focusing the informational processing routes possibly involved we would like to argue that his main thesis (e.g. idea of intentionality as a cognitive construct) lacks support at least for two reasons: (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Theories of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (1):58-64.
    Phenomenal consciousness is the property mental states, events, and processes have when, and only when, there is something it is like for their subject to undergo them, or be in them. What it is like to have a conscious experience is customarily referred to as the experience’s phenomenal character. Theories of consciousness attempt to account for this phenomenal character. This article surveys the currently prominent theories, paying special attention to the various attempts to explain a state’s phenomenal character in terms (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Wittgenstein and Qualia.Ned Block - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):73-115.
    endorsed one kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis and rejected another. This paper argues that the kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis that Wittgenstein endorsed is the thin end of the wedge that precludes a Wittgensteinian critique of the kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis he rejected. The danger of the dangerous kind is that it provides an argument for qualia, where qualia are contents of experiential states which cannot be fully captured in natural language. I will pinpoint the difference between the innocuous (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Materialism, Functionalism, and Supervenient Qualia.Ausonio Marras - 1993 - Dialogue 32 (3):475-92.
    Qualia are phenomenal properties of sensations and perceptual states: they are whatever it is that gives such states their “felt,” qualitative character. (In speaking of sensations, I speak of course not of mental objects or mental contents, but of mental events—of sensings, not sensa.).
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Escape From the Cartesian Theater.Daniel C. Dennett & Marcel Kinsbourne - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):234-247.
  • Closing the Cartesian Theatre.Andy Young - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):233-233.
  • The Psychoanatomy of Consciousness: Neural Integration Occurs in Single Cells.Gerald S. Wasserman - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):232-233.
  • Global Pattern Perception and Temporal Order Judgments.Richard M. Warren - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):230-231.
  • Is Consciousness Integrated?Max Velmans - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):229-230.
    In the visual system, the represented features of individual objects (shape, colour, movement, and so on) are distributed both in space and time within the brain. Representations of inner and outer event sequences arrive through different sense organs at different times, and are likewise distributed. Objects are nevertheless perceived as integrated wholes - and event sequences are experienced to form a coherent "consciousness stream." In their thoughtful article, Dennett & Kinsbourne ask how this is achieved.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Time for More Alternatives.Robert Van Gulick - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):228-229.
  • In Defense Off the Pineal Gland.Robert Teghtsoonian - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):224-225.
  • Does the Perception of Temporal Sequence Throw Light on Consciousness?Michel Treisman - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):225-228.
  • Mental Representation: Always Delayed but Not Always Ephemeral.Roger N. Shepard - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):223-224.
  • Cinema 1-2-Many of the Mind.Adina L. Roskies & C. C. Wood - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):221-223.
  • Time and Consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):220-221.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Content and Conformation: Isomorphism in the Neural Sway.Mark Rollins - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):219-220.
  • Conscious Versus Unconscious Processes: Are They Qualitatively Different?Eyal M. Reingold - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):218-219.
  • Little “Me”.Drew McDermott - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):217-218.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Toward an Identity Theory of Consciousness.Dan Lloyd - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):215-216.
  • UnCartesian Materialism and Lockean Introspection.William G. Lycan - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):216-217.
  • Models of Conscious Timing and the Experimental Evidence.Benjamin Libet - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):213-215.
  • The Where in the Brain Determines the When in the Mind.M. Jeannerod - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):212-213.
  • Some Mistakes About Consciousness and Their Motivation.S. L. Hurley - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):211-212.
  • Nothing is Instantaneous, Even in Sensation.Robert A. M. Gregson - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):210-211.
  • The Distributed Pineal Gland.Martha J. Farah - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):209-209.
  • The Cartesian Theater Stance.Bruce Glymour, Rick Grush, Valerie Gray Hardcastle, Brian Keeley, Joe Ramsey, Oron Shagrir & Ellen Watson - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):209-210.
  • The Selfless Consciousness.Antonio R. Damasio - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):208-209.
  • Experiential Facts?Andy Clark - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):207-208.
  • What is Consciousness for, Anyway?Bruce Bridgeman - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):206-207.
  • Begging the Question Against Phenomenal Consciousness.Ned Block - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):205-206.
  • Consciousness is Associated with Central as Well as Distributed Processes.Bernard J. Baars & Michael Fehling - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):203-204.
  • Throwing the Conscious Baby Out with the Cartesian Bath Water.J. Aronson, E. Dietrich & E. Way - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):202-203.
  • The Where and When of What?Michael V. Antony - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):201-202.
  • Time and the Observer: The Where and When of Consciousness in the Brain.Daniel C. Dennett & Marcel Kinsbourne - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):183-201.
    _Behavioral and Brain Sciences_ , 15, 183-247, 1992. Reprinted in _The Philosopher's Annual_ , Grim, Mar and Williams, eds., vol. XV-1992, 1994, pp. 23-68; Noel Sheehy and Tony Chapman, eds., _Cognitive Science_ , Vol. I, Elgar, 1995, pp.210-274.
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   248 citations  
  • The Mental Lives of Zombies.Declan Smithies - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):343-372.
    Could there be a cognitive zombie – that is, a creature with the capacity for cognition, but no capacity for consciousness? Searle argues that there cannot be a cognitive zombie because there cannot be an intentional zombie: on this view, there is a connection between consciousness and cognition that is derived from a more fundamental connection between consciousness and intentionality. However, I argue that there are good empirical reasons for rejecting the proposed connection between consciousness and intentionality. Instead, I argue (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • A Defense of the Knowledge Argument.John Martin DePoe - unknown
    Defenders of the Knowledge Argument contend that physicalism is false because knowing all the physical truths is not sufficient to know all the truths about the world. In particular, proponents of the Knowledge Argument claim that physicalism is false because the truths about the character of conscious experience are not knowable from the complete set of physical truths. This dissertation is a defense of the Knowledge Argument. Chapter one characterizes what physicalism is and provides support for the claim that if (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Distracted Drivers and Unattended Experience.Wayne Wright - 2005 - Synthese 144 (1):41-68.
    Consider the much-discussed case of the distracted driver, who is alleged to successfully navigate his car for miles despite being completely oblivious to his visual states. Perhaps he is deeply engrossed in the music playing over the radio or in philosophical reflection, and as a result he goes about unaware of the scene unfolding before him on the road. That the distracted driver has visual experiences of which he is not aware is a possibility that first-order representationalists happily accept, but (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Davidson on First‐Person Authority and Externalism.Sven Bernecker - 1996 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):121-139.
    Incompatibilism is the view that privileged knowledge of our own mental states cannot be reconciled with externalism regarding the content of mental states. Davidson has recently developed two arguments that are supposed to disprove incompatibilism and establish the consistency of privileged access and externalism. One argument criticizes incompatibilism for assuming that externalism conflicts with the mind?body identity theory. Since mental states supervene on neurological events, Davidson argues, they are partly ?in the head? and are knowable just by reflection. Another argument (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Sense Experiences and Their Contents: A Defense of the Propositional Account.Michael Pendlebury - 1990 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):215-30.
    A number of philosophers are committed to the view that sense experiences, in so far as they have contents, have propositional contents, but this is more often tacitly accepted than argued for in the literature. This paper explains the propositional account and presents a basic case in support of it in a simple and straightforward way which does not involve commitment to any specific philosophical theory of perception.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • How Many Concepts of Consciousness?Ned Block - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):272-287.
  • Feeling of Knowing and Phenomenal Consciousness.Tiziana Zalla & Adriano P. Palma - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):271-272.
  • More on Prosopagnosia.Andrew W. Young - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):271-271.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Should We Continue to Study Consciousness?Richard M. Warren - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):270-271.
  • Consciousness is Not a Natural Kind.J. van Brakel - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):269-270.
  • Blindsight, Orgasm, and Representational Overlap.Michael Tye - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):268-269.
  • What is an Agent That It Experiences P-Consciousness? And What is P-Consciousness That It Moves an Agent?Roger N. Shepard - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):267-268.
  • Block's Philosophical Anosognosia.G. Rey - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):266-267.
  • Conscious and Nonconscious Control of Action.Antti Revonsuo - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):265-266.
  • How Access-Consciousness Might Be a Kind of Consiousness.Thomas Natsoulas - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):264-265.