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  1. Inquiries Into Cognition: L. Wittgenstein’s Language-Games and C. S. Peirce’s Semeiosis for the Philosophy of Cognition.Andrey Pukhaev - 2013 - Dissertation, Gregorian University
    SUMMARY Major theories of philosophical psychology and philosophy of mind are examined on the basis of the fundamental questions of ontology, metaphysics, epistemology, semantics and logic. The result is the choice between language of eliminative reductionism and dualism, neither of which answers properly the relation between mind and body. In the search for a non–dualistic and non–reductive language, Wittgenstein’s notion of language–games as the representative links between language and the world is considered together with Peirce’s semeiosis of cognition. The result (...)
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  • A Posteriori Physicalism and Introspection.Andreas Elpidorou - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):474-500.
    Introspection presents our phenomenal states in a manner otherwise than physical. This observation is often thought to amount to an argument against physicalism: if introspection presents phenomenal states as they essentially are, then phenomenal states cannot be physical states, for we are not introspectively aware of phenomenal states as physical states. In this article, I examine whether this argument threatens a posteriori physicalism. I argue that as along as proponents of a posteriori physicalism maintain that phenomenal concepts present the nature (...)
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  • Decentering Anthropocentrisms: A Functional Approach to Animal Minds.Matthew C. Altman - 2015 - Between the Species 18 (1).
    Anthropocentric biases manifest themselves in two different ways in research on animal cognition. Some researchers claim that only humans have the capacity for reasoning, beliefs, and interests; and others attribute mental concepts to nonhuman animals on the basis of behavioral evidence, and they conceive of animal cognition in more or less human terms. Both approaches overlook the fact that language-use deeply informs mental states, such that comparing human mental states to the mental states of nonlinguistic animals is misguided. In order (...)
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  • Three Philosophical Problems About Consciousness and Their Possible Resolution.Nicholas Maxwell - 2011 - Open Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):1.
    Three big philosophical problems about consciousness are: Why does it exist? How do we explain and understand it? How can we explain brain-consciousness correlations? If functionalism were true, all three problems would be solved. But it is false, and that means all three problems remain unsolved (in that there is no other obvious candidate for a solution). Here, it is argued that the first problem cannot have a solution; this is inherent in the nature of explanation. The second problem is (...)
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  • Complexities in the First-Person Perspective. Review of Self-Awareness and Alterity by Dan Zahavi.Shaun Gallagher - 2002 - Research in Phenomenology 32 (1):238-248.
  • Needs, Desires and Moral Turpitude.Richard Wollheim - 1974 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 8:162-179.
    Need and Desire have obvious affinities. In this lecture I shall consider how they are to be distinguished, and how they may be confused: distinguished, that is, within philosophy, and confused in life itself. I shall then consider, very briefly, how this possibility of confusion bears upon morality and moral assessment.
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  • Zombies, Epiphenomenalism, and Physicalist Theories of Consciousness.Andrew Bailey - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):481-509.
    The University of Guelph, Guelph, ON N1G 2W1, CANADA.
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  • Dualism and Secondary Quality Eliminativism: Putting a New Spin on the Knowledge Argument.Emmett L. Holman - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (2):229-256.
    Frank Jackson formulated his knowledge argument as an argument for dualism. In this paper I show how the argument can be modified to also establish the irreducibility of the secondary qualities to the properties of physical theory, and ultimately "secondary quality eliminativism"-the view that the secondary qualities are physically uninstantiated. In addition to being of interest in its own right, this new argument provides a perspective to better see that certain popular would-be refutations of the knowledge argument do not work. (...)
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  • The Transparency of Experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):376-425.
    A common objection to sense-datum theories of perception is that they cannot give an adequate account of the fact that introspection indicates that our sensory experiences are directed on, or are about, the mind-independent entities in the world around us, that our sense experience is transparent to the world. In this paper I point out that the main force of this claim is to point out an explanatory challenge to sense-datum theories.
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  • Occurrent States.Gary Bartlett - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (1):1-17.
    The distinction between occurrent and non-occurrent mental states is frequently appealed to by contemporary philosophers, but it has never been explicated in any significant detail. In the literature, two accounts of the distinction are commonly presupposed. One is that occurrent states are conscious states. The other is that non-occurrent states are dispositional states, and thus that occurrent states are manifestations of dispositions. I argue that neither of these accounts is adequate, and therefore that another account is needed. I propose that (...)
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  • Philosophical Issues About Consciousness.Ned Block - 2003 - In L. Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group.
    There are a number of different matters that come under the heading of ‘consciousness’. One of them is phenomenality, the feeling of say a sensation of red or a pain, that is what it is like to have such a sensation or other experience. Another is reflection on phenomenality. Imagine two infants, both of which have pain, but only one of which has a thought about that pain. Both would have phenomenal states, but only the latter would have a state (...)
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  • Homonymous Mistakes with Ontological Aspirations: The Persisting Problem with the Word 'Consciousness'.Rodrigo Becerra - 2004 - Sorites 15 (December):11-23.
    In order to understand consciousness one would benefit from developing a more eclectic intellectual style. Consciousness is, as proposed by almost everyone except the stubborn reductionists, a truly mysterious concept. Its study and dissection merits a multidisciplinary approach. Waving this multidisciplinary flag has positively enlarged the discussion and neurologists, psychiatrists, mathematicians, and so on, have moved to the philosophy of mind arena, first with caution and now with a more powerful voice. Identifying what we mean by consciousness is a first (...)
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  • Two Russellian Arguments for Acquaintance.Matt Duncan - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):461-474.
    Bertrand Russell [1912] argued that we are acquainted with our experiences. Although this conclusion has generated a lot of discussion, very little has been said about Russell's actual arguments for it. This paper aims to remedy that. I start by spelling out two Russellian arguments for acquaintance. Then I show that these arguments cannot both succeed. For if one is sound, the other isn't. Finally, I weigh our options with respect to these arguments, and defend one option in particular. I (...)
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  • Anscombe, Sensation and Intentional Objects.Douglas Odegard - 1972 - Dialogue 11 (1):69-77.
  • Moral Motivation, Moral Phenomenology, And The Alief/Belief Distinction.Uriah Kriegel - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):469-486.
    In a series of publications, Tamar Gendler has argued for a distinction between belief and what she calls ?alief?. Gendler's argument for the distinction is a serviceability argument: the distinction is indispensable for explaining a whole slew of phenomena, typically involving ?belief-behaviour mismatch?. After embedding Gendler's distinction in a dual-process model of moral cognition, I argue here that the distinction also suggests a possible (dis)solution of what is perhaps the organizing problem of contemporary moral psychology: the apparent tension between the (...)
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  • On the Structural Properties of the Colours.Jonathan Cohen - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):78-95.
    Primary quality theories of color claim that colors are intrinsic, objective, mind-independent properties of external objects — that colors, like size and shape, are examples of the sort of properties moderns such as Boyle and Locke called primary qualities of body.1 Primary quality theories have long been seen as one of the main philosophical options for understanding the nature of color.
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  • Quantum Indeterminacy and Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument.Dale Jacquette - 1999 - Philosophical Explorations 2 (2):79 – 95.
    The demand for 'criteria of correctness' to identify recurring particulars in Wittgenstein's private language argument favors an idealist interpretation of quantum phenomena.The indeterminacy principle in quantum physics and the logic of the private language argument share a common concern with the limitations by which microphysical or sensation particulars can be reidentified. Wittgenstein's criteria for reidentifying particular recurrent private sensations are so general as to apply with equal force to quantum particulars, and to support the idealist thesis that quantum phenomena are (...)
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  • Mind and Body in Aristotle.H. M. Robinson - 1978 - Classical Quarterly 28 (1):105-124.
    In this paper I hope to show that a particular modern approach to Aristotle's philosophy of mind is untenable and, out of that negative discussion, develop some tentative suggestions concerning the interpretation of two famous and puzzling Aristotelian maxims. These maxims are, first, that the soul is the form of the body and, second, that perception is the reception of form without matter. The fashionable interpretation of Aristotle which I wish to criticize is the attempt to assimilate him to certain (...)
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  • World Graphs: A Partial Model of Spatial Behavior.Israel Lieblich & Michael A. Arbib - 1982 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (4):651-659.
  • Looking for Nodes and Edges.Arnold Trehub - 1982 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (4):650-651.
  • A Trace of Memory.D. Nico Spinelli - 1982 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (4):650-650.
  • Ecologizing World Graphs.Robert E. Shaw & Ennio Mingolla - 1982 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (4):648-650.
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  • A Maze in Graphs.Christopher K. Riesbeck - 1982 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (4):648-648.
  • What Spaces? What Subjects?Jean Pailhous & Patrick Peruch - 1982 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (4):646-647.
  • The Special Nature of Spatial Information.Michael Potegal - 1982 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (4):647-648.
  • Computational Hullianism.John W. Moore - 1982 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (4):646-646.
  • The Cognitive Map Must Be a Separate Module.Benjamin Kuipers - 1982 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (4):645-646.
  • Exploratory Behavior Without Novelty Drive?Arthur I. Karshmer, Derek Partridge & Victor Johnson - 1982 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (4):644-645.
  • Lost in Chelm: Maladaptive Behavior in an Adaptive Model.Stephen Kaplan - 1982 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (4):643-644.
  • Human Spatial Learning.Kristina Hooper - 1982 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (4):642-643.
  • Standards for Neural Modeling.Jerome A. Feldman & David Zipser - 1982 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (4):642-642.
  • Maps, Space, and Places.Roger M. Downs - 1982 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (4):641-642.
  • Representations of the Environment, Multiple Brain Maps, and Control Systems.Charles M. Butter - 1982 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (4):640-641.
  • Multiple Representations of Space Underlying Behavior.Israel Lieblich & Michael A. Arbib - 1982 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (4):627-640.
  • The Structure of Experience, the Nature of the Visual, and Type 2 Blindsight‌.Fiona Macpherson - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 32:104 - 128.
    Unlike those with type 1 blindsight, people who have type 2 blindsight have some sort of consciousness of the stimuli in their blind field. What is the nature of that consciousness? Is it visual experience? I address these questions by considering whether we can establish the existence of any structural—necessary—features of visual experience. I argue that it is very difficult to establish the existence of any such features. In particular, I investigate whether it is possible to visually, or more generally (...)
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  • A New Defense of Trope Content View of Experience.Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1757-1768.
    The idea that what we perceive are tropes is anything but new. In fact, it was one of the reasons why the ontology of tropes was postulated in the first place. Still, the claim that we perceive tropes is invariably and purely based on pre-philosophical intuitions or, indirectly, either as a supporting argument for the advantages of content view when compared to the relational view of experience, or as a supporting argument in favor of the irreducible subjective character of experience. (...)
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  • Meanings Attributed to the Term Consciousness: An Overview.Ram Vimal - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (5):9-27.
    I here describe meanings attributed to the term consciousness, extracted from the literature and from recent online discussions. Forty such meanings were identified and categorized according to whether they were principally about function or about experience; some overlapped but others were apparently mutually exclusive - and this list is by no means exhaustive. Most can be regarded as expressions of authors' views about the basis of con-sciousness, or opinions about the significance of aspects of its con-tents. The prospects for reaching (...)
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  • Consciousness: Phenomenal Consciousness, Access Consciousness, and Scientific Practice.Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - In Paul R. Thagard (ed.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science. Elsevier.
    Key Terms: Phenomenal consciousness, access consciousness, qualitative character, subjective character, intransitive self-consciousness, disposition, categorical basis, subliminal perception, blindsight.
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  • Theories of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (1):58-64.
    Phenomenal consciousness is the property mental states, events, and processes have when, and only when, there is something it is like for their subject to undergo them, or be in them. What it is like to have a conscious experience is customarily referred to as the experience’s phenomenal character. Theories of consciousness attempt to account for this phenomenal character. This article surveys the currently prominent theories, paying special attention to the various attempts to explain a state’s phenomenal character in terms (...)
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  • Locke on Consciousness.Angela Coventry & Uriah Kriegel - 2008 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 25 (3):221-242.
    Locke’s theory of consciousness is often appropriated as a forerunner of present-day Higher-Order Perception (HOP) theories, but not much is said about it beyond that. We offer an interpretation of Locke’s account of consciousness that portrays it as crucially different from current-day HOP theory, both in detail and in spirit. In this paper, it is argued that there are good historical and philosophical reasons to attribute to Locke the view not that conscious states are accompanied by higher-order perceptions, but rather (...)
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  • Agency as Difference-Making: Causal Foundations of Moral Responsibility.Johannes Himmelreich - 2015 - Dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Science
    We are responsible for some things but not for others. In this thesis, I investigate what it takes for an entity to be responsible for something. This question has two components: agents and actions. I argue for a permissive view about agents. Entities such as groups or artificially intelligent systems may be agents in the sense required for responsibility. With respect to actions, I argue for a causal view. The relation in virtue of which agents are responsible for actions is (...)
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  • Is Feeling Pain the Perception of Something?Murat Aydede - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (10):531-567.
    According to the increasingly popular perceptual/representational accounts of pain (and other bodily sensations such as itches, tickles, orgasms, etc.), feeling pain in a body region is perceiving a non-mental property or some objective condition of that region, typically equated with some sort of (actual or potential) tissue damage. In what follows I argue that given a natural understanding of what sensory perception requires and how it is integrated with (dedicated) conceptual systems, these accounts are mistaken. I will also examine the (...)
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  • Another Look at Color Primitivism.Pendaran Roberts - forthcoming - Synthese.
    This article is on a precise kind of color primitivism,‘ ostensivism.’ This is the view that it is in the nature of the colors that they are phenomenal, non-reductive, structural, categorical properties. First, I differentiate ostensivism from other precise forms of primitivism. Next, I examine the core belief ‘Revelation,’ and propose a revised version, which, unlike standard statements, is compatible with a yet unstated but plausible core belief: roughly, that there are interesting things to be discovered about the nature of (...)
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  • Self-Awareness: Issues in Classical Indian and Contemporary Western Philosophy.Matthew D. Mackenzie - 2004 - Dissertation, University of Hawai'i
    In this dissertation I critically engage and draw insights from classical Indian, Anglo-American, phenomenological, and cognitive scientific approaches to the topic of self-awareness. In particular, I argue that in both the Western and the Indian tradition a common and influential view of self-awareness---that self-awareness is the product of an act of introspection in which consciousness takes itself as an object---distorts our understanding of both self-awareness and consciousness as such. In contrast, I argue for the existence and primacy of pre-reflective self-awareness (...)
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  • The Mind-Body Problem in the Origin of Logical Empiricism: Herbert Feigl and Psychophysical Parallelism.Michael Heidelberger - 2001 - In Paolo Parrini, Wes Salmon & Merrilee Salmon (eds.), Cogprints. Pittsburgh University Pres. pp. 233--262.
    In the 19th century, "Psychophysical Parallelism" was the most popular solution of the mind-body problem among physiologists, psychologists and philosophers. (This is not to be mixed up with Leibnizian and other cases of "Cartesian" parallelism.) The fate of this non-Cartesian view, as founded by Gustav Theodor Fechner, is reviewed. It is shown that Feigl's "identity theory" eventually goes back to Alois Riehl who promoted a hybrid version of psychophysical parallelism and Kantian mind-body theory which was taken up by Feigl's teacher (...)
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  • Token-Distinctness and the Disjunctive Strategy.Ranpal Dosanjh - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-18.
    According to the Multiple Realizability Argument, a higher-level property typically has many physical realizers, so it cannot be type-identical to any one of them. This enables the non-reductive physicalist to claim that some higher-level properties are type-distinct from physical properties. The reductive physicalist can counter with the Disjunctive Strategy: nothing prevents us from type-identifying the higher-level property with the disjunction of its realizers. Developing a powers-based ontology of properties, Shoemaker and Wilson present responses to the Disjunctive Strategy, wherein higher-level property (...)
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  • How to Analyze Consciousness in Terms of Meta-Belief and Temporal Awareness.Christian Beyer - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
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  • The Epistemic Status of Reflective Beliefs.Tomoji Shogenji - manuscript
    This paper examines the epistemic status of the reflective belief about the content of one’s own conscious mental state, with emphasis on perceptual experience. I propose that the process that gives a special epistemic status to a reflective belief is not observation, inference, or conceptual articulation, but semantic ascent similar to the transition from a sentence in the object language to a sentence in the meta-language that affirms the truth of the original sentence. This account of the process of reflection (...)
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  • Contemporary Problems in the Philosophy of Perception.Austen Clark - 1994 - American Journal of Psychology 107 (4):613-22.
    Imagine, if you will, that the entire community of investigators interested in the problems of perception all lived together in the same town. Some continual shuffling of neighbors would be inevitable, and there might be occasional episodes of mass relocation and energetic bulldozing, but after a while the residents would probably settle down and find themselves living in districts defined roughly by disciplinary boundaries. The experimental psychologists would occupy the newer part of town, laced with superhighways, workshops and factories, machines (...)
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  • XV—Intelligent Capacities.Victoria McGeer - forthcoming - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.
    In The Concept of Mind, Gilbert Ryle argued that a more sophisticated understanding of the dispositional nature of ‘intelligent capacities’ could bolster philosophical resistance to the tempting view that the human mind is possessed of metaphysically ‘occult’ powers and properties. This temptation is powerful in the context of accounting for the special qualities of responsible agency. Incompatibilists indulge the temptation; compatibilists resist it, using a variety of strategies. One recent strategy, reminiscent of Ryle’s, is to exploit a more sophisticated understanding (...)
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