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  1. A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness.J. Kevin O'Regan & Alva Noë - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):883-917.
    Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of (...)
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  • Reviews. [REVIEW]Adam Morton - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (3):341-344.
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  • Locating and Representing Pain.Simone Gozzano - forthcoming - Philosophical Investigations.
    Two views on the nature and location of pain are usually contrasted. According to the first, experientialism, pain is essentially an experience, and its bodily location is illusory. According to the second, perceptualism or representationalism, pain is a perceptual or representational state, and its location is to be traced to the part of the body in which pain is felt. Against this second view, the cases of phantom, referred and chronic pain have been marshalled: all these cases apparently show that (...)
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  • How Many Concepts of Consciousness?Ned Block - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):272-287.
  • Feeling of Knowing and Phenomenal Consciousness.Tiziana Zalla & Adriano P. Palma - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):271-272.
  • More on Prosopagnosia.Andrew W. Young - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):271-271.
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  • Should We Continue to Study Consciousness?Richard M. Warren - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):270-271.
  • Consciousness is Not a Natural Kind.J. van Brakel - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):269-270.
  • Blindsight, Orgasm, and Representational Overlap.Michael Tye - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):268-269.
  • What is an Agent That It Experiences P-Consciousness? And What is P-Consciousness That It Moves an Agent?Roger N. Shepard - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):267-268.
  • Block's Philosophical Anosognosia.G. Rey - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):266-267.
  • Conscious and Nonconscious Control of Action.Antti Revonsuo - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):265-266.
  • How Access-Consciousness Might Be a Kind of Consiousness.Thomas Natsoulas - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):264-265.
  • Phenomenal and Attentional Consciousness May Be Inextricable.Adam Morton - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):263-264.
  • We've Only Just Begun.William G. Lycan - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):262-263.
  • Phenomenal Access: A Moving Target.Joseph Levine - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):261-261.
  • Access Denied.Dan Lloyd - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):261-262.
  • Access and What It is Like.Bernard W. Kobes - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):260-260.
  • Triangulating Phenomenal Consciousness.Patricia Kitcher - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):259-260.
  • On Distinguishing Phenomenal Consciousness From the Representational Functions of Mind.Leonard D. Katz - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):258-259.
  • Blocking Out the Distinction Between Sensation and Perception: Superblindsight and the Case of Helen.Nicholas Humphrey - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):257-258.
  • Phenomenal Fallacies and Conflations.Gilbert Harman - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):256-257.
  • Guilty Consciousness.George Graham - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):255-256.
  • Is Consciousness of Perception Really Separable From Perception?Martha J. Farah - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):254-255.
  • Breakthrough on the Consciousness Front or Much Ado About Nothing?N. F. Dixon - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):253-254.
  • The Path Not Taken.Daniel Dennett - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):252-253.
    The differences Block attempts to capture with his putative distinction between P-consciousness and A-consciousness are more directly and perspicuously handled in terms of differences in richness of content and degree of influence. Block's critiques, based on his misbegotten distinction, evaporate on closer inspection.
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  • Fallacies or Analyses?Jennifer Church - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):251--2.
    To demonstrate that a fallacy is committed, Block needs to convince us of two things: first, that the concept of phenomenal consciousness is distinct from that of access consciousness, and second, that it picks out a different property from that of access consciousness. I raise doubt about both of these claims, suggesting that the concept of a phenomenal property is the concept of a property to which we have a special sort of access.
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  • More Empirical Cases to Break the Accord of Phenomenal and Access-Consciousness.Talis Bachmann - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):249-251.
  • Evidence That Phenomenal Consciousness is the Same as Access Consciousness.Bernard J. Baars - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):249-249.
  • Consciousness Without Conflation.Anthony P. Atkinson & Martin Davies - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):248-249.
    Although information-processing theories cannot provide a full explanatory account of P-consciousness, there is less conflation and confusion in cognitive psychology than Block suspects. Some of the reasoning that Block criticises can be interpreted plausibly in the light of a folk psychological view of the relation between P-consciousness and A-consciousness.
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  • Perception-Consciousness and Action-Consciousness?D. M. Armstrong - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):247-248.
  • Observações sobre o Behaviorismo Teleológico: Parte I.F. Lazzeri - 2013 - Acta Comportamentalia 21 (2).
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  • Causality.Jessica M. Wilson - 2006 - In Jessica Pfeifer & Sahotra Sarkar (eds.), The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia. Routledge. pp. 90--100.
    Arguably no concept is more fundamental to science than that of causality, for investigations into cases of existence, persistence, and change in the natural world are largely investigations into the causes of these phenomena. Yet the metaphysics and epistemology of causality remain unclear. For example, the ontological categories of the causal relata have been taken to be objects (Hume 1739), events (Davidson 1967), properties (Armstrong 1978), processes (Salmon 1984), variables (Hitchcock 1993), and facts (Mellor 1995). (For convenience, causes and effects (...)
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  • The Mind-Body Problem and Quine's Repudiation Theory.Nathan Stemmer - 2001 - Behavior and Philosophy 29:187-202.
    Most scholars who presently deal with the Mind-Body problem consider themselves monist materialists. Nevertheless, many of them also assume that there exist (in some sense of existence) mental entities. But since these two positions do not harmonize quite well, the literature is full of discussions about how to reconcile the positions. In this paper, I will defend a materialist theory that avoids all these problems by completely rejecting the existence of mental entities. This is Quine's repudiation theory. According to the (...)
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  • Folk Psychology Is Not a Metarepresentational Device.Tamás Demeter - 2009 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 5 (2):19-38.
    Here I challenge the philosophical consensus that we use folk psychology for the purposes of metarepresentation. The paper intends to show that folk psychology should not be conceived on par with fact-stating discourses in spite of what its surface semantics may suggest. I argue that folk-psychological discourse is organised in a way and has conceptual characteristics such that it cannot fulfill a fact-stating function. To support this claim I develop an open question argument for psychological interpretations, and I draw attention (...)
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  • Keeping It Real: Intentional Inexistents, Fineness‐of‐Grain, and the Dilemma for Extrinsic Higher‐Order Representational Theories.Vincent Picciuto - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (4):555-575.
    According to the standard argument from targetless higher-order representations, the possibility of such representations presents a dilemma for higher-order theorists. In this article I argue that there are two theoretically well-motivated replies to the standard argument. Consequently, the standard argument against higher-order theories fails. I then go on to argue that while certain versions of higher-order theory can adequately respond to the standard argument, they both, nevertheless, fail to explain the fineness-of-grain that phenomenally conscious experience appears to have.
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  • Against the Complex Versus Simple Distinction.Patrik Hummel - 2016 - Erkenntnis:1-16.
    This paper examines three proposals on the difference between the complex and the simple view about personal identity: Parfit’s original introduction of the distinction, Gasser and Stefan’s definition, and Noonan’s recent proposal. I argue that the first two classify the paradigm cases of simplicity as complex, while Noonan’s proposal makes simplicity and complexity turn on features whose relevance for the distinction is questionable. Given these difficulties, I examine why we should be interested in whether a position is complex or simple. (...)
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  • Introspection and Necessity.Daniel Stoljar - 2018 - Noûs 52 (2):389-410.
    What is the connection between being in a conscious mental state and believing that you yourself are currently in that state? On the one hand, it is natural to think that this connection is, or involves, a necessary connection of some sort. On the other hand, it is hard to know what the nature of this necessary connection is. For there are plausible arguments according to which this connection is not metaphysically necessary, not rationally necessary, and not merely naturally necessary. (...)
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  • The Sense of Temporal Flow: A Higher-Order Account.Thomas Sattig - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
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