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The nature of mind

In Clive V. Borst (ed.), The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. Macmillan (1970)

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  1. Quantum Mechanics and the Plight of Physicalism.Fernando Birman - 2009 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 40 (2):207-225.
    The literature on physicalism often fails to elucidate, I think, what the word physical in physical ism precisely means. Philosophers speak at times of an ideal set of fundamental physical facts, or they stipulate that physical means non-mental , such that all fundamental physical facts are fundamental facts pertaining to the non-mental. In this article, I will probe physicalism in the very much tangible framework of quantum mechanics. Although this theory, unlike “ideal physics” or some “final theory of non-mentality”, is (...)
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  • How Many Concepts of Consciousness?Ned Block - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):272-287.
  • Feeling of Knowing and Phenomenal Consciousness.Tiziana Zalla & Adriano P. Palma - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):271-272.
  • More on Prosopagnosia.Andrew W. Young - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):271-271.
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  • Should We Continue to Study Consciousness?Richard M. Warren - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):270-271.
  • Consciousness is Not a Natural Kind.J. van Brakel - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):269-270.
  • Blindsight, Orgasm, and Representational Overlap.Michael Tye - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):268-269.
  • What is an Agent That It Experiences P-Consciousness? And What is P-Consciousness That It Moves an Agent?Roger N. Shepard - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):267-268.
  • Block's Philosophical Anosognosia.G. Rey - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):266-267.
  • Conscious and Nonconscious Control of Action.Antti Revonsuo - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):265-266.
  • How Access-Consciousness Might Be a Kind of Consiousness.Thomas Natsoulas - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):264-265.
  • Phenomenal and Attentional Consciousness May Be Inextricable.Adam Morton - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):263-264.
  • We've Only Just Begun.William G. Lycan - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):262-263.
  • Access Denied.Dan Lloyd - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):261-262.
  • Phenomenal Access: A Moving Target.Joseph Levine - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):261-261.
  • Access and What It is Like.Bernard W. Kobes - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):260-260.
  • Triangulating Phenomenal Consciousness.Patricia Kitcher - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):259-260.
  • On Distinguishing Phenomenal Consciousness From the Representational Functions of Mind.Leonard D. Katz - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):258-259.
  • Blocking Out the Distinction Between Sensation and Perception: Superblindsight and the Case of Helen.Nicholas Humphrey - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):257-258.
  • Phenomenal Fallacies and Conflations.Gilbert Harman - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):256-257.
  • Guilty Consciousness.George Graham - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):255-256.
  • Is Consciousness of Perception Really Separable From Perception?Martha J. Farah - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):254-255.
  • Breakthrough on the Consciousness Front or Much Ado About Nothing?N. F. Dixon - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):253-254.
  • The Path Not Taken.Daniel Dennett - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):252-253.
    The differences Block attempts to capture with his putative distinction between P-consciousness and A-consciousness are more directly and perspicuously handled in terms of differences in richness of content and degree of influence. Block's critiques, based on his misbegotten distinction, evaporate on closer inspection.
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  • Fallacies or Analyses?Jennifer Church - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):251--2.
    To demonstrate that a fallacy is committed, Block needs to convince us of two things: first, that the concept of phenomenal consciousness is distinct from that of access consciousness, and second, that it picks out a different property from that of access consciousness. I raise doubt about both of these claims, suggesting that the concept of a phenomenal property is the concept of a property to which we have a special sort of access.
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  • More Empirical Cases to Break the Accord of Phenomenal and Access-Consciousness.Talis Bachmann - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):249-251.
  • Evidence That Phenomenal Consciousness is the Same as Access Consciousness.Bernard J. Baars - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):249-249.
  • Consciousness Without Conflation.Anthony P. Atkinson & Martin Davies - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):248-249.
    Although information-processing theories cannot provide a full explanatory account of P-consciousness, there is less conflation and confusion in cognitive psychology than Block suspects. Some of the reasoning that Block criticises can be interpreted plausibly in the light of a folk psychological view of the relation between P-consciousness and A-consciousness.
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  • Perception-Consciousness and Action-Consciousness?D. M. Armstrong - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):247-248.
  • On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
    Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different "consciousnesses." Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state. The mark of access-consciousness, by contrast, is availability for use in reasoning and rationally guiding speech and action. These concepts are often partly or totally conflated, with bad results. This target article uses as an example a form of reasoning about a function of "consciousness" based on (...)
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  • Searle's Regimen for Rediscovering the Mind.Jeffrey Hershfield - 1997 - Dialogue 36 (2):361-374.
    Like Wittgenstein, John Searle believes that much of analytic philosophy—especially the philosophy of mind—is founded on confusion and falsehood. Unlike Wittgenstein, he does not consider this condition to be endemic to philosophy. As a result, Searle's dual goals in The Rediscovery of the Mind are to rid the philosophy of mind of the fundamental confusions that plague it, and to set the field on the path toward genuine progress. Thus, the book opens with a chapter entitled “What's Wrong with the (...)
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  • What Am I? Virtual Machines and the Mind/Body Problem.John L. Pollock - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):237–309.
    When your word processor or email program is running on your computer, this creates a "virtual machine” that manipulates windows, files, text, etc. What is this virtual machine, and what are the virtual objects it manipulates? Many standard arguments in the philosophy of mind have exact analogues for virtual machines and virtual objects, but we do not want to draw the wild metaphysical conclusions that have sometimes tempted philosophers in the philosophy of mind. A computer file is not made of (...)
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  • On Naturalizing the Epistemology of Mathematics.Jeffrey W. Roland - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1):63-97.
    In this paper, I consider an argument for the claim that any satisfactory epistemology of mathematics will violate core tenets of naturalism, i.e. that mathematics cannot be naturalized. I find little reason for optimism that the argument can be effectively answered.
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  • Comments on Herrera's: "The Controversy Over Authorship in Medical Journals".Tony Doyle - 2007 - Journal of Information Ethics 16 (2):71-74.
  • Apperception, Sensation, and Dissociability.David M. Rosenthal - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (2):206-223.
  • Metaphilosophical Dualism.Ross Barham - 2011 - Essays in Philosophy 12 (2):6.
    There exist two equally prominent, though seemingly divergent metaphilosophical viewpoints. One takes philosophy to be an essentially revolutionary process. The other sees philosophy as a constructive, collaborative enterprise that seeks increased rigor and consensus. Recent debate in the philosophy of language regarding the relationship of particular languages to the general capacity for language reveals an illuminating structural analogy with these divergent metaphilosophical trends. While neither debate is settled herein, regardless of their eventual determinations, it is concluded that there is little (...)
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  • Materialism: Matters Of Definition, Defense, and Deconstruction.Terry Horgan - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (1):157-183.
    How should the metaphysical hypothesis of materialism be formulated? What strategies look promising for defending this hypothesis? How good are the prospects for its successful defense, especially in light of the infamous "hard problem" of phenomenal consciousness? I will say something about each of these questions.
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  • The Knowledge Argument and Objectivity.Robert J. Howell - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (2):145-177.
    In this paper I argue that Frank Jackson.
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  • The Eleatic and the Indispensabilist.Russell Marcus - 2015 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 30 (3):415-429.
    The debate over whether we should believe that mathematical objects exist quickly leads to the question of how to determine what we should believe. Indispensabilists claim that we should believe in the existence of mathematical objects because of their ineliminable roles in scientific theory. Eleatics argue that only objects with causal properties exist. Mark Colyvan’s recent defenses of Quine’s indispensability argument against some contemporary eleatics attempt to provide reasons to favor the indispensabilist’s criterion. I show that Colyvan’s argument is not (...)
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  • Introspection and Authoritative Self-Knowledge.Cynthia Macdonald - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (2):355-372.
    In this paper I outline and defend an introspectionist account of authoritative self-knowledge for a certain class of cases, ones in which a subject is both thinking and thinking about a current, conscious thought. My account is distinctive in a number of ways, one of which is that it is compatible with the truth of externalism.
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  • Naïve Realism, Privileged Access, and Epistemic Safety.Matthew Kennedy - 2011 - Noûs 45 (1):77-102.
    Working from a naïve-realist perspective, I examine first-person knowledge of one's perceptual experience. I outline a naive-realist theory of how subjects acquire knowledge of the nature of their experiences, and I argue that naive realism is compatible with moderate, substantial forms of first-person privileged access. A more general moral of my paper is that treating “success” states like seeing as genuine mental states does not break up the dynamics that many philosophers expect from the phenomenon of knowledge of the mind.
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  • Mental Causation From the Top-Down.William Jaworski - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (2):277-299.
    Dual-attribute theories are alleged to face a problem with mental causation which commits them to either epiphenomenalism or overdetermination – neither of which is attractive. The problem, however, is predicated on assumptions about psychophysical relations that dual-attribute theorists are not obliged to accept. I explore one way they can solve the problem by rejecting those assumptions.
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  • Higher-Order Intentionalism and Higher-Order Acquaintance.Benj Hellie - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (3):289--324.
    I argue against such "Relation Intentionalist" theories of consciousness as the higher-order thought and inner sense views on the grounds that they understand a subject's awareness of his or her phenomenal characters to be intentional, like seeming-seeing, rather than "direct", like seeing. The trouble with such views is that they reverse the order of explanation between phenomenal character and intentional awareness. A superior theory of consciousness, based on views expressed by Russell and Price, takes the relation of awareness to be (...)
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  • Trying and the Arguments From Total Failure.Thor Grünbaum - 2008 - Philosophia 36 (1):67-86.
    New Volitionalism is a name for certain widespread conception of the nature of intentional action. Some of the standard arguments for New Volitionalism, the so-called arguments from total failure, have even acquired the status of basic assumptions for many other kinds of philosophers. It is therefore of singular interest to investigate some of the most important arguments from total failure. This is what I propose to do in this paper. My aim is not be to demonstrate that these arguments are (...)
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  • What is It Like to Be Oscar?Leopold Stubenberg - 1992 - Synthese 90 (1):1-26.
    Oscar is going to be the first artificial person — at any rate, he is going to be the first artificial person to be built in Tucson's Philosophy Department. Oscar's creator, John Pollock, maintains that once Oscar is complete he will experience qualia, will be self-conscious, will have desires, fears, intentions, and a full range of mental states (Pollock 1989, pp. ix–x). In this paper I focus on what seems to me to be the most problematical of these claims, viz., (...)
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  • Are the Properties of Cells Relevant for Understanding Consciousness?Tim Shallice - 1978 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (3):364.
  • From Volitionalism to the Dual Aspect Theory of Action.Joshua Stuchlik - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (3):867-886.
    Volitionalism is a theory of action motivated by certain shortcomings in the standard causal theory of action. However, volitionalism is vulnerable to the objection that it distorts the phenomenology of embodied agency. Arguments for volitionalism typically proceed by attempting to establish three claims: (1) that whenever an agent acts, she tries or wills to act, (2) that it is possible for volitions to occur even in the absence of bodily movement, and (3) that in cases of successful bodily actions the (...)
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  • The Problem of Reconciliation.Arda Denkel - 1995 - Philosophical Papers 24 (1):23-50.
  • How (Not) to Think About Mental Action.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):83-89.
    I examine Galen Strawson's recent work on mental action in his paper, 'Mental Ballistics or The Involuntariness of Spontaneity'. I argue that his account of mental action is too restrictive. I offer a means of testing tokens of mental activity types to determine if they are actional. The upshot is that a good deal more mental activity than Strawson admits is actional.
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