- Why do the Laws Support Counterfactuals?Chris Dorst - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (2):545-566.details
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Why do the Laws Support Counterfactuals?Chris Dorst - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (2):545-566.details
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There is no measurement problem for Humeans.Chris Dorst - 2021 - Noûs 57 (2):263-289.details
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Humean laws, explanatory circularity, and the aim of scientific explanation.Chris Dorst - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (10):2657-2679.details
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Laws, Dispositions, Memory: Three Hypotheses on the Order of the World.Joël Dolbeault - 2021 - Metaphysica 22 (1):101-121.details
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Bergson’s panpsychism.Joël Dolbeault - 2018 - Continental Philosophy Review 51 (4):549-564.details
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Belief in Absolute Necessity.John Divers & José Edgar González-Varela - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):358-391.details
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Representationalism and indeterminate perceptual content.John Dilworth - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3):369-387.details
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The Myth of Generic Grounding.Duen-Min Deng - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):2053-2061.details
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Determinable nominalism.David A. Denby - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 102 (3):297--327.details
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Fundamental Properties and the Laws of Nature.Heather Demarest - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (5):334-344.details
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Explanatory Consolidation: From ‘Best’ to ‘Good Enough’.Finnur Dellsén - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (1):157-177.details
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Regularity theories disconfirmed: a revamped argument and a wager.Patrick Cronin - 2017 - Synthese 194 (12):4913-4933.details
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Can Dispositional Essences Ground the Laws of Nature?Richard Corry - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):263-275.details
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A better best system account of lawhood.Jonathan Cohen & Craig Callender - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (1):1 - 34.details
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Hempel, Grue and the Logical Empiricist Baseline.Mathew Coakley - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (5):969-982.details
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Essence and the inference problem.Ashley Coates - 2021 - Synthese 198 (2):915-931.details
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The explanatory virtue of abstracting away from idiosyncratic and messy detail.Christopher Clarke - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1429-1449.details
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Nonreductive physicalism and the causal powers of the mental.Randolph Clarke - 1999 - Erkenntnis 51 (2-3):295-322.details
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Free choice, effort, and wanting more.Randolph Clarke - 1999 - Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):20-41.details
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Laws, melodies, and the paradox of predictability.Dorst Chris - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-21.details
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Fundamental Nomic Vagueness.Eddy Keming Chen - 2022 - Philosophical Review 131 (1):1-49.details
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The dispositional essentialist view of properties and laws.Anjan Chakravartty - 2003 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (4):393 – 413.details
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Causal Realism: Events and Processes.Anjan Chakravartty - 2005 - Erkenntnis 63 (1):7-31.details
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Alien worlds, alien laws, and the Humean conceivability argument.Lok-Chi Chan, David Braddon-Mitchell & Andrew J. Latham - 2019 - Ratio 33 (1):1-13.details
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Is the Humean Defeated by Induction? A Reply to Smart.Eduardo Castro - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (2):435-446.details
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Best Before Date Necessity: A Reply to Psillos.Eduardo Castro - 2019 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 50 (1):163-169.details
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Property-level causation?John W. Carroll - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 63 (3):245 - 270.details
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Ontology and the laws of nature.John W. Carroll - 1987 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (3):261 – 276.details
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Laws of nature.John W. Carroll - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
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In defense of psychological laws.Martin Carrier - 1998 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 12 (3):217-232.details
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Humean laws, circularity, and contrastivity.Pablo Carnino - 2020 - Synthese 198 (9):8713-8731.details
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Between general and particular: Objections to the necessitarian theory of laws.Renato Cesar Cani - 2018 - Filosofia Unisinos 19 (2).details
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The contingency of composition.Ross P. Cameron - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (1):99-121.details
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Is Epistemic Anxiety an Intellectual Virtue?Frank Cabrera - 2021 - Synthese (5-6):1-25.details
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Does IBE Require a ‘Model’ of Explanation?Frank Cabrera - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (2):727-750.details
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Against the Compositional View of Facts.William Bynoe - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):91-100.details
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A Deflationist Error Theory of Properties.Arvid Båve - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (1):23-59.details
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Lawful Persistence.David Builes & Trevor Teitel - 2022 - Philosophical Perspectives 36 (1):5-30.details
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The No-Category Ontology.O. Bueno, S. A. Shalkowski & J. Busch - 2015 - The Monist 98 (3):233-245.details
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World Enough and Form: Why Cosmology Needs Hylomorphism.John G. Brungardt - 2019 - Synthese (Suppl 11):1-33.details
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Thought experiments since the scientific revolution.James Robert Brown - 1986 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1 (1):1 – 15.details
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Platonic explanation: Or, what abstract entities can do for you.James Robert Brown - 1988 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 3 (1):51 – 67.details
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Against instantiation as identity.Scott Brown - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):887-900.details
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Dispositions and Ontology.Denny Bradshaw - 2003 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (2):169-182.details
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A Theory of Presentism.Craig Bourne - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):1-23.details
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Sobre la crítica de Mumford al realismo nomológico.Bruno Borge - 2015 - Manuscrito 38 (3):59-80.details
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Epistemic structural realism, modality and laws of nature.Bruno Borge - 2018 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 33 (3):447-468.details
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El estatus epistémico de Los experimentos mentales en ciencias fácticas.Bruno Borge & Guadalupe Mettini - 2018 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 59 (140):341-364.details
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El debate realismo vs. antirrealismo nomológicos y la inferencia a la mejor explicación.Bruno Borge & Roberto Azar - 2016 - Areté. Revista de Filosofía 28 (2):213-232.details
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