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The Primitivist Theory of Truth

Cambridge University Press (2013)

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  1. The Best Thing About the Deflationary Theory of Truth.Jamin Asay - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    I argue that deflationary theories of truth reveal an important lesson for the broader theory of truth: although the notion of truthmaking has played an essential role in many traditional theories of truth, it can be separated from and survive the rejection of substantive theories of truth. I argue that many of the traditional substantive theories of truth (correspondence, coherence, pragmatic) are unified in defining truth in terms of the ontological grounds (or truthmakers) that are needed to account for truth. (...)
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  • Primitivism About Truth.Jamin Asay - forthcoming - In Michael Lynch, Nathan Kellen, Junyeol Kim & Jeremy Wyatt (eds.), The Nature of Truth (Second edition). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
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  • Frege's Choice: The Indefinability Argument, Truth, and the Fregean Conception of Judgment.Junyeol Kim - 2021 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 9 (5):1-26.
    I develop a new reading of Frege’s argument for the indefinability of truth. I concentrate on what Frege literally says in the passage that contains the argument. This literal reading of the passage establishes that the indefinability argument is an arguably sound argument to the following conclusion: provided that the Fregean conception of judgment—which has recently been countered by Hanks—is correct and that truth is a property of truth-bearers, a vicious infinite regress is produced. Given this vicious regress, Frege chooses (...)
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  • What is deflationism about truth?Matti Eklund - 2021 - Synthese 198 (2):631-645.
    What is deflationism about truth? There are many questions that can be raised about this, given the numerous different characterizations of deflationism in the literature. Here I attend to questions about the characterization of deflationism that arise when we carefully distinguish between issues pertaining to concepts and issues pertaining to properties.
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  • Truth : a concept unlike any other.Jamin Asay - 2021 - Synthese 198 (Supplement issue 2):S605-S630.
    This paper explores the nature of the concept of truth. It does not offer an analysis or definition of truth, or an account of how it relates to other concepts. Instead, it explores what sort of concept truth is by considering what sorts of thoughts it enables us to think. My conclusion is that truth is a part of each and every propositional thought. The concept of truth is therefore best thought of as the ability to token propositional thoughts. I (...)
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  • Hebrew Philosophy or Jewish Theology? A False Dichotomy.Samuel Lebens - 2014 - Journal of Analytic Theology 2:250-260.
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  • From One to Many: Recent Work on Truth.Jeremy Wyatt & Michael Lynch - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (4):323-340.
    In this paper, we offer a brief, critical survey of contemporary work on truth. We begin by reflecting on the distinction between substantivist and deflationary truth theories. We then turn to three new kinds of truth theory—Kevin Scharp's replacement theory, John MacFarlane's relativism, and the alethic pluralism pioneered by Michael Lynch and Crispin Wright. We argue that despite their considerable differences, these theories exhibit a common "pluralizing tendency" with respect to truth. In the final section, we look at the underinvestigated (...)
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  • Truth as a relational property.Douglas Edwards - 2016 - Synthese 198 (2):735-757.
    In this paper I investigate the claim that truth is a relational property. What does this claim really mean? What is its import?—Is it a basic feature of the concept of truth; or a distinctive feature of the correspondence theory of truth; or even both? After introducing some general ideas about truth, I begin by highlighting an ambiguity in current uses of the term ‘relational property’ in the truth debate, and show that we need to distinguish two separate ideas: that (...)
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  • Conceptual Engineering for Truth: Aletheic Properties and New Aletheic Concepts.Kevin Scharp - 2020 - Synthese (Suppl 2):1-42.
    What is the property of being true like? To answer this question, begin with a Canberra-plan analysis of the concept of truth. That is, assemble the platitudes for the concept of truth, and then investigate which property might satisfy them. This project is aided by Friedman and Sheard’s groundbreaking analysis of twelve logical platitudes for truth. It turns out that, because of the paradoxes like the liar, the platitudes for the concept of truth are inconsistent. Moreover, there are so many (...)
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  • Editorial Introduction to ‘Truth: Concept Meets Property’.Jeremy Wyatt - 2020 - Synthese 198 (2):591-603.
  • Realism and Theories of Truth.Jamin Asay - 2018 - In Juha Saatsi (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism. London: Routledge. pp. 383-393.
    The topic of truth has long been thought to be connected to scientific realism and its opposition. In this essay, I discuss the various ways that truth might be related to realism. First, I consider how truth might be of use when defining scientific realism and its opposition. Second, I consider whether various stances regarding realism require specific stances on the nature of truth. I survey "neutralist" views that argue that one's stance on realism is independent of one's view on (...)
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  • Examination of Merricks' Primitivism About Truth.A. R. J. Fisher - 2014 - Metaphysica 15 (2):281-98.
    Trenton Merricks argues for and defends a novel version of primitivism about truth : being true is a primitive monadic but non-intrinsic property. This examination consists of the following triad: a critical discussion of Merricks’ argument for his view, a rejection of his objection against Paul Horwich’s minimalist theory of truth, and a direct objection against his view on the grounds that it entails being true is a mysterious and suspicious property. The conclusion is that Merricks’ primitivism should be rejected.
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  • Pluralism and the Absence of Truth.Jeremy Wyatt - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Connecticut
    In this dissertation, I argue that we should be pluralists about truth and in turn, eliminativists about the property Truth. Traditional deflationists were right to suspect that there is no such property as Truth. Yet there is a plurality of pluralities of properties which enjoy defining features that Truth would have, were it to exist. So although, in this sense, truth is plural, Truth is non-existent. The resulting account of truth is indebted to deflationism as the provenance of the suspicion (...)
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  • The Many (yet Few) Faces of Deflationism.Jeremy Wyatt - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly (263):362-382.
    It's often said that according to deflationary theories of truth, truth is not a ‘substantial’ property. While this is a fine slogan, it is far from transparent what deflationists mean (or ought to mean) in saying that truth is ‘insubstantial’. Focusing so intently upon the concept of truth and the word ‘true’, I argue, deflationists and their critics have been insufficiently attentive to a host of metaphysical complexities that arise for deflationists in connection with the property of truth. My aim (...)
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  • Review of Joshua Rasmussen's Defending the Correspondence Theory of Truth. [REVIEW]Joseph Ulatowski - 2015 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):83-89.
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  • The Identity Theory of Truth.Stewart Candlish - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    is true, there is a truth-maker (e.g., a fact) with which it is identical and the truth of the former consists in its identity with the latter. The theory is best understood as a reaction to the correspondence theory, according to which the relation of truth-bearer to truth-maker is correspondence. A correspondence theory is vulnerable to the nagging suspicion that if the best we can do is make statements that merely correspond to the truth, then we inevitably fail to capture (...)
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  • Logic and/of Truthmaking.Jamin Asay - 2016 - In Syraya Chin-Mu Yang, Duen-Min Deng & Hanti Lin (eds.), Structural Analysis of Non-Classical Logics: The Proceedings of the Second Taiwan Philosophical Logic Colloquium. Springer Verlag.
    The purpose of this paper is to explore the question of how truthmaker theorists ought to think about their subject in relation to logic. Regarding logic and truthmaking, I defend the view that considerations drawn from advances in modal logic have little bearing on the legitimacy of truthmaker theory. To do so, I respond to objections Timothy Williamson has lodged against truthmaker theory. As for the logic of truthmaking, I show how the project of understanding the logical features of the (...)
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  • Measurement Theory, Nomological Machine And Measurement Uncertainties (In Classical Physics).Ave Mets - 2012 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 5 (2):167-186.
    Measurement is said to be the basis of exact sciences as the process of assigning numbers to matter (things or their attributes), thus making it possible to apply the mathematically formulated laws of nature to the empirical world. Mathematics and empiria are best accorded to each other in laboratory experiments which function as what Nancy Cartwright calls nomological machine: an arrangement generating (mathematical) regularities. On the basis of accounts of measurement errors and uncertainties, I will argue for two claims: 1) (...)
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  • Meaning and Reality: A Cross-Traditional Encounter.Lajos L. Brons - 2013 - In Bo Mou & R. Tieszen (eds.), Constructive Engagement of Analytic and Continental Approaches in Philosophy. Brill. pp. 199-220.
    (First paragraph.) Different views on the relation between phenomenal reality, the world as we consciously experience it, and noumenal reality, the world as it is independent from an experiencing subject, have different implications for a collection of interrelated issues of meaning and reality including aspects of metaphysics, the philosophy of language, and philosophical methodology. Exploring some of these implications, this paper compares and brings together analytic, continental, and Buddhist approaches, focusing on relevant aspects of the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Jacques (...)
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  • The Role of Truth in Psychological Science.Jamin Asay - 2018 - Theory and Psychology 28 (3):382-397.
    In a recent paper, Haig and Borsboom explore the relevance of the theory of truth for psychological science. Although they conclude that correspondence theories of truth are best suited to offer the resources for making sense of scientific practice, they leave open the possibility that other theories might accomplish those same ends. I argue that deflationary theories of truth, which deny that there is any substantive property that unifies the class of truths, makes equally good sense of scientific practice as (...)
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  • The Epistemic Significance of Valid Inference – A Model-Theoretic Approach.Constantin C. Brîncuș - 2015 - In Sorin Costreie & Mircea Dumitru (eds.), Meaning and Truth. Bucharest: PRO Universitaria Publishing. pp. 11-36.
    The problem analysed in this paper is whether we can gain knowledge by using valid inferences, and how we can explain this process from a model-theoretic perspective. According to the paradox of inference (Cohen & Nagel 1936/1998, 173), it is logically impossible for an inference to be both valid and its conclusion to possess novelty with respect to the premises. I argue in this paper that valid inference has an epistemic significance, i.e., it can be used by an agent to (...)
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  • The Semantics and Ontology of The Average American.Collins John - 2017 - Journal of Semantics 34 (3):373-405.
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  • Wang Chong, Truth, and Quasi-Pluralism.Lajos L. Brons - 2015 - Comparative Philosophy 6 (1):129-148.
    In (2011) McLeod suggested that the first century Chinese philosopher Wang Chong 王充 may have been a pluralist about truth. In this reply I contest McLeod's interpretation of Wang Chong, and suggest "quasi-pluralism" (albeit more as an alternative to pluralism than as an interpretation of Wang Chong), which combines primitivism about the concept of truth with pluralism about justification.
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  • Deflationism, Truth-Aptness and Non-Factualism.Massimiliano Vignolo - 2008 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (1):84-103.
    I will argue that the standard formulation of non-factualism in terms of a denial of truth-aptness is consistent with a version of deflationsim. My line of argument assumes the use conception of meaning. This brings out an interesting consequence since mostly the philosophers who endorse the use conception of meaning, e.g. Paul Horwich, hold that deflationism is inconsistent with the strategy of implementing non-factualism in terms of a denial of truth-aptness and thereby urge a reformulation of non-factualism.
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  • Deflationism and the Invisible Power of Truth.Andrea Strollo - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (4):521-543.
    In recent decades deflationary theories of truth have been challenged with a technical argument based on the notion of conservativeness. In this paper, I shall stress that conservative extensions of theories and expandability of their models are not equivalent notions. Then, I shall argue that the deflationary thesis of the unsubstantiality of truth is better understood as leveraging on the stronger notion of expandability of models. Once expandability is involved in the argument, some notable consequences follow: the strategy proposed by (...)
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