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Vagueness and revision sequences

Synthese 190 (6):953-974 (2013)

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  1. Solovay-type theorems for circular definitions.Shawn Standefer - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (3):467-487.
    We present an extension of the basic revision theory of circular definitions with a unary operator, □. We present a Fitch-style proof system that is sound and complete with respect to the extended semantics. The logic of the box gives rise to a simple modal logic, and we relate provability in the extended proof system to this modal logic via a completeness theorem, using interpretations over circular definitions, analogous to Solovay’s completeness theorem forGLusing arithmetical interpretations. We adapt our proof to (...)
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  • Revision Without Revision Sequences: Circular Definitions.Edoardo Rivello - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):57-85.
    The classical theory of definitions bans so-called circular definitions, namely, definitions of a unary predicate P, based on stipulations of the form $$Px =_{\mathsf {Df}} \phi,$$where ϕ is a formula of a fixed first-order language and the definiendumP occurs into the definiensϕ. In their seminal book The Revision Theory of Truth, Gupta and Belnap claim that “General theories of definitions are possible within which circular definitions [...] make logical and semantic sense” [p. IX]. In order to sustain their claim, they (...)
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  • Conditionals in Theories of Truth.Anil Gupta & Shawn Standefer - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1):27-63.
    We argue that distinct conditionals—conditionals that are governed by different logics—are needed to formalize the rules of Truth Introduction and Truth Elimination. We show that revision theory, when enriched with the new conditionals, yields an attractive theory of truth. We go on to compare this theory with one recently proposed by Hartry Field.
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  • Guest Editors’ Introduction.Riccardo Bruni & Shawn Standefer - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):1-9.
  • The revision theory of truth.Philip Kremer - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  • Paradojas, contradicción y principios constitutivos del significado.Diego Tajer - 2013 - Páginas de Filosofía (Universidad Nacional del Comahue) 14 (17):49-65.
    En ocasiones, las paradojas involucran principios constitutivos del significado. Priest sostiene que en todos los casos deberíamos retener los principios y aceptar las contradicciones resultantes, mientras que Eklund sugiere modificar los principios en todos los casos. En este artículo, afirmo que las diferentes respuestas son adecuadas para las distintas paradojas. En particular, para paradojas del tipo del mentiroso, es mejor quedarse con el esquema T, que caracteriza el significado de “verdadero”, y aceptar las conclusiones contradictorias; mientras que para la paradoja (...)
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