Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Psychological Categories as Homologies: Lessons From Ethology.Marc Ereshefsky - 2007 - Biology and Philosophy 22 (5):659-674.
  • The Weirdest People in the World?Joseph Henrich, Steven J. Heine & Ara Norenzayan - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):61-83.
    Behavioral scientists routinely publish broad claims about human psychology and behavior in the world's top journals based on samples drawn entirely from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies. Researchers assume that either there is little variation across human populations, or that these are as representative of the species as any other population. Are these assumptions justified? Here, our review of the comparative database from across the behavioral sciences suggests both that there is substantial variability in experimental results across (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   255 citations  
  • Physiological Linguistics, and Some Implications Regarding Disciplinary Autonomy and Unification.Samuel D. Epstein - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (1):44–67.
    Chomsky's current Biolinguistic methodology is shown to comport with what might be called 'established' aspects of biological method, thereby raising, in the biolinguistic domain, issues concerning biological autonomy from the physical sciences. At least current irreducibility of biology, including biolinguistics, stems in at least some cases from the very nature of what I will claim is physiological, or inter-organ/inter-component, macro-levels of explanation which play a new and central explanatory role in Chomsky's inter-componential explanation of certain properties of the syntactic component (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Developmental Objections to Evolutionary Modularity.John Sarnecki - 2007 - Biology and Philosophy 22 (4):529-546.
    Evolutionary psychologists argue that selective pressures in our ancestral environment yield a highly specialized set of modular cognitive capacities. However, recent papers in developmental psychology and neuroscience claim that evolutionary accounts of modularity are incompatible with the flexibility and plasticity of the developing brain. Instead, they propose cortical and neuronal brain structures are fixed through interactions with our developmental environment. Buller and Gray Hardcastle contend that evolutionary accounts of cognitive development are unacceptably rigid in light of evidence of cortical plasticity. (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   4 citations