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Cognitive Foundations of Natural History: Towards an Anthropology of Science

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1990)

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  1. Donald Campbell on Cultural Relativism.Rik Pinxten - 1997 - Philosophica 60.
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  • Why Are Perfect Animals, Hybrids, and Monsters Food for Symbolic Thought?Dan Sperber - unknown
    not only anomalous animals, but also exemplary animals often take on a symbolic value, thus raising a second problem. A solution to both problems is suggested, based on an examination of the cognitive..
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  • Adaptationism for Human Cognition: Strong, Spurious, or Weak?Scott Atran - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (1):39-67.
    Strong adaptationists explore complex organic design as taskspecific adaptations to ancestral environments. This strategy seems best when there is evidence of homology. Weak adaptationists don't assume that complex organic (including cognitive and linguistic) functioning necessarily or primarily represents taskspecific adaptation. This approach to cognition resembles physicists' attempts to deductively explain the most facts with fewest hypotheses. For certain domainspecific competencies (folkbiology) strong adaptationism is useful but not necessary to research. With grouplevel belief systems (religion) strong adaptationism degenerates into spurious notions (...)
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  • The Trouble with Memes: Inference Versus Imitation in Cultural Creation.Scott Atran - 2001 - Human Nature 12 (4):351-381.
    Memes are hypothetical cultural units passed on by imitation; although nonbiological, they undergo Darwinian selection like genes. Cognitive study of multimodular human minds undermines memetics: unlike in genetic replication, high-fidelity transmission of cultural information is the exception, not the rule. Constant, rapid 'mutation' of information during communication generates endlessly varied creations that nevertheless adhere to modular input conditions. The sort of cultural information most susceptible to modular processing is that most readily acquired by children, most easily transmitted across individuals, most (...)
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  • Are Humans Good Intuitive Statisticians After All? Rethinking Some Conclusions From the Literature on Judgment Under Uncertainty.L. Cosmides - 1996 - Cognition 58 (1):1-73.
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  • No Interpretation Without Representation: The Role of Domain-Specific Representations and Inferences in the Wason Selection Task.Laurence Fiddick, Leda Cosmides & John Tooby - 2000 - Cognition 77 (1):1-79.
  • How Biological is Essentialism.Susan A. Gelman & Lawrence A. Hirschfeld - 1999 - In D. Medin & S. Atran (eds.), Folkbiology. MIT Press. pp. 403--446.
  • The Essentialist Aspect of Naive Theories.Michael Strevens - 2000 - Cognition 74 (149):175.
    Recent work on children’s inferences concerning biological and chemical categories has suggested that children (and perhaps adults) are essentialists— a view known as psychological essentialism. I distinguish three varieties of psychological essentialism and investigate the ways in which essentialism explains the inferences for which it is supposed to account. Essentialism succeeds in explaining the inferences, I argue, because it attributes to the child belief in causal laws connecting category membership and the possession of certain characteristic appearances and behavior. This suggests (...)
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  • When Traditional Essentialism Fails.Robert A. Wilson, Matthew J. Barker & Ingo Brigandt - 2007 - Philosophical Topics 35 (1-2):189-215.
    Essentialism is widely regarded as a mistaken view of biological kinds, such as species. After recounting why (sections 2-3), we provide a brief survey of the chief responses to the “death of essentialism” in the philosophy of biology (section 4). We then develop one of these responses, the claim that biological kinds are homeostatic property clusters (sections 5-6) illustrating this view with several novel examples (section 7). Although this view was first expressed 20 years ago, and has received recent discussion (...)
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  • Evolutionizing the Cognitive Sciences: A Reply to Shapiro and Epstein.John Tooby & Leda Cosmides - 1998 - Mind and Language 13 (2):195-204.
  • Ocho Desiderata Metodológicos de Las Teorías Sociales Normativas.Antoni Dümenech - 1998 - Isegoría 18:115-141.
  • Cephalic Organization: Animacy and Agency.Jay Schulkin - 2008 - Contemporary Pragmatism 5 (1):61-77.
    Humans come prepared to recognize two fundamental features of our surroundings: animate objects and agents. This recognition begins early in ontogeny and pervades our ecological and social space. This cognitive capacity reveals an important adaptation and sets the conditions for pervasive shared experiences. One feature of our species and our evolved cephalic substrates is that we are prepared to recognize self-propelled action in others. Our cultural evolution is knotted to an expanding sense of shared experiences.
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  • Culture and Cognition.Richard E. Nisbett & Ara Norenzayan - 2002 - In J. Wixted & H. Pashler (eds.), Stevens' Handbook of Experimental Psychology. Wiley.