Switch to: References

Citations of:

Existential Inertia

Philosophic Exchange 48 (1):1-26 (2019)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Simply Unsuccessful: The Neo-Platonic Proof of God’s Existence.Joseph Conrad Schmid - 2022 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 13 (4):129-156.
    Edward Feser defends the ‘Neo-Platonic proof ’ for the existence of the God of classical theism. After articulating the argument and a number of preliminaries, I first argue that premise three of Feser’s argument—the causal principle that every composite object requires a sustaining efficient cause to combine its parts—is both unjustified and dialectically ill-situated. I then argue that the Neo-Platonic proof fails to deliver the mindedness of the absolutely simple being and instead militates against its mindedness. Finally, I uncover two (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Existential inertia and the Aristotelian proof.Joseph C. Schmid - 2020 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 89 (3):201-220.
    Edward Feser defends the ‘Aristotelian proof’ for the existence of God, which reasons that the only adequate explanation of the existence of change is in terms of an unchangeable, purely actual being. His argument, however, relies on the falsity of the Existential Inertia Thesis, according to which concrete objects tend to persist in existence without requiring an existential sustaining cause. In this article, I first characterize the dialectical context of Feser’s Aristotelian proof, paying special attention to EIT and its rival (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • On Whether External Relations or Their Relata can have Existential Inertia.Patrick Rooney - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (4):1907-1922.
    Joseph Schmid has proposed an account of existential inertia which says (among other things) that each existentially inert object is not ontologically dependent on anything that is not a part of itself. Using this account, I propose an argument that existential inertia cannot be enjoyed by external relations nor by their relata. I first draw from Arianna Betti’s case for relata-specific relations to argue that external relations cannot have existential inertia. Building on this conclusion, I then propose an argument that (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark