Through a detailed analysis of Xenophon's defence against a charge for hybris among the Ten Thousand, this paper discusses violence, reputation and hierarchy in Greek military and social contexts. Contrary to other recent treatments of the episode, the study highlights the centrality of honour/shame dynamics and of desert in establishing and upholding social order, showing that these notions are found consistently in numerous examples as early as Homer. Addressing the apparent lack of strict discipline in Greek armies, the paper concludes (...) that shame and peer pressure had a strong normative power in acknowledging and reconciling personal claims and common interests within a group. (shrink)

I argue that musical education in Plato’sRepublicis not aimed at developing a moral discriminatory faculty in the spirited part, but rather that its benefits are predominantly intellectual, and become fully apparent only at the philosophical stage of the guardians’ education. In order to prove this point, I discuss the intellectual state which the guardians’ philosophical education is meant to bring about, and then show why it is dependent on the earlier cognitive effects of musical education. Ultimately, I show that musical (...) education allows guardians to provide a unified analysis of both culture and nature. (shrink)

‘DU bist Radio’ (DBR) is an award winning [DBR has been awarded with the “Catholic Media Award of the German Bishops Conference, Prädikat WERTvoll” (2011), the Suisse “Media Prize Aargau/Solothurn” (2010), the German “Alternative Media Award” (2009) and was nominated for the “Prix Europa” (2009)] monthly radio format that goes on air on three Swiss radio stations. The purpose of this program which was first broadcast in 2009 is the development of a new media format which—without applying any journalistic (or (...) other) filter and influence—conveys authenticity of expression amongst society’s most vulnerable fellow citizens such as patients, clients and the socially deprived. So-called marginal groups are encouraged to speak for themselves, as a possible paradigm case for encouraging the inclusion of patients’ and relatives’ “unfiltered” voices in general and in clinical ethics as well. Before handing over the microphone to the groups in focus, a team of journalists, educated in medical ethics, over a period of 4 days, teaches them on-site radio skills and craft. Once this task is completed and the actual production of the broadcast begins, the media crew does not exert any influence whatsoever on the content of the 1-h program. Thus, the final product is solely created and accounted for by the media-inexperienced participants, leading to unforeseen and often surprising results. It is discussed that the DBR approach of fostering authenticity of expression can serve as an enhancement to today’s respect and autonomy oriented field of medical ethics. (shrink)

Despite the Aristotelian renaissance in the philosophy of education, the development of virtue has not received much attention. This is unfortunate, because an attempt to draft an Aristotelian model of moral development can help philosophers to evaluate the contribution Aristotelian virtue ethics can make to our understanding of moral development, provide psychologists with a potentially richer account of morality and its development, and help educators to understand the developmental phase people are in. In the article, it is argued that the (...) Aristotelian categories of the ‘morally indifferent’, ‘un-self-controlled’, ‘self-controlled’ and ‘properly virtuous’ can be interpreted as the successive stages or levels of a comprehensive developmental model. For each stage, it will be made clear whether people are committed to virtue, whether they act virtuously or not, whether they act with pleasure or pain, and which desires and reasons they have for acting. The article closes with suggestions about what needs to be done if the proposed Aristotelian account of moral development is to become psychologically more realistic and educationally useful. (shrink)

That contempt and dishonor are closely related has been shown not only in recent discussions of the subject, but also in Aristotle's investigation of emotions in the judiciary. In this paper, I will discuss the ways in which the ancient Greeks—and, in particular, the polis of Athens—institutionalized what Bell calls “apt contempt” (i.e., contempt as a response to actual and serious faults of character which stems from the contemnor's concern for the values at stake) through the legal penalty of atimia (...) (“dishonor”). Not only does Athenian evidence prove Bell's point that contempt can be “apt”—it also represents an early case study of a community that formalized such “apt” contempt in law and in the formal enactment of collectively approved social norms. And yet, the Greeks were also aware of the potential ambivalence of notions such as “contempt” and “dishonor.” This ambivalence is likely to have been one of the factors that catalyzed a differentiation, within the semantic field of atimia, between “dishonoring” ( atiman/ atimoun) and “disrespecting” ( atimazein)—between “apt” and “inapt” contempt. (shrink)

Greco-Roman philosophers and historians frequently attempted to define the human being vis-á-vis other animals by isolating capacities, intellectual, physical, and emotional, judged unique to humans. The Stoic claim that only humans have a sense of shame because only humans are rational and therefore capable of emotions, which entail reasoning, was contradicted by other philosophers and naturalists who argued that some animal behaviors were analogous to behavior in humans that indicate shame. Ancient debates on both sides of the issue of animal (...) emotions are paralleled in current philosophy and cognitive ethology employing anecdotal and anthropomorphizing arguments that mirror classical examples. (shrink)

Sophocles' Antigone contains the first recorded instance of the word αὑτ ό νομος, the source for our word “autonomous”. I argue that reflection upon the human aspiration toward autonomy is central to that work. I begin by focusing on the difficulty readers of the play have determining whether Antigone's actions in the play should be considered autonomous and then suggest that recognizing this difficulty is crucial to a proper understanding of the play. The very aspects of Antigone's character that seem (...) to militate against understanding her actions within the play as autonomous—her rejection of life, her intimacy with death and the way she seems defined by her incestuous heritage— serve to illustrate the inherently problematic character of a moral ideal that we can provisionally call Antigone's autonomy. I show how the movement of the play can be understood in terms of Antigone's progress from what Kant would characterize as a heteronomous representation of her irremissible duty to bury her dead brother, to a self-conception defined by a recognition and embrace of her autonomy understood as, in Kant's words, “a respect for something entirely different from life”. Antigone's autonomy is exemplified by her choice to be dead, the choice to bear the burden of responsibility to her own. This choice, I argue, must be understood as the choice of herself as defined by her obligation to her own. Sophocles' Antigone suggests that the moral ideal Antigone represents is unliveable, but that this ideal is nonetheless essential to human moral aspiration. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 63, Issue 2, pp 117 - 147 I argue that Plato, in the _Timaeus_, draws deep theoretical distinctions between sensation and affect, which comprises pleasure, pain, desire and emotion. Sensation is both ‘fine-grained’ and ‘immediate’. Emotions, by contrast, are mediated and coarse-grained. Pleasure and pain are coarse-grained but, in a range of important cases, immediate. The _Theaetetus_ assimilates affect to sensation in a way the _Timaeus_ does not. Smell frustrates Timaeus because it is coarse-grained, although unlike pleasure (...) and pain it is so by accident of physiology. (shrink)

This paper offers a sustained philosophical meditation on contrasting interpretations of the emotion of shame within four academic discourses—social psychology, psychological anthropology, educational psychology and Aristotelian scholarship—in order to elicit their implications for moral education. It turns out that within each of these discourses there is a mainstream interpretation which emphasises shame’s expendability or moral ugliness (and where shame is typically described as guilt’s ugly sister), but also a heterodox interpretation which seeks to retrieve and defend shame. As the heterodox (...) interpretation seems to offer a more realistic picture of shame’s role in moral education, the provenance of the mainstream interpretation merits scrutiny. I argue that social scientific studies of the concept of shame, based on its supposed phenomenology, incorporate biases in favour of excessive, rather than medial, forms of the emotion. I suggest ways forward for more balanced analyses of the nature, moral justification and educative role of shame. (shrink)

Voici un ouvrage fort bien traduit dont la lecture attentive récompensera aussi bien ceux que l’éthique des Grecs passionne, ceux que le sort de la modernité inquiète et ceux que l’œuvre de Bernard Williams intéresse. Le philosophe britannique présente ici une série de conférences Sather prononcées à Berkeley en 1989 et traitant des conceptions éthiques des Grecs anciens à travers l’œuvre des poètes épiques et tragiques. L’auteur reprend dans cet ouvrage nombre de thèmes déjà présents dans ses travaux antérieurs; il (...) radicalise à certains égards ses conceptions concernant les Grecs, la modernité et leur relation, et appuie ses interprétations sur une analyse minutieuse des textes classiques. L’érudition n’est cependant pas ici une fin en soi, car Williams n’entend pas faire œuvre de spécialiste des humanités grecquesmais plutôt défendre une thèse générale fréquente depuis Nietzsche, à savoir que, «par certains aspects, les idées éthiques fondamentales des Grecs étaient différentes des nôtres, mais [elles] étaient plus valables. Par d’autres côtés [...] nous nous référons aux mêmes conceptions, mais nous ignorons jusqu’à quel point nous le faisons». Si nos conceptions éthiques modernes sont ainsi plus proches de celles des Grecs que nous le soupçonnons, en revanche nous ne partageons plus nombre de leurs croyances, en particulier les conceptions surnaturelles apparaissant par exemple dans les tragédies. «Toutes ces propositions peuvent-elles être vraies ensemble?» : voilà le problème que se pose Williams et qu’il s’efforcera ici de résoudre. Cet ouvrage présente ainsi autre chose qu’une histoire des idées de honte et de nécessité; il ne constitue pas non plus un plaidoyer nostalgique pour un retour aux Grecs: la tension entre «les Grecs et nous» est constamment maintenue et exploitée pour proposer une interprétation éclairante des Grecs et une critique décapante de la modernité. Voyons tout d’abord cette interprétation, avant que de présenter quelques critiques. (shrink)

Voici un ouvrage fort bien traduit dont la lecture attentive récompensera aussi bien ceux que l'éthique des Grecs passionne, ceux que le sort de la modernité inquiète et ceux que l'œuvre de Bernard Williams intéresse. Le philosophe britannique présente ici une série de conférences Sather prononcées à Berkeley en 1989 et traitant des conceptions éthiques des Grecs anciens à travers l'œuvre des poètes épiques et tragiques. L'auteur reprend dans cet ouvrage nombre de thèmes déjà présents dans ses travaux antérieurs; il (...) radicalise à certains égards ses conceptions concernant les Grecs, la modernité et leur relation, et appuie ses interprétations sur une analyse minutieuse des textes classiques. L'érudition n'est cependant pas ici une fin en soi, car Williams n'entend pas faire œuvre de spécialiste des humanités grecques, mais plutôt défendre une thèse générate fréquente depuis Nietzsche, à savoir que, «par certains aspects, les idées éthiques fondamentales des Grecs étaient différentes des nôtres, mais [elles] étaient plus valables. (shrink)

Those who write about early Greek literature often assume that each item in the ancient vocabulary answers to a single concept in the world-view of its users. It seems reasonable to hope that the body of ideas represented by a particular Greek word will frame one's discussion better than any question that could be asked in English: so that a cautious scholar might prefer to discuss the phenomenon called αδς, for example, than to plunge into a study of Greek ideas (...) of ‘honour and shame' irrespective of whether those anthropologists’ labels mark off a single body of ancient ideas. But the question is not merely one of common sense: in recent years, for example, a strategy of extrapolating deep ideas from single words has been deliberately developed by such scholars as Gregory Nagy, who constantly moves back and forth between the semantic patterns of individual words and corresponding thematic patterns found in myths. Here is a recent example from his analysis of Pindar's conception of the unity between athletic victory and mythical heroism: In Pindaric usage εθλος applies equally to the contests of athletes and to the life-and-death ordeals of heroes. We have already seen from the myth of the chariot race of Pelops that the ordeals of heroes on the level of myth correspond aetiologically to the contests of athletes on the level of ritual, in that the myths can motivate the rituals. Now we see that a word like εθλος can collapse the very distinction between the myth and the ritual. (shrink)

Those who write about early Greek literature often assume that each item in the ancient vocabulary answers to a single concept in the world-view of its users. It seems reasonable to hope that the body of ideas represented by a particular Greek word will frame one's discussion better than any question that could be asked in English: so that a cautious scholar might prefer to discuss the phenomenon called αἰδώς, for example, than to plunge into a study of Greek ideas (...) of ‘honour and shame' irrespective of whether those anthropologists’ labels mark off a single body of ancient ideas. But the question is not merely one of common sense: in recent years, for example, a strategy of extrapolating deep ideas from single words has been deliberately developed by such scholars as Gregory Nagy, who constantly moves back and forth between the semantic patterns of individual words and corresponding thematic patterns found in myths. Here is a recent example from his analysis of Pindar's conception of the unity between athletic victory and mythical heroism:In Pindaric usage ἂεθλος applies equally to the contests of athletes and to the life-and-death ordeals of heroes. We have already seen from the myth of the chariot race of Pelops that the ordeals of heroes on the level of myth correspond aetiologically to the contests of athletes on the level of ritual, in that the myths can motivate the rituals. Now we see that a word like ἂεθλος can collapse the very distinction between the myth and the ritual. (shrink)

In Plato’s Gorgias 482c4–484c3, Callicles advances a concept of natural justice: the laws of the polis must agree with nature, that is, human nature. Since human nature is characterised by its desire to get a greater share, nature itself makes it legitimate that stronger human beings get a greater share than weaker ones. Socrates objects: Callicles’ theoretical approach to civic life poses a threat to the polis’ community, its citizens, and to the friendship amongst its citizens. However, Socrates accepts Callicles’ (...) premise, that the laws of the polis must agree with nature. Still, he disagrees with Callicles about the nature of human nature and proposes an alternative theory of human nature, eventually leading to his alternative concept of natural justice. The article explains the arguments underpinning these two concepts of natural justice, including the conflicting understandings of human nature. (shrink)

This article proposes an analysis of Plato’s Sophist that underlines the bond between the logical and the emotional components of the Socratic elenchus, with the aim of depicting the social valence of this philosophical practice. The use of emotions characterizing the ‘elenctic’ method described by Plato is crucial in influencing the audience and is introduced at the very moment in which the interlocutor attempts to protect his social image by concealing his shame at being refuted. The audience, thanks to Plato’s (...) literary strategy, realizes the failures of the interlocutor even as he refuses to accept them. As a result, his social image becomes tarnished. Purification through shame reveals how the medium is strictly related to the endorsement of specific ethical and political goals, making the Platonic dialogs the tools for the constitution of a new paideia. (shrink)

The paper concerns the refutation of Polus (474c-475e). My approach to the refutation is to give a logical analysis of the argument and the fallacy in it. I argue that the verbal nature of the refutation is a valuable key to understanding the special emphasis that Plato places on the sophistic misuse of language.

An introduction to a collection of nine papers on contempt, bringing contemporary philosophical approaches to the phenomenon into relation with its construction and presentation in the four classical cultures of China, Greece, India, and Rome. The introduction offers a brief summary of the papers and places the issues that they explore in the wider research context of the historical and cross-cultural study of emotion.

The paper offers a new reading of the argument against poetry in Plato’s Republic 10. I argue that Socrates’ corruption charges rely on the tripartite theory of the soul, and that metaphysical doctrines play a role only in the first charge, which demonstrates that the poets are not qualified to teach by reducing tragic poetry to mimetic skill. This accusation clears the way for two corruption charges: the strengthening of appetite, and the softening of spirit (i.e., ‘the greatest charge’). The (...) former focuses on the dangerous association between the poets and the largest appetitive class in the city (hoi polloi), while the latter focuses on the corruption of the educated elite (hoi epieikeis). (shrink)