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  1. Assertability Conditions and the Investigations.Nicoletta Bartunek - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (4):1023-1042.
    Later Wittgenstein is famous for having related meaning and use. Nonetheless, thanks to Dummett and Kripke, and the debates they provoked, a conventional wisdom is nowadays available: Wittgenstein, so the story goes, adopted a theory of meaning in terms of assertability conditions. This paper claims that it is wrong to attribute such a theory to the Investigations. For such a thesis to go through, one of the following two scenarios should be confirmed. It should either be true that Wittgenstein reduces (...)
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  • Wittgenstein on Public Language About Personal Experiences.Mamata Manjari Panda & Rajakishore Nath - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (5):1939-1960.
    In this paper, we would like to discuss Wittgenstein’s critique of the idea that a person’s experiences are necessarily private, and these experiences can only be expressible in a private language. Taking a clue from Wittgenstein, we intend to say that the person’s experiences though private, can also be known by others. In the following sections 243 of his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein argues against the possibility of a private language about the subject’s inner experiences. He contends that by coining names/words (...)
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  • Stroud on Wittgenstein, Meaning, and Community.Claudine Verheggen - 2005 - Dialogue 44 (1):67-85.
    According to Barry Stroud, Wittgenstein thought that language is social only in this minimal way: we cannot make sense of the idea of someone having a language unless we can describe her as using signs in conformity with the linguistic practices of some community. Since a solitary person could meet this condition, Stroud concludes that, for Wittgenstein, solitary languages are possible. I argue that Wittgenstein in fact thought that language is social in a much more robust way. Solitary languages are (...)
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  • International Handbook of Research in History, Philosophy and Science Teaching.Michael R. Matthews (ed.) - 2014 - Springer.
    This inaugural handbook documents the distinctive research field that utilizes history and philosophy in investigation of theoretical, curricular and pedagogical issues in the teaching of science and mathematics. It is contributed to by 130 researchers from 30 countries; it provides a logically structured, fully referenced guide to the ways in which science and mathematics education is, informed by the history and philosophy of these disciplines, as well as by the philosophy of education more generally. The first handbook to cover the (...)
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  • The Community View Revisited.Claudine Verheggen - 2007 - Metaphilosophy 38 (5):612-631.
    Joining a vast Wittgensteinian anti-theoretical movement, John Canfield has argued that it is possible to read the claims that (1) “language is essentially communal” and (2) “it is conceptually possible that a Crusoe isolated from birth should speak or follow rules” in such a way that they are perfectly compatible, and, indeed, that Wittgenstein held them both at once. The key to doing this is to drain them of any theoretical content or implications that would put each claim at odds (...)
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  • Rules, Technique, and Practical Knowledge: A Wittgensteinian Exploration of Vocational Learning.Christopher Winch - 2006 - Educational Theory 56 (4):407-421.
    In this essay, Christopher Winch explores the relevance of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s account of rule‐following to vocational education with particular reference to the often‐made claim that any account of an activity in terms of rule‐following implies rigidity and inflexibility. He argues that most rule‐following is only successful when it involves a degree of flexibility. For instance, most technical work that involves rule‐following requires flexibility and situational awareness for success. Technical education that fails to take account of the need to apply rules (...)
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  • Is Community Necessary? Quasi-Philosophical Ruminations.C. J. B. Macmillan - 1996 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 15 (1-2):77-88.
  • No Picnic: Cavell on Rule-Descriptions.Constantine Sandis - 2021 - Philosophical Investigations 44 (3):295-317.
    Philosophical Investigations, EarlyView.
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  • That We Obey Rules Blindly Does Not Mean That We Are Blindly Subservient to Rules.Wes Sharrock & Alex Dennis - 2008 - Theory, Culture and Society 25 (2):33-50.
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  • Wittgenstein on the Impossibility of Following a Rule Only Once.Francis Y. Lin - 2020 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 28 (1):134-154.
    ABSTRACTWittgenstein’s remark that one cannot follow a rule only once has generated two puzzles: how can everyone accept it to be true? and why does Wittgenstein advance it? These two puzzles have tormented commentators for decades. In this paper I put forward a new interpretation and explain away the two puzzles. I shall show that Wittgenstein’s remark is plain truth and that his motivation behind making it is to dissolve the picture theory of meaning propounded in the Tractatus. This interpretation (...)
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  • Private Language.Stewart Candlish - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    cannot understand the language.”[1] This is not intended to cover (easily imaginable) cases of recording one's experiences in a personal code, for such a code, however obscure in fact, could in principle be deciphered. What Wittgenstein had in mind is a language conceived as necessarily comprehensible only to its single originator because the things which define its vocabulary are necessarily inaccessible to others.
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