Arguments about the morality of the use of deception in patient care have been conducted largely in an empirical vacuum, with few data about the situations in which deception occurs. Do staff frequently deceive their patients and, if so, under what conditions? Can the consequences of deception always be foreseen? What justifications do staff use to explain their behaviour? The small-scale study reported here on the uses of deception by nurses when attempting to reassure patients provides information on these questions. (...) The results suggest that deception can have deleterious effects on trust and increase the emotional distance between patients and staff. (shrink)

Is there ever any reason for a doctor to lie to a patient? In this paper, we critically review the literature on lying to patients and challenge the common notion that while lying is unacceptable, a related entity--'benevolent deception' is defensible. Further, we outline a rare circumstance when treating psychotic patients where lying to the patient is justified. This circumstance is illustrated by a clinical vignette.

Background: There is a lack of empirical data on lay attitudes toward different sorts of deception in medicine. However, lay attitudes toward deception should be taken into account when we consider whether deception is ever permissible in a medical context. The objective of this study was to examine lay attitudes of U.S. citizens toward different sorts of deception across different medical contexts. Methods: A one-time online survey was administered to U.S. users of the Amazon “Mechanical Turk” website. Participants were asked (...) to answer questions regarding a series of vignettes depicting different sorts of deception in medical care, as well as a question regarding their general attitudes toward truth-telling. Results: Of the 200 respondents, the majority found the use of placebos in different contexts to be acceptable following partial disclosure but found it to be unacceptable if it involved outright lying. Also, 55.5% of respondents supported the use of sham surgery in clinical research, although 55% claimed that it would be unacceptable to deceive patients in this research, even if this would improve the quality of the data from the study. Respondents supported fully informing patients about distressing medical information in different contexts, especially when the patient is suffering from a chronic condition. In addition, 42.5% of respondents believed that it is worse to deceive someone by providing the person with false information than it is to do so by giving the person true information that is likely to lead them to form a false belief, without telling them other important information that shows it to be false. However, 41.5% believed that the two methods of deception were morally equivalent. Conclusions: Respondents believed that some forms of deception were acceptable in some circumstances. While the majority of our respondents opposed outright lying in medical contexts, they were prepared to support partial disclosure and the use of placebos when it is in the patient's interests or when it is what the person would want. These results support the position that physicians should be allowed a greater degree of authority to make a professional judgment about whether deception might be morally warranted by the circumstances, provided that it doesn't involve outright lying. (shrink)

Objectives—To discover what dementia sufferers feel is wrong with them; what they have been told and by whom, and what they wish to know about their illness.Background—Ethical guidelines regarding telling truth appear to be equivocal. Declarations of cognitively intact subjects, attitudes of family members and current psychiatric practice all vary, but no previous research has been published concerning what patients with dementia would in fact like to know about their diagnosis and prognosis.Design—Questionnaire study of the patients' opinions.Setting—Old Age Psychiatry Service (...) in Worcester.Participants—30 consecutive patients with dementia.Results—The quality of information received has been poor and many patients have no opportunity to discuss their illness with anybody. Despite that almost half of the participants in this study had adequate insight and a majority declared that they would like to know more about their predicament.Conclusions—Although many patients would like to know the truth, the rights of those who do not want to know should also be respected. Therefore the diagnosis of dementia should not be routinely disclosed but health care professionals should seek to understand their patients' preferences and act appropriately according to their choice. (shrink)

Does it signify morally whether a deception is achieved by a lie or some other way? David Bakhurst has challenged my view that it can signify. Here I counter his criticisms--firstly, by clarifying the terminology: What counts as a lie? Secondly, by exploring further what makes lying wrong. Bakhurst maintains that lying is wrong in that it infringes autonomy--and other deceiving stratagems, he says, do so equally. I maintain that lying is wrong in that it endangers trust--and other types of (...) deceiving stratagems do not do so equally. Lying to patients, I contend, is an abuse of their trust. Other forms of their intentional deception need not be so, although, in our autonomy-minded culture, they are likely to be so. (shrink)

Power is an inescapable aspect of all socialrelationships, and inherently is neither goodnor evil. Doctors need power to fulfil theirprofessional obligations to multipleconstituencies including patients, thecommunity and themselves. Patients need powerto formulate their values, articulate andachieve health needs, and fulfil theirresponsibilities. However, both parties canuse or misuse power. The ethical effectivenessof a health system is maximised by empoweringdoctors and patients to develop `adult-adult'rather than `adult-child' relationships thatrespect and enable autonomy, accountability,fidelity and humanity. Even in adult-adultrelationships, conflicts and complexitiesarise. Lack of (...) concordance between doctors andpatients can encourage paternalism but may bebest resolved through negotiated care. Afurther area of conflict involves the `doubleagency' of doctors for both patients and thecommunity. Empowerment of all players is notalways possible but is most likely where eachparty considers and acknowledges power issues. (shrink)

All’interno del dibattito sulla definizione filosofica della menzogna, alcuni autori hanno sostenuto che mentire è sempre sbagliato. Margolis, in particolare, ha espresso la tesi radicale secondo cui “mentire è moralmente sbagliato” è una tautologia. Nella prima parte dell’articolo introduco la tesi di Margolis, e ne difendo la plausibilità contro le semplificazioni che ha subito all’interno del dibattito filosofico, mostrando che l’applicazione condizionale del predicato “sbagliato” consente di trattare in modo adeguato alcune menzogne intuitivamente giustificabili. Nella seconda parte argomento che, nonostante (...) questo stratagemma, non è possibile difendere la tesi che “mentire è moralmente sbagliato” sia una tautologia, perché bisognerebbe assumere che “mentire è moralmente sbagliato” sia una condizione necessaria fra quelle che definiscono il concetto stesso di menzogna. Questo non è desiderabile perché, come dimostro nella parte finale del mio articolo, ogni definizione di menzogna che incorpori requisiti morali nelle sue condizioni necessarie é destinata a contraddire le intuizioni del senso comune su che cos’é una menzogna. La conclusione è che la tesi che “mentire è moralmente è sbagliato” è una tautologia non può essere difesa, se non al prezzo, troppo alto, di ridefinire in modo controintuitivo il significato del termine “menzogna”. (shrink)