Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. An Epistemological Problem for Resurrection.Yann Schmitt - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7 (1):219--230.
    Some theists have adopted materialism for human persons. They associate this metaphysics with their belief in resurrection and focus on problems arising from personal identity, temporal gaps or material constitution, but, in this paper, I argue that being a materialist for human persons leads to an epistemological problem regarding our knowledge of God’s life. The only way to avoid this problem is to choose a particular materialist metaphysics for human persons, that is, a constitution theory that emphasizes the irreducibility of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Why a Bodily Resurrection?: The Bodily Resurrection and the Mind/Body Relation.Mugg Joshua & James T. Turner Jr - 2017 - Journal of Analytic Theology 5:121-144.
    The doctrine of the resurrection says that God will resurrect the body that lived and died on earth—that the post-mortem body will be numerically identical to the pre-mortem body. After exegetically supporting this claim, and defending it from a recent objection, we ask: supposing that the doctrine of the resurrection is true, what are the implications for the mind-body relation? Why would God resurrect the body that lived and died on earth? We compare three accounts of the mind-body relation that (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Can I Survive Without My Body? Undercutting the Modal Argument.Joshua Mugg - 2018 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 84 (1):71-92.
    Modal Arguments in the philosophy of mind purport to show that the body is not necessary for a human person’s existence. The key premise in these arguments are generally supported with thought experiments. I argue that Christians endorsing the Doctrine of the Resurrection have good reason to deny this key premise. Traditional Christianity affirms that eschatological human existence is an embodied existence in the very bodies we inhabited while alive. The raises the Resurrection Question: why would God go through the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Soul, Body and Survival: The Renaissance of Christian Materialism.Godehard Brüntrup - 2009 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 65 (1):1137 - 1155.
    Article on recent metaphysical accounts of bodily resurrection.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Dismantling Bodily Resurrection Arguments Against Mind-Body Dualism.Brandon Rickabaugh - 2018 - In R. Keith Loftin & Joshua Farris (eds.), Christian Physicalism? Philosophical Theological Criticisms. Lanham: Lexington Books. pp. 295-317.
    According to the Christian doctrine of bodily resurrection, human persons will have an embodied existence in eternity. Many Christian materialists, especially Lynne Rudder Baker, Trenton Merricks, and Kevin Corcoran, argue that the doctrine of bodily resurrection creates serious problems for substance dualism (dualism). These critiques argued that bodily resurrection is made trivial by dualism, that dualism makes it difficult if not impossible to explain why we need to be embodied, or that dualism should be rejected as bodily resurrection is better (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Swinburne on Substance Dualism.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (2):5--15.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • A Personalist-Phenomenological Model of General Resurrection in Light of Current Science and Medicine.Edgar Danielyan - 2018 - Dissertation,
    I have argued that the central Christian doctrine of general resurrection (with particular reference to the Pauline corpus) can and should be understood in a scientifically and philosophically informed context, and have proposed a personalist-phenomenological model of general resurrection as a personally continuous transformative re-embodiment by the grace of God within an interpretative framework that respects the methods and findings of science while rejecting scientism and associated physicalist metaphysical claims. I have considered and rejected the re-assembly model of resurrection on (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • First-Personal Aspects of Agency.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (1-2):1-16.
    Abstract: On standard accounts, actions are caused by reasons (Davidson), and reasons are taken to be neural phenomena. Since neural phenomena are wholly understandable from a third-person perspective, standard views have no room for any ineliminable first-personal elements in an account of the causation of action. This article aims to show that first-person perspectives play essential roles in both human and nonhuman agency. Nonhuman agents have rudimentary first-person perspectives, whereas human agents—at least rational agents and moral agents—have robust first-person perspectives. (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • IV—Empathy and First-Personal Imagining.Rae Langton - 2019 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 119 (1):77-104.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • 3.5-Dimensionalism and Survival. A Process-Ontological Approach.Godehard Brüntrup - 2010 - In Georg Gasser (ed.), Personal Identity and Resurrection. How Do We Survive Our Death? Ashgate. pp. 67-85.
    A slightly abbreviated English version of the German paper on personal identity and resurrection.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Emergent Individuals and the Resurrection.Jonathan D. Jacobs & Timothy O'Connor - 2010 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2 (2):69 - 88.
    We present an original emergent individuals view of human persons, on which persons are substantial biological unities that exemplify metaphysically emergent mental states. We argue that this view allows for a coherent model of identity-preserving resurrection from the dead consistent with orthodox Christian doctrine, one that improves upon alternatives accounts recently proposed by a number of authors. Our model is a variant of the “falling elevator” model advanced by Dean Zimmerman that, unlike Zimmerman’s, does not require a closest continuer account (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Identity, Incarnation, and the Imago Dei.James T. Turner - forthcoming - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion:1-17.
    A number of thinkers suggest that, given certain conditions, it’s possible that any concrete human nature could have been united hypostatically to the second Person of the Trinity. Oliver Crisp argues that a potency to have been possibly hypostatically united to the Logos is an important part of what it means for a human person to be made in the image of God. Against this line of reasoning, and building on an argument in print by Andrew Jaeger, I argue two (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • No Explanation of Persons, No Explanation of Resurrection: On Lynne Baker’s Constitution View and the Resurrection of Human Persons.James T. Turner - 2014 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 76 (3):297-317.
    I don’t think Lynne Rudder Baker’s constitution view can account for personal identity problems of a synchronic or diachronic nature. As such, it cannot accommodate the Christian’s claim of eschatological bodily resurrection-a principle reason for which she gives this account. In light of this, I press objections against her constitution view in the following ways: First, I critique an analogy she draws between Aristotle’s “accidental sameness” and constitution. Second, I address three problems for Baker’s constitution view [‘Constitution Problems’ ], each (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Christian Materialism in a Scientific Age.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2011 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (1):47-59.
    Many Christians who argue against Christian materialism direct their arguments against what I call ‘Type-I materialism’, the thesis that I cannot exist without my organic body. I distinguish Type-I materialism from Type-II materialism, which entails only that I cannot exist without some body that supports certain mental functions. I set out a version of Type-II materialism, and argue for its superiority to Type-I materialism in an age of science. Moreover, I show that Type-II materialism can accommodate Christian doctrines like the (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Mandatory Autopsies and Organ Conscription.David Hershenov - 2009 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 19 (4):367-391.
    The State may require an autopsy when foul play is suspected in the death of one of its citizens.[1] This is so regardless of any objections to such invasive procedures expressed by the deceased before their deaths or afterward by their families. There is not even a religious exemption. The most obvious explanation for why consent is not needed is that apprehending a murderer with information obtained from the autopsy can save lives. However, taking organs without consent from the deceased (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • The Possibility of Resurrection by Reassembly.Justin Mooney - 2018 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 84 (3):273-288.
    It is widely held that the classic reassembly model of resurrection faces intractable problems. What happens to someone if God assembles two individuals at the resurrection which are equally good candidates for being the original person? If two or more people, such as a cannibal and the cannibal’s victim, were composed of the same particles at their respective deaths, can they both be resurrected? If they can, who gets the shared particles? And would an attempt to reassemble a long-gone individual (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Constitution and the Falling Elevator: The Continuing Incompatibility of Materialism and Resurrection Belief.Jonathan Loose - 2012 - Philosophia Christi 14 (2):439-450.
    Ontological dualism is energetically resisted by a range of Christian scholars including philosophers such as Baker and Corcoran who defend accounts of human persons based on material constitution. Whilst Baker’s view fails to account for diachronic identity, Corcoran’s account of life after death makes use of Zimmerman’s problematic “Falling Elevator Model.” It is argued that Zimmerman’s recent reassessment of the model overestimates its value for materialists. In fact, the model generates either a fatal encounter with the nature of identity, or (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Animals with Soul.Joshua C. Thurow - 2018 - Sophia 57 (1):85-101.
    I argue that ensouled animalism—the view that we are identical to animals that have immaterial souls as parts—has a pair of advantages over its two nearest rivals, materialistic animalism and pure dualism. Contra pure dualism, ensouled animalism can explain how physical predications can be literally true of us. Contra materialistic animalism, ensouled animalism can explain how animals can survive death. Furthermore, ensouled animalism has these advantages without creating any problems beyond those already faced by animalism and by belief in souls. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Surviving Resurrection.Andrei A. Buckareff & Joel S. Van Wagenen - 2010 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 67 (3):123 - 139.
    In this paper we examine and critique the constitution view of the metaphysics of resurrection developed and defended by Lynne Rudder Baker. Baker identifies three conditions for an adequate metaphysics of resurrection. We argue that one of these, the identity condition, cannot be met on the constitution view given the account of personal identity it assumes. We discuss some problems with the constitution theory of personal identity Baker develops in her book, Persons and Bodies. We argue that these problems render (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Metaphysics of Constitution and Accounts of the Resurrection.Jonathan Loose - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (9):857-865.
    Some Christian materialists have argued for the possibility of resurrection given that persons are constituted by bodies, and constitution is not identity. Baker's constitutionist view claims superiority over animalist alternatives but offers only circular accounts of both personal identity over time and personhood. Corcoran's alternative approaches these questions differently but makes use of Zimmerman's ‘Falling Elevator Model’ of resurrection, which is rendered incoherent by its reliance on contingent identity. A recent constitutionist revision of this model succeeds only in exchanging incoherence (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Natural Evil: The Simulation Solution.Barry Dainton - forthcoming - Religious Studies:1-22.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Animalism.Andrew M. Bailey - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):867-883.
    Among your closest associates is a certain human animal – a living, breathing, organism. You see it when you look in the mirror. When it is sick, you don't feel too well. Where it goes, you go. And, one thinks, where you go, it must follow. Indeed, you can make it move through sheer force of will. You bear, in short, an important and intimate relation to this, your animal. So too rest of us with our animals. Animalism says that (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations