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Nathan Ballantyne (2014). Counterfactual Philosophers.

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  1.  48
    The Epistemology of Moral Disagreement.Richard Rowland - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (2):1-16.
    This article is about the implications of a conciliatory view about the epistemology of peer disagreement for our moral beliefs. Many have endorsed a conciliatory view about the epistemology of peer disagreement according to which if we find ourselves in a disagreement about some matter with another whom we should judge to be our epistemic peer on that matter, we must revise our judgment about that matter. This article focuses on three issues about the implications of conciliationism for our moral (...)
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  2. Worrisome Skepticism About Philosophy.Bryan Frances - 2016 - Episteme 13 (3):289-303.
    A new kind of skepticism about philosophy is articulated and argued for. The key premise is the claim that many of us are well aware that in the past we failed to have good responses to substantive objections to our philosophical beliefs. The conclusion is disjunctive: either we are irrational in sticking with our philosophical beliefs, or we commit some other epistemic sin in having those beliefs.
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  3. The Significance of Unpossessed Evidence.Nathan Ballantyne - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):315-335.
  4.  58
    The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays By David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey.Tomas Bogardus & Anna Brinkerhoff - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):339-342.
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  5. Philosophical Success.Nathan Hanna - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2109-2121.
    Peter van Inwagen proposes a criterion of philosophical success. He takes it to support an extremely pessimistic view about philosophy. He thinks that all philosophical arguments for substantive conclusions fail, including the argument from evil. I’m more optimistic on both counts. I’ll identify problems with van Inwagen’s criterion and propose an alternative. I’ll then explore the differing implications of our criteria. On my view, philosophical arguments can succeed and the argument from evil isn’t obviously a failure.
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