Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. O Que É Behaviorismo Sobre a Mente?Filipe Lazzeri - 2019 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 23 (2):249-277.
    It is common to find depictions of behaviorist approaches to the mind as approaches according to which mental events are “dispositions for behavior.” Moreover, it is sometimes said that for these approaches the dispositions are for publicly observable behaviors, or even “purely physical movements,” thereby excluding from being constitutive of mental events any internal bodily happening, besides any movement not taken as “purely physical.” In this paper I aim to pinpoint problems in such widespread depictions of behaviorism about the mind, (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Repliek: Breken met een oude conceptuele tegenstelling.Fred Keijzer - 2016 - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 108 (2):207-224.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Picturing Primates and Looking at Monkeys: Why 21st Century Primatology Needs Wittgenstein.Louise Barrett - 2018 - Philosophical Investigations 41 (2):161-187.
    The Social Intelligence or Social Brain Hypothesis is an influential theory that aims to explain the evolution of brain size and cognitive complexity among the primates. This has shaped work in both primate behavioural ecology and comparative psychology in deep and far-reaching ways. Yet, it not only perpetuates many of the conceptual confusions that have plagued psychology since its inception, but amplifies them, generating an overly intellectual view of what it means to be a competent and successful social primate. Here, (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Enactivism, Pragmatism…Behaviorism?Louise Barrett - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (3):807-818.
    Shaun Gallagher applies enactivist thinking to a staggeringly wide range of topics in philosophy of mind and cognitive science, even venturing into the realms of biological anthropology. One prominent point Gallagher makes that the holistic approach of enactivism makes it less amenable to scientific investigation than the cognitivist framework it seeks to replace, and should be seen as a “philosophy of nature” rather than a scientific research program. Gallagher also gives truth to the saying that “if you want new ideas, (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation