Several inquires about healthcare over the past several decades have shown that the evolution of healthcare practices exhibit their own microcosm of local and political influences. Likewise, other studies have shown clearly the ways in which both external and internal institutional factors establish the sectors within which healthcare is delivered. Although restrictions have always been present in some form, it seems obvious that whatever the precise form of healthcare delivery that results from current changes in its organization, there are going (...) to be broader restrictions not only on the choices that providers will be able to make about individual patients' care and needs, but also regarding the character of their clinical judgments. Indeed, there are already reports of instances where physicians' contracts with managed care organizations forbid them to disclose the existence of services not covered by a plan. (shrink)

“Clinical ethics consultants” have been practicing in the United States for about 50 years. Most of the earliest consultants—the “pioneers”—were “outsiders” when they first appeared at patients' bedsides and in the clinic. However, if they were outsiders initially, they acclimated to the clinical setting and became “insiders” very quickly. Moreover, there was some tension between traditional academics and those doing applied ethics about whether there was sufficient “critical distance” for appropriate reflection about the complex medical ethics dilemmas of the day (...) if one were involved in the decision making. Again, the pioneers deflected concerns by identifying and instituting safeguards to assure professional objectivity in clinical ethics consultation services. One might suggest that in moving inside and establishing normative practices, the pioneer clinical ethics consultants anticipated adoption of their routines and professionalization of the field. (shrink)

Background Implementing person-centred care (PCC) in nursing homes is challenging due to a gap between theory and practice. Bridging this gap requires suitable education, which focuses on learning how to attune care to the values and preferences of residents and take moral, relational, and situational aspects into account. Staff’s stories about the care they provide (i.e. caring stories) may deliver valuable insights for learning about these aspects. However, there is limited research on using staff's narratives for moral learning. Objective This (...) study aims to provide insight into the perspectives of nursing staff on using their caring stories to learn about PCC. Research design In this qualitative research, we conducted two rounds of interviews with 17 participants working in nursing homes. We wanted to obtain nursing staff’s perceptions of working with their caring stories and the impact on PCC. Ethical considerations Participation was voluntary, and participants provided written consent. The study protocol is approved by The Institutional Review Board of the Medical Ethical Committee Leiden-Den Haag-Delft. Findings Working with caring stories enables nursing staff to provide PCC and improves job satisfaction. It increases awareness of what matters to residents, fosters information rich in context and meaning, and enhances voice and vocabulary. Through in-depth team reflections, nursing staff discussed the significant moments for residents, which centralizes the discussions on the moral quality of care. Discussion Working with caring stories fosters dialogue on PCC and enhances reflection on ethical situations in daily encounters, contributing to the moral development of nursing staff. Putting nursing staff’s narratives at the centre of learning suits their daily practice and intrinsic motivation. Therefore, the outcomes of this study are an addition to the existing literature about using narratives in long-term care. Conclusion Using nursing staff's narratives contributes to PCC and positively impacts nursing staff. We recommend using staff's caring stories as a vehicle for moral learning in the transition to PCC. (shrink)

OBJECTIVES: To study empirically whether ethical theory (from the mainstream principles-based, virtue-based, and feminist schools) usefully describes the approaches doctors and nurses take in everyday patient care. DESIGN: Ethnographic methods: participant observation and interviews, the transcripts of which were analysed to identify themes in ethical approaches. SETTING: A British old-age psychiatry ward. PARTICIPANTS: The more than 20 doctors and nurses on the ward. RESULTS: Doctors and nurses on the ward differed in their conceptions of the principles of beneficence and respect (...) for patient autonomy. Nurses shared with doctors a commitment to liberal and utilitarian conceptions of these principles, but also placed much greater weight on relationships and character virtues when expressing the same principles. Nurses also emphasised patient autonomy, while doctors were more likely to advocate beneficence, when the two principles conflicted. CONCLUSION: The study indicates that ethical theory can, contrary to the charges of certain critics, be relevant to everyday health care-if it (a) attends to social context and (b) is flexible enough to draw on various schools of theory. (shrink)

Among the many striking features of modern medicine is one that has rarely received its due, save by those specialists in the arcane and remote: medical historians. Medicine is a profoundly historical enterprise, deeply marked by and in continuous, if only implicit, dialogue with its own history. Historical reflection on medicine is therefore an especially compelling undertaking. A case in point: scratch almost any physician today and you find an abiding commitment to “Hippocmtic morality.”.

The attempt to critique the profession of clinical ethics consultation by establishing the impossibility of ethics expertise has been a red herring. Decisions made in clinical ethics cases are almost never based purely on moral judgments. Instead, they are all-things-considered judgments that involve determining how to balance other values as well. A standard of justified decision-making in this context would enable us to identify experts who could achieve these standards more often than others, and thus provide a basis for expertise (...) in clinical ethics consultation. This expertise relies in part on what Richard Zaner calls the “expert knowledge of ethical phenomena”. (shrink)

In this paper, I supplement T. A. Cavanaugh’s arguments against physician-assisted suicide in his book, Hippocrates’ Oath and Asclepius’ Snake, by focusing more specifically on the dangers of the misuse of physician power and on the virtues essential to restrain such power. Since Cavanaugh’s starting point is similar to Edmund Pellegrino’s views on the fundamental ends of medicine, I start with the question of the proper ends of medicine. Cavanaugh’s interpretation of the Hippocratic Oath as the limitation of physician power (...) to heal and to kill raises the issue of the proper use of physician power over the patient. In order to support and strengthen Cavanaugh’s case, I use Richard Zaner’s discussion of physician power over the patient and the attendant duty to use such power in a responsible way. Finally, I supplement Cavanaugh’s discussion with a fuller account of physician virtues as they relate to physician-assisted suicide. I first discuss the ends of medicine, medical power, and physician-assisted suicide. Second, I discuss the relationship between virtue and physician-assisted suicide. Third, I draw some final conclusions. (shrink)

Several inquires about healthcare over the past several decades have shown that the evolution of healthcare practices exhibit their own microcosm of local and political influences. Likewise, other studies have shown clearly the ways in which both external and internal institutional factors establish the sectors within which healthcare is delivered. Although restrictions have always been present in some form, it seems obvious that whatever the precise form of healthcare delivery that results from current changes in its organization, there are going (...) to be broader restrictions not only on the choices that providers will be able to make about individual patients' care and needs, but also regarding the character of their clinical judgments. Indeed, there are already reports of instances where physicians' contracts with managed care organizations forbid them to disclose the existence of services not covered by a plan. (shrink)

Applied ethics is at a watershed. In all its domains a gulf between the theory of applied ethics and the practice of applied ethics is now being recognized. In medical ethics, for example, it has been observed that “practicing clinicians often feel let down by bioethics.” The disappointment of clinicians is attributed in part to their own unrealistic expectations but is also said to be a function ofthe extent to which bioethics as a discipline doesn't seem to be in possession (...) of the realities of practice. Bioethicists tend to leave the “facts” of clinical medicine to the doctors; their task is then to apply elegant and compelling arguments drawn from first principles of ethics … to these undisputed and indisputable facts. Unfortunately, when the relationship between clinical medicine and bioethics is conceived … [in this way], the result is a very sterile discourse. (shrink)

Whether ethics is too important to be left to the experts or so important that it must be is an age-old question. The emergence of clinical ethicists raises it again, as a question about professionalism. What role clinical ethicists should play in healthcare decision making – teacher, mediator, or consultant – is a question that has generated considerable debate but no consensus.

Clinical ethics consultants (CECs) work in complex environments ripe with multiple types of expectations. Significantly, some are due to the perspectives of professional colleagues and the patients and families with whom CECs consult and concern how CECs can, do, or should function, thus adding to the moral complexity faced by CECs in those particular circumstances. We outline six such common expectations: Ethics Police, Ethics Equalizer, Ethics Superhero, Ethics Expediter, Ethics Healer or Ameliorator, and, finally, Ethics Expert. Framed by examples of (...) requests for ethics consultation that illustrate each kind, along with brief descriptions, we argue that while these expectations ought to be resisted for clear and practical reasons, they also create opportunities for CECs to articulate, educate, and ultimately be responsible to the professional demands of clinical ethics work. Recognizing, acknowledging, and at times resisting those expectations thus become key activities and responsibilities in the performance of ethics consultation. (shrink)

In recent years the phenomenological approach to bioethics has been rejuvenated and reformulated by, among others, the Swedish philosopher Fredrik Svenaeus. Building on the now-relatively mainstream phenomenological approach to health and illness, Svenaeus has sought to bring phenomenological insights to bear on the bioethical enterprise, with a view to critiquing and refining the “philosophical anthropology” presupposed by the latter. This article offers a critical but sympathetic analysis of Svenaeus’ efforts, focusing on both his conception of the ends of phenomenological bioethics (...) and the predominantly Heideggerian means he employs. Doing so reveals certain problems with both. I argue that the main aim of phenomenological bioethics as set out by Svenaeus needs to be reformulated, and that there are important oversights in his approach to reaching this end. I conclude by arguing that to overcome the latter problem we should draw instead on the works of Max Scheler and Hans Jonas. (shrink)

In this article I argue for an interpretive approach to bioethics with critically ill children. I begin by highlighting the dominant Anglo-American bioethical framework that defines standards for ethical care in critically ill children and then outline a critique of this framework. Drawing predominantly on the ideas of Charles Taylor, Michael Walzer and Richard Zaner, I call for a reconception of bioethics and propose an interpretive ‘thick’ framework that is centred on culture and context. Finally, I illustrate this interpretive approach (...) through a comparative study of two cases in pediatric intensive care: the narratives of Marc and Larry. These case studies reveal that ethical dilemmas in pediatric critical care can be traced to relational tensions over respect, trust and power rooted in the disparity of moral horizons among the persons involved. (shrink)

Douglas Diekema has argued that it is not the best interest standard, but the harm principle that serves as the moral basis for ethicists, clinicians, and the courts to trigger state intervention to limit parental authority in the clinic. Diekema claims the harm principle is especially effective in justifying state intervention in cases of religiously motivated medical neglect in pediatrics involving Jehovah’s Witnesses and Christian Scientists. I argue that Diekema has not articulated a harm principle that is capable of justifying (...) state intervention in these cases. Where disagreements over appropriate care are tethered to metaphysical disagreements, it is moral-metaphysical standards, rather than merely moral standards, that are needed to provide substantive guidance. I provide a discussion of Diekema’s harm principle to the broader end of highlighting an inconsistency between the theory and practice of secular bioethics when overriding religiously based medical decisions. In a secular state, ethicists, clinicians, and the courts are purportedly neutral with respect to moral-metaphysical positions, especially regarding those claims considered to be religious. However, the practice of overriding religiously based parental requests requires doffing the mantle of neutrality. In the search for a meaningful standard by which to override religiously based parental requests in pediatrics, bioethicists cannot avoid some minimal metaphysical commitments. To resolve this inconsistency, bioethicists must either begin permitting religiously based requests, even at the cost of children’s lives, or admit that at least some moral-metaphysical disputes can be rationally adjudicated. (shrink)

Robert Card has proposed a reasonability view of conscientious objection that asks providers to state the reasons for their objection for evaluation and approval by a review board. Jason Marsh has challenged Card to provide explicit criteria for what makes a conscientious objection reasonable, which he claims will be too difficult a task given that such objections often involve contentious metaphysical or religious claims. Card has responded by outlining standards by which a conscientious objection could be judged reasonable. In this (...) paper, I extend Marsh’s critique to key concepts in the standards outlined by Card such as abortifacient, harm, emergency, and discrimination, showing they can be given radically different interpretations given different metaphysical or religious presumptions. To resolve these conflicting interpretations, a reasonability view of conscientious objection will need more than the criteria outlined by Card, it will need the resources to evaluate the reasonability of metaphysical or religious claims. (shrink)

This written account of a clinical encounter - depicting fragments of a more extensive array of events - attempts to exemplify many facets and associated complexities of clinical ethics consultation. Within the general telling, I provide more detailed portrayals of several key events. In secion 1, I document briefly my initial interactions at the beginning of the consultation, focusing on the information gained - in the context of those interactions - as I read the medical chart of Mrs. Rose. Next (...) in section 2, I briefly describes my initial conversation with Mrs. Rose's three sons. Section 3 illustrates several questions raised in sections 1 and 2. Then section 4 presents my encounter with Paul, the youngest son, as he was carrying out his vigil at his mother's bedside in the hospital. Section 5 chronicles my interactions with several care providers involved in Mrs. Rose's situation, including two different meetings that occurred with Mrs. Rose's attending physician. I conclude in section 6 by telling about a conversation I had with Mrs. Rose's middle son, Russell, approximately one month after Mrs. Rose died. (shrink)

Significant challenges arise for clinical care teams when a patient or surrogate decision-maker hopes a miracle will occur. This article answers the question, “How should clinical bioethicists respond when a medical decision-maker uses the hope for a miracle to orient her medical decisions?” We argue the ethicist must first understand the complexity of the miracle-invocation. To this end, we provide a taxonomy of miracle-invocations that assist the ethicist in analyzing the invocator's conceptions of God, community, and self. After the ethicist (...) appreciates how these concepts influence the invocator's worldview, she can begin responding to this hope with specific practices. We discuss these practices in detail and offer concrete recommendations for a justified response to the hope for a miracle. (shrink)

“If philosophy is essentially this activity of questioning and responding, that is, dialogue…” ∼ R.M. Zaner (The Way of Phenomenology)“Not to philosophize is to philosophize still.” E. Lévinas (“Go...