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  1. Intentionality, Mind and Folk Psychology.Winand H. Dittrich & Stephen E. G. Lea - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):39-41.
    The comment addresses central issues of a "theory theory" approach as exemplified in Gopnik' and Goldman's BBS-articles. Gopnik, on the one hand, tries to demonstrate that empirical evidence from developmental psychology supports the view of a "theory theory" in which common sense beliefs are constructed to explain ourselves and others. Focusing the informational processing routes possibly involved we would like to argue that his main thesis (e.g. idea of intentionality as a cognitive construct) lacks support at least for two reasons: (...)
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  • Religious Thought and Behaviour as by-Products of Brain Function.Pascal Boyer - 2003 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (3):119-124.
  • Responding to the Emotions of Others: Dissociating Forms of Empathy Through the Study of Typical and Psychiatric Populations.R. J. R. Blair - 2005 - Consciousness and Cognition 14 (4):698-718.
    Empathy is a lay term that is becoming increasingly viewed as a unitary function within the field of cognitive neuroscience. In this paper, a selective review of the empathy literature is provided. It is argued from this literature that empathy is not a unitary system but rather a loose collection of partially dissociable neurocognitive systems. In particular, three main divisions can be made: cognitive empathy , motor empathy, and emotional empathy. The two main psychiatric disorders associated with empathic dysfunction are (...)
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  • Do We Adopt the Intentional Stance Toward Humanoid Robots?Serena Marchesi, Davide Ghiglino, Francesca Ciardo, Jairo Perez-Osorio, Ebru Baykara & Agnieszka Wykowska - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.
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  • Competence and Performance in Belief-Desire Reasoning Across Two Cultures: The Truth, the Whole Truth and Nothing but the Truth About False Belief?Amir Amin Yazdi, Tim P. German, Margaret Anne Defeyter & Michael Siegal - 2006 - Cognition 100 (2):343-368.
  • Early Social Cognition: Alternatives to Implicit Mindreading.Leon de Bruin, Derek Strijbos & Marc Slors - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):499-517.
    According to the BD-model of mindreading, we primarily understand others in terms of beliefs and desires. In this article we review a number of objections against explicit versions of the BD-model, and discuss the prospects of using its implicit counterpart as an explanatory model of early emerging socio-cognitive abilities. Focusing on recent findings on so-called ‘implicit’ false belief understanding, we put forward a number of considerations against the adoption of an implicit BD-model. Finally, we explore a different way to make (...)
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  • Early Social Cognition: Alternatives to Implicit Mindreading.Leon Bruin, Derek Strijbos & Marc Slors - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):499-517.
    According to the BD-model of mindreading, we primarily understand others in terms of beliefs and desires. In this article we review a number of objections against explicit versions of the BD-model, and discuss the prospects of using its implicit counterpart as an explanatory model of early emerging socio-cognitive abilities. Focusing on recent findings on so-called ‘implicit’ false belief understanding, we put forward a number of considerations against the adoption of an implicit BD-model. Finally, we explore a different way to make (...)
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  • Young Children's Conceptions of Knowledge.Rachel Dudley - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (6):e12494.
    How should knowledge be analyzed? Compositionally, as having constituents like belief and justification, or as an atomic concept? In making arguments for or against these perspectives, epistemologists have begun to use experimental evidence from developmental psychology and developmental linguistics. If we were to conclude that knowledge were developmentally prior to belief, then we might have a good basis to claim that belief is not a constituent of knowledge. In this review, I present a broad range of developmental evidence from the (...)
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  • Egocentrism, Allocentrism, and Asperger Syndrome.Uta Frith & Frederique de Vignemont - 2005 - Consciousness and Cognition 14 (4):719-738.
    In this paper, we attempt to make a distinction between egocentrism and allocentrism in social cognition, based on the distinction that is made in visuo-spatial perception. We propose that it makes a difference to mentalizing whether the other person can be understood using an egocentric (‘‘you'') or an allocentric (‘‘he/ she/they'') stance. Within an egocentric stance, the other person is represented in relation to the self. By contrast, within an allocentric stance, the existence or mental state of the other person (...)
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  • Is Language Required to Represent Others’ Mental States? Evidence From Beliefs and Other Representations.Steven Samuel, Kresimir Durdevic, Edward W. Legg, Robert Lurz & Nicola S. Clayton - 2019 - Cognitive Science 43 (1):e12710.
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  • Introspection and the Elementary Acts of Mind.William Seager - 2000 - Dialogue 39 (1):53-76.
  • Introspection and the Elementary Acts of Mind.William Seager - 2000 - Dialogue 39 (1):53-76.
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  • Good Developmental Sequence and the Paradoxes of Children's Skills.Brian D. Josephson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):53.
  • Self-Ascription Without Qualia: A Case-Study.David J. Chalmers - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):35-36.
    In Section 5 of his interesting article, Goldman suggests that the consideration of imaginary cases can be valuable in the analysis of our psychological concepts. In particular, he argues that we can imagine a system that is isomorphic to us under any functional description, but which lacks qualitative mental states, such as pains and color sensations. Whether or not such a being is empirically possible, it certainly seems to be logically possible, or conceptually coherent. Goldman argues from this possibility to (...)
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  • Knowing Children's Minds.Michael Siegal - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):79.
  • Special Access Lies Down with Theory-Theory.Sydney Shoemaker - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):78.
  • Disenshrining the Cartesian Self.Barbara A. C. Saunders - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):77.
  • On Leaving Your Children Wrapped in Thought.James Russell - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):76.
  • Qualities and Relations in Folk Theories of Mind.Lance J. Rips - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):75.
  • Why Presume Analyses Are on-Line?Georges Rey - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):74.
  • Theories of Mind: Some Methodological/Conceptual Problems and an Alternative Approach.Sam S. Rakover - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):73.
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  • Theory-Theory Theory.Howard Rachlin - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):72.
  • Matching and Mental-State Ascription.Ian Pratt - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):71.
  • Representational Development and Theory-of-Mind Computations.David C. Plaut & Annette Karmiloff-Smith - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):70.
  • Limitations on First-Person Experience: Implications of the “Extent”.Bradford H. Pillow - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):69.
  • First-Person Authority and Beliefs as Representations.Paul M. Pietroski - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):67.
  • A Plea for the Second Functionalist Model and the Insufficiency of Simulation.Josef Perner - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):66.
  • The Role of Concepts in Perception and Inference.David R. Olson & Janet Wilde Astington - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):65.
  • Developmental Evidence and Introspection.Shaun Nichols - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):64.
  • Heuristics and Counterfactual Self-Knowledge.Adam Morton - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):63.
  • Mismatching Categories?William Edward Morris & Robert C. Richardson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):62.
  • Knowledge of the Psychological States of Self and Others is Not Only Theory-Laden but Also Data-Driven.Chris Moore & John Barresi - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):61.
  • The Fallibility of First-Person Knowledge of Intentionality.Peter Ludlow & Norah Martin - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):60.
  • Functionalism Can Explain Self-Ascription.Brian Loar - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):58.
  • Three Inferential Temptations.Alexander Levine & Georg Schwarz - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):57.
  • Even a Theory-Theory Needs Information Processing: ToMM, an Alternative Theory-Theory of the Child's Theory of Mind.Alan M. Leslie, Tim P. German & Francesca G. Happé - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):56.
  • Self-Attributions Help Constitute Mental Types.Bernard W. Kobes - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):54.
  • Common Sense and Adult Theory of Communication.Boaz Keysar - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):54.
  • Gopnik's Invention of Intentionality.Carl N. Johnson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):52.
  • Qualia for Propositional Attitudes?Frank Jackson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):52.
  • Analytic Functionalism Without Representational Functionalism.Terence Horgan - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):51.
  • Qualitative Characteristics, Type Materialism and the Circularity of Analytic Functionalism.Christopher S. Hill - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):50.
  • Unraveling Introspection.John Heil - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):49.
  • First-Person Current.Paul L. Harris - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):48.
  • Know My Own Mind? I Should Be so Lucky!Jennifer M. Gurd & John C. Marshall - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):47.
  • On Behalf of Phenomenological Parity for the Attitudes.Keith Gunderson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):46.
  • Self-Ascription of Belief and Desire.Robert M. Gordon - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):45.
  • Theories and Qualities.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):44.
  • Competing Accounts of Belief-Task Performance.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):43.
  • Goldman has Not Defeated Folk Functionalism.James H. Fetzer - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):42.