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  1. Ruse's Darwinian Meta-Ethics: A Critique. [REVIEW]Peter Woolcock - 1993 - Biology and Philosophy 8 (4):423-439.
    Michael Ruse, in Taking Darwin Seriously seeks to establish that taking Darwin seriously requires us to treat morality as subjective and naturalistic. I argue that, if morality is not objective, then we have no good reason for being moral if we can avoid detection and punishment. As a consequence, we will only continue to behave morally as long as we remain ignorant of Ruse''s theory, that is, as long as the cat is not let out of the bag. Ruse offers (...)
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  • The Insufficience of Supervenient Explanations of Moral Actions: Really Taking Darwin and the Naturalistic Fallacy Seriously. [REVIEW]William A. Rottschaefer & David Martinsen - 1991 - Biology and Philosophy 6 (4):439-445.
    In a recent paper in this journal (Rottschaefer and Martinsen 1990) we have proposed a view of Darwinian evolutionary metaethics that we believe improves upon Michael Ruse's (e.g., Ruse 1986) proposals by claiming that there are evolutionary based objective moral values and that a Darwinian naturalistic account of the moral good in terms of human fitness can be given that avoids the naturalistic fallacy in both its definitional and derivational forms while providing genuine, even if limited, justifications for substantive ethical (...)
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  • Bridging the Is/Ought Gap with Evolutionary Biology: Is This a Bridge Too Far?John Lemos - 1998 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (4):559-577.