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Avner Baz (2012). Must Philosopherss Rely On Intuitions?

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  1.  3
    Reply to Baz.Max Deutsch - forthcoming - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-9.
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  2.  59
    On Going Nowhere with Our Words: New Skepticism About the Philosophical Method of Cases.Avner Baz - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (1):64-83.
    The philosophical “method of cases” has been the subject of intense discussion. In a recent paper, Frank Jackson attempts to vindicate the method by proposing that it is underwritten by the “representational view of language.” Jackson's proposal is potentially very significant. For if it is true, then the method of cases stands, but quite possibly also falls, with the representational view of language as characterized by Jackson. The aim of this paper is to question the philosophical method of cases by (...)
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  3. Recent Attempts to Defend the Philosophical Method of Cases and the Linguistic Turn.Avner Baz - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):105-130.
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    Carving Intuition at its Joints.Jason Schukraft - 2016 - Metaphilosophy 47 (3):326-352.
    A central metaphilosophical project seeks to evaluate the reliability of the types of evidence that figure in philosophical arguments and, relatedly, the justificatory status of relying on those types of evidence. Traditionally, metaphilosophers have approached this project via an analysis of intuition. This article argues that the category picked out by “intuition” is both too broad and too heterogeneous to serve as the appropriate target for metaphilosophical inquiry. Intuition is a gerrymandered and disjunctive kind, undeserving of the widespread attention it (...)
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  5.  21
    Questioning the Method of Cases Fundamentally—Reply to Deutsch.Avner Baz - 2015 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (7-8):895-907.
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    Avner Baz on the ‘Point’ of a Question.Max Deutsch - 2015 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (7-8):875-894.
    Avner Baz claims that questions philosophers ask about hypothetical cases lack the kind of ‘point’ possessed by ‘everyday’ questions. He concludes from this that there is something wrong with the philosophical practice of asking questions about hypothetical cases. This paper defends the practice from Baz’s criticism.
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  7. Contemporary Ordinary Language Philosophy.Nat Hansen - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (8):556-569.
    There is a widespread assumption that ordinary language philosophy was killed off sometime in the 1960s or 70s by a combination of Gricean pragmatics and the rapid development of systematic semantic theory. Contrary to that widespread assumption, however, contemporary versions of ordinary language philosophy are alive and flourishing but going by various aliases – in particular (some versions of) ‘contextualism’ and (some versions of) ‘experimental philosophy’. And a growing group of contemporary philosophers are explicitly embracing the title as well as (...)
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    Prospects for Peircean Truth.Andrew Howat - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):365-387.
    Peircean Truth is the view that truth is in some sense epistemically constrained, constrained that is by what we would, if we inquired long enough and well enough, eventually come to believe. Contemporary Peirceans offer various different formulations of the view, which can make it difficult, particularly for critics, to see exactly how PT differs from popular alternatives such as correspondence theories or deflationism. This article, therefore, considers four possible formulations of PT, and sets out the different objections and challenges (...)
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  9. Geach's 'Refutation' of Austin Revisited.Avner Baz - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (1):pp. 41-62.
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  10. Who Knows?Avner Baz - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 17 (2):201-223.
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