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  1. Is Logic Distinctively Normative?Ivar Labukt - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (4):1025-1043.
    Logic is widely held to be a normative discipline. Various claims have been offered in support of this view, but they all revolve around the idea that logic is concerned with how one ought to reason. I argue that most of these claims—while perhaps correct—only entail that logic is normative in a way that many, if not all, intellectual disciplines are normative. I also identify some claims whose correctness would make logic normative in a way that sets it apart from (...)
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  • Philosophical Investigation Series: Selected Texts on Logic / Série Investigação Filosófica: Textos Selecionados de Lógica.Danilo Fraga Dantas & Rodrigo Cid - 2020 - Pelotas - Princesa, Pelotas - RS, Brasil: UFPEL's Publisher / Editora da UFPEL.
    Este livro marca o início da Série Investigação Filosófica. Uma série de livros de traduções de textos de plataformas internacionalmente reconhecidas, que possa servir tanto como material didático para os professores das diferentes subáreas e níveis da Filosofia quanto como material de estudo para o desenvolvimento pesquisas relevantes na área. Nós, professores, sabemos o quão difícil é encontrar bons materiais em português para indicarmos. E há uma certa deficiência na graduação brasileira de filosofia, principalmente em localizações menos favorecidas, com relação (...)
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  • Limits of Abductivism About Logic.Ulf Hlobil - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (2):320-340.
    I argue against abductivism about logic, which is the view that rational theory choice in logic happens by abduction. Abduction cannot serve as a neutral arbiter in many foundational disputes in logic because, in order to use abduction, one must first identify the relevant data. Which data one deems relevant depends on what I call one's conception of logic. One's conception of logic is, however, not independent of one's views regarding many of the foundational disputes that one may hope to (...)
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  • A Dialogical Route to Logical Pluralism.Rohan French - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4969-4989.
    This paper argues that adopting a particular dialogical account of logical consequence quite directly gives rise to an interesting form of logical pluralism, the form of pluralism in question arising out of the requirement that deductive proofs be explanatory.
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  • Does Logical Pluralism Imply, or Suggest, Truth Pluralism, or Vice Versa?Stewart Shapiro & Michael Lynch - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4925-4936.
    The answers to the questions in the title depend on the kind of pluralism one is talking about. We will focus here on our own views. The purpose of this article is to trace out some possible connections between these kinds of pluralism. We show how each of them might bear on the other, depending on how certain open questions are resolved.
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  • Metalinguistic Negotiation and Logical Pluralism.Teresa Kouri Kissel - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4801-4812.
    Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one right logic. A particular version of the view, what is sometimes called domain-specific logical pluralism, has it that the right logic and connectives depend somehow on the domain of use, or context of use, or the linguistic framework. This type of view has a problem with cross-framework communication, though: it seems that all such communication turns into merely verbal disputes. If two people approach the same domain with different logics (...)
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  • Against Logical Generalism.Nicole Wyatt & Gillman Payette - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4813-4830.
    The orthodox view of logic takes for granted the central importance of logical principles. Logic, and thus logical reasoning, is to be understood as a system of rules or principles with universal application. Let us call this orthodox view logical generalism. In this paper we argue that logical generalism, whether monist or pluralist, is wrong. We then outline an account of logical consequence in the absence of general logical principles, which we call logical particularism.
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  • Proof-Theoretic Pluralism.Filippo Ferrari & Eugenio Orlandelli - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4879-4903.
    Starting from a proof-theoretic perspective, where meaning is determined by the inference rules governing logical operators, in this paper we primarily aim at developing a proof-theoretic alternative to the model-theoretic meaning-invariant logical pluralism discussed in Beall and Restall. We will also outline how this framework can be easily extended to include a form of meaning-variant logical pluralism. In this respect, the framework developed in this paper—which we label two-level proof-theoretic pluralism—is much broader in scope than the one discussed in Beall (...)
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  • Is There a Neutral Metalanguage?Rea Golan - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4831-4858.
    Logical pluralists are committed to the idea of a neutral metalanguage, which serves as a framework for debates in logic. Two versions of this neutrality can be found in the literature: an agreed upon collection of inferences, and a metalanguage that is neutral as such. I discuss both versions and show that they are not immune to Quinean criticism, which builds on the notion of meaning. In particular, I show that the first version of neutrality is sub-optimal, and hard to (...)
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  • Substructural Logics, Pluralism and Collapse.Eduardo Alejandro Barrio, Federico Pailos & Damian Szmuc - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4991-5007.
    When discussing Logical Pluralism several critics argue that such an open-minded position is untenable. The key to this conclusion is that, given a number of widely accepted assumptions, the pluralist view collapses into Logical Monism. In this paper we show that the arguments usually employed to arrive at this conclusion do not work. The main reason for this is the existence of certain substructural logics which have the same set of valid inferences as Classical Logic—although they are, in a clear (...)
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  • Abstraction Without Exceptions.Luca Zanetti - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    Wright claims that “the epistemology of good abstraction principles should be assimilated to that of basic principles of logical inference”. In this paper I follow Wright’s recommendation, but I consider a different epistemology of logic, namely anti-exceptionalism. Anti-exceptionalism’s main contention is that logic is not a priori, and that the choice between rival logics should be based on abductive criteria such as simplicity, adequacy to the data, strength, fruitfulness, and consistency. This paper’s goal is to lay down the foundations for (...)
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  • For Better and for Worse. Abstractionism, Good Company, and Pluralism.Andrea Sereni, Maria Paola Sforza Fogliani & Luca Zanetti - forthcoming - Review of Symbolic Logic:1-30.
    A thriving literature has developed over logical and mathematical pluralism – i.e. the views that several rival logical and mathematical theories can be equally correct. These have unfortunately grown separate; instead, they both could gain a great deal by a closer interaction. Our aim is thus to present some novel forms of abstractionist mathematical pluralism which can be modeled on parallel ways of substantiating logical pluralism. To do this, we start by discussing the Good Company Problem for neo-logicists recently raised (...)
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  • Islamic Contradictory Theology . . . Is There Any Such Thing?Abbas Ahsan - 2021 - Logica Universalis 15 (2).
    The application of paraconsistent logics to theological contradictions is a fascinating move. Jc Beall’s (J Anal Theol, 7(1): 400–439, 2019) paper entitled ‘Christ—A Contradiction: A Defense of ‘Contradictory Christology’ is a notable example. Beall proposes a solution to the fundamental problem of Christology. His solution aims at making the case, and defending the viability of, what he has termed, ‘Contradictory Christology’. There are at least two essential components of Beall’s ‘Contradictory Christology’. These include the dogmatic statements of Chalcedon and FDE (...)
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  • On Logical Relativity.Achille C. Varzi - 2002 - Philosophical Issues 12 (1):197-219.
    One logic or many? I say—many. Or rather, I say there is one logic for each way of specifying the class of all possible circumstances, or models, i.e., all ways of interpreting a given language. But because there is no unique way of doing this, I say there is no unique logic except in a relative sense. Indeed, given any two competing logical theories T1 and T2 (in the same language) one could always consider their common core, T, and settle (...)
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  • Carnap’s Tolerance, Meaning, and Logical Pluralism.Greg Restall - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (8):426 - 443.
    In this paper, I distinguish different kinds of pluralism about logical consequence. In particular, I distinguish the pluralism about logic arising from Carnap’s Principle of Tolerance from a pluralism which maintains that there are different, equally “good” logical consequence relations on the one language. I will argue that this second form of pluralism does more justice to the contemporary state of logical theory and practice than does Carnap’s more moderate pluralism.
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  • Logical Pluralism From a Pragmatic Perspective.Teresa Kouri Kissel - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):578-591.
    This paper presents a new view of logical pluralism. This pluralism takes into account how the logical connectives shift, depending on the context in which they occur. Using the Question-Under-Discussion Framework as formulated by Craige Roberts, I identify the contextual factor that is responsible for this shift. I then provide an account of the meanings of the logical connectives which can accommodate this factor. Finally, I suggest that this new pluralism has a certain Carnapian flavour. Questions about the meanings of (...)
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  • Another way logic might be normative.J. W. Evershed - 2021 - Synthese:1-21.
    Is logic normative for reasoning? In the wake of work by Gilbert Harman and John MacFarlane, this question has been reduced to: are there any adequate bridge principles which link logical facts to normative constraints on reasoning? Hitherto, defenders of the normativity of logic have exclusively focussed on identifying adequate validity bridge principles: principles linking validity facts—facts of the form 'gamma entails phi'—to normative constraints on reasoning. This paper argues for two claims. First, for the time being at least, Harman’s (...)
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  • Modalism and Logical Pluralism.Otávio Bueno & Scott A. Shalkowski - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):295-321.
    Logical pluralism is the view according to which there is more than one relation of logical consequence, even within a given language. A recent articulation of this view has been developed in terms of quantification over different cases: classical logic emerges from consistent and complete cases; constructive logic from consistent and incomplete cases, and paraconsistent logic from inconsistent and complete cases. We argue that this formulation causes pluralism to collapse into either logical nihilism or logical universalism. In its place, we (...)
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  • Logical Pluralism, Meaning-Variance, and VerbalDisputes.Ole Thomassen Hjortland - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):355-373.
    Logical pluralism has been in vogue since JC Beall and Greg Restall 2006 articulated and defended a new pluralist thesis. Recent criticisms such as Priest 2006a and Field 2009 have suggested that there is a relationship between their type of logical pluralism and the meaning-variance thesis for logic. This is the claim, often associated with Quine 1970, that a change of logic entails a change of meaning. Here we explore the connection between logical pluralism and meaning-variance, both in general and (...)
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  • The Reliability Challenge and the Epistemology of Logic.Joshua Schechter - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):437-464.
    We think of logic as objective. We also think that we are reliable about logic. These views jointly generate a puzzle: How is it that we are reliable about logic? How is it that our logical beliefs match an objective domain of logical fact? This is an instance of a more general challenge to explain our reliability about a priori domains. In this paper, I argue that the nature of this challenge has not been properly understood. I explicate the challenge (...)
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  • Requiem for logical nihilism, or: Logical nihilism annihilated.Bogdan Dicher - 2021 - Synthese 198 (8):7073-7096.
    Logical nihilism is the view that the relation of logical consequence is empty: there are counterexamples to any putative logical law. In this paper, I argue that the nihilist threat is illusory. The nihilistic arguments do not work. Moreover, the entire project is based on a misguided interpretation of the generality of logic.
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  • Defending Logical Pluralism.J. C. Beall & Greg Restall - 2001 - In Logical Consequence: Rival Approaches. Stanmore: Hermes. pp. 1-22.
    We are pluralists about logical consequence [1]. We hold that there is more than one sense in which arguments may be deductively valid, that these senses are equally good, and equally deserving of the name deductive validity. Our pluralism starts with our analysis of consequence. This analysis of consequence is not idiosyncratic. We agree with Richard Jeffrey, and with many other philosophers of logic about how logical consequence is to be defined. To quote Jeffrey.
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  • On Negation for Non-classical Set Theories.S. Jockwich Martinez & G. Venturi - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (3):549-570.
    We present a case study for the debate between the American and the Australian plans, analyzing a crucial aspect of negation: expressivity within a theory. We discuss the case of non-classical set theories, presenting three different negations and testing their expressivity within algebra-valued structures for ZF-like set theories. We end by proposing a minimal definitional account of negation, inspired by the algebraic framework discussed.
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  • Metaethics, Agnosticism, and Logic.Sven Rosenkranz - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (1):47-61.
    In this paper, I present an argument for the revision of classical logic. The argument is based on the coherence of a metaethical position which is a species of agnosticism. According to this view, the debate between cognitivists and noncognitivists about moral discourse is unresolved. I argue that there is something at stake in this debate and so something one can coherently be agnostic about. The revisionary argument also draws on principles of epistemic closure. I make these principles explicit and (...)
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  • Reinflating Logical Consequence.Owen Griffiths - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic (1):1-9.
    Shapiro (Philos Q 61:320–342, 2011) argues that, if we are deflationists about truth, we should be deflationists about logical consequence. Like the truth predicate, he claims, the logical consequence predicate is merely a device of generalisation and more substantial characterisation, e.g. proof- or model-theoretic, is mistaken. I reject his analogy between truth and logical consequence and argue that, by appreciating how the logical consequence predicate is used as well as the goals of proof theory and model theory, we can be (...)
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  • Categoricity by Convention.Julien Murzi & Brett Topey - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
    On a widespread naturalist view, the meanings of mathematical terms are determined, and can only be determined, by the way we use mathematical language—in particular, by the basic mathematical principles we’re disposed to accept. But it’s mysterious how this can be so, since, as is well known, minimally strong first-order theories are non-categorical and so are compatible with countless non-isomorphic interpretations. As for second-order theories: though they typically enjoy categoricity results—for instance, Dedekind’s categoricity theorem for second-order and Zermelo’s quasi-categoricity theorem (...)
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  • Reasons, Basing, and the Normative Collapse of Logical Pluralism.Christopher Blake-Turner - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
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  • Varieties of Deep Epistemic Disagreement.Paul Simard Smith & Michael Patrick Lynch - forthcoming - Topoi.
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  • Non-Boolean Classical Relevant Logics II: Classicality Through Truth-Constants.Tore Fjetland Øgaard - 2021 - Synthese:1-33.
    This paper gives an account of Anderson and Belnap’s selection criteria for an adequate theory of entailment. The criteria are grouped into three categories: criteria pertaining to modality, those pertaining to relevance, and those related to expressive strength. The leitmotif of both this paper and its prequel is the relevant legitimacy of disjunctive syllogism. Relevant logics are commonly held to be paraconsistent logics. It is shown in this paper, however, that both E and R can be extended to explosive logics (...)
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  • Thinking Crossroads: From Scientific Pluralism to Pluralist History of Science.Matteo Vagelli, Laurent Loison & Ivan Moya-Diez - 2021 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 52 (1):87-95.
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  • Information and Logical Discrimination.Patrick Allo - 2012 - In S. Barry Cooper (ed.), How the World Computes. pp. 17--28.
    Informational conceptions of logic are barely novel. We find them in the work of John Corcoran, in several papers on substructural and constructive logics by Heinrich Wansing, and in the interpretation of the Routley-Meyer semantics for relevant logics in terms of Barwises and Perrys theory of situations. Allo & Mares [2] present an informational account of logical consequence that is based on the content-nonexpantion platitude, but that also relies on a double inversion of the standard direction of explanation (in- formation (...)
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  • Goodness, Availability and Argument Structure.Anna Sara Malmgren - forthcoming - Synthese:1-33.
    According to a widely shared generic conception of inferential justification—‘the standard conception’—an agent is inferentially justified in believing that p only if she has antecedently justified beliefs in all the non-redundant premises of a good argument for p. This conception tends to serve as the starting-point in contemporary debates about the nature and scope of inferential justification: as neutral common ground between various competing, more specific, conceptions. But it’s a deeply problematic starting-point. This paper explores three questions that haven’t been (...)
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  • Presentism and Truth-Making.Jonathan Tallant - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (3):407-416.
    Here, I defend the view that there is no sensible way to pin a truth-maker objection on presentism. First, I suggest that if we adopt truth-maker maximalism then the presentist can requisition appropriate ontological resources with impunity. Second, if we deny maximalism, then the presentist can sensibly restrict the truth-maker principle in order to avoid the demand for truth-makers for talk about the non-present.
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  • Absence of Action.Randolph Clarke - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):361-376.
    Often when one omits to do a certain thing, there's no action that is one's omission; one's omission, it seems, is an absence of any action of some type. This paper advances the view that an absence of an action--and, in general, any absence--is nothing at all: there is nothing that is an absence. Nevertheless, it can result from prior events that one omits to do a certain thing, and there can be results of the fact that one omits to (...)
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  • Expressivism and Plural Truth.Michael P. Lynch - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):385-401.
    Contemporary expressivists typically deny that all true judgments must represent reality. Many instead adopt truth minimalism, according to which there is no substantive property of judgments in virtue of which they are true. In this article, I suggest that expressivists would be better suited to adopt truth pluralism, or the view that there is more than one substantive property of judgments in virtue of which judgments are true. My point is not that an expressivism that takes this form is true, (...)
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  • Restricting Factiveness.Fredrik Stjernberg - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (1):29 - 48.
    In discussions of Fitch’s paradox, it is usually assumed without further argument that knowledge is factive, that if a subject knows that p, then p is true. It is argued that this common assumption is not as well-founded as it should be, and that there in fact are certain reasons to be suspicious of the unrestricted version of the factiveness claim. There are two kinds of reason for this suspicion. One is that unrestricted factiveness leads to paradoxes and unexpected results, (...)
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  • Levels of Criticism: Handling Popperian Problems in a Popperian Way. [REVIEW]Ivor Grattan-Guinness - 2008 - Axiomathes 18 (1):37-48.
    Popper emphasised both the problem-solving nature of human knowledge, and the need to criticise a scientific theory as strongly as possible. These aims seem to contradict each other, in that the former stresses the problems that motivate scientific theories while the one ignores the character of the problems that led to the formation of the theories against which the criticism is directed. A resolution is proposed in which problems as such are taken as prime in the search for knowledge, and (...)
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  • R and Relevance Principle Revisited.Eunsuk Yang - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (5):767-782.
    This paper first shows that some versions of the logic R of Relevance do not satisfy the relevance principle introduced by Anderson and Belnap, the principle of which is generally accepted as the principle for relevance. After considering several possible (but defective) improvements of the relevance principle, this paper presents a new relevance principle for (three versions of) R, and explains why this principle is better than the original and others.
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  • The Substitutional Analysis of Logical Consequence.Volker Halbach - 2020 - Noûs 54 (2):431-450.
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  • Modal Objectivity1.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2019 - Noûs 53 (2):266-295.
    It is widely agreed that the intelligibility of modal metaphysics has been vindicated. Quine's arguments to the contrary supposedly confused analyticity with metaphysical necessity, and rigid with non-rigid designators.2 But even if modal metaphysics is intelligible, it could be misconceived. It could be that metaphysical necessity is not absolute necessity – the strictest real notion of necessity – and that no proposition of traditional metaphysical interest is necessary in every real sense. If there were nothing otherwise “uniquely metaphysically significant” about (...)
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  • Modal Objectivity1.Clarke-Doane Justin - 2019 - Noûs:266-295.
    It is widely agreed that the intelligibility of modal metaphysics has been vindicated. Quine's arguments to the contrary supposedly confused analyticity with metaphysical necessity, and rigid with non-rigid designators.2 But even if modal metaphysics is intelligible, it could be misconceived. It could be that metaphysical necessity is not absolute necessity – the strictest real notion of necessity – and that no proposition of traditional metaphysical interest is necessary in every real sense. If there were nothing otherwise “uniquely metaphysically significant” about (...)
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  • The Original Sin of Proof-Theoretic Semantics.Bogdan Dicher & Francesco Paoli - 2020 - Synthese:1-26.
    Proof-theoretic semantics is an alternative to model-theoretic semantics. It aims at explaining the meaning of the logical constants in terms of the inference rules that govern their behaviour in proofs. We argue that this must be construed as the task of explaining these meanings relative to a logic, i.e., to a consequence relation. Alas, there is no agreed set of properties that a relation must have in order to qualify as a consequence relation. Moreover, the association of a consequence relation (...)
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  • Variations on Intra-Theoretical Logical Pluralism: Internal Versus External Consequence.Bogdan Dicher - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):667-686.
    Intra-theoretical logical pluralism is a form of meaning-invariant pluralism about logic, articulated recently by Hjortland :355–373, 2013). This version of pluralism relies on it being possible to define several distinct notions of provability relative to the same logical calculus. The present paper picks up and explores this theme: How can a single logical calculus express several different consequence relations? The main hypothesis articulated here is that the divide between the internal and external consequence relations in Gentzen systems generates a form (...)
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  • Implicit and Explicit Stances in Logic.Johan van Benthem - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (3):571-601.
    We identify a pervasive contrast between implicit and explicit stances in logical analysis and system design. Implicit systems change received meanings of logical constants and sometimes also the notion of consequence, while explicit systems conservatively extend classical systems with new vocabulary. We illustrate the contrast for intuitionistic and epistemic logic, then take it further to information dynamics, default reasoning, and other areas, to show its wide scope. This gives a working understanding of the contrast, though we stop short of a (...)
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  • Introduction: Logical Pluralism and Translation.Francesca Ervas, Antonio Ledda, Francesco Paoli & Giuseppe Sergioli - 2019 - Topoi 38 (2):263-264.
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  • An Epistemic Approach to Paraconsistency: A Logic of Evidence and Truth.Walter Carnielli & Abilio Rodrigues - 2019 - Synthese 196 (9):3789-3813.
    The purpose of this paper is to present a paraconsistent formal system and a corresponding intended interpretation according to which true contradictions are not tolerated. Contradictions are, instead, epistemically understood as conflicting evidence, where evidence for a proposition A is understood as reasons for believing that A is true. The paper defines a paraconsistent and paracomplete natural deduction system, called the Basic Logic of Evidence, and extends it to the Logic of Evidence and Truth. The latter is a logic of (...)
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  • From Natural to Formal Language: A Case for Logical Pluralism.Pilar Terrés Villalonga - 2019 - Topoi 38 (2):333-345.
    I argue for a version of logical pluralism based on the plurality of legitimate formalizations of the logical vocabulary. In particular, I argue that the apparent rivalry between classical and relevant logic can be resolved, given that both logics capture and formalize normative and legitimate senses of logical consequence: classical logic encodes “follows from” as truth preservation and captures the truth conditions of the logical constants, while relevant logic encodes a notion of “follows from” which, apart from preserving truth, avoids (...)
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  • Conjunction and Contradiction.Achille C. Varzi - 2004 - In Graham Priest, J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction: New Philosophical Essays. Clarendon Press. pp. 93–110.
    There are two ways of understanding the notion of a contradiction: as a conjunction of a statement and its negation, or as a pair of statements one of which is the negation of the other. Correspondingly, there are two ways of understanding the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC), i.e., the law that says that no contradictions can be true. In this paper I offer some arguments to the effect that on the first (collective) reading LNC is non-negotiable, but on the second (...)
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  • Anti-Exceptionalism About Logic.Ole Thomassen Hjortland - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):631-658.
    Logic isn’t special. Its theories are continuous with science; its method continuous with scientific method. Logic isn’t a priori, nor are its truths analytic truths. Logical theories are revisable, and if they are revised, they are revised on the same grounds as scientific theories. These are the tenets of anti-exceptionalism about logic. The position is most famously defended by Quine, but has more recent advocates in Maddy, Priest, Russell, and Williamson. Although these authors agree on many methodological issues about logic, (...)
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  • Translating Logical Terms.Stewart Shapiro - 2019 - Topoi 38 (2):291-303.
    The is an old question over whether there is a substantial disagreement between advocates of different logics, as they simply attach different meanings to the crucial logical terminology. The purpose of this article is to revisit this old question in light a pluralism/relativism that regards the various logics as equally legitimate, in their own contexts. We thereby address the vexed notion of translation, as it occurs between mathematical theories. We articulate and defend a thesis that the notion of “same meaning” (...)
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