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  1. Normality: a Two-Faced Concept.Tomasz Wysocki - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (4):689-716.
    Consider how we evaluate how normal an object is. On the dual-nature hypothesis, a normality evaluation depends on the object’s goodness and frequency. On the single-nature hypothesis, the evaluation depends solely on either frequency or goodness. To assess these hypotheses, I ran four experiments. Study 1 shows that normality evaluations vary with both the goodness and the frequency assessment of the object. Study 2 shows that manipulating the goodness and the frequency dimension changes the normality evaluation. Yet, neither experiment rules (...)
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  • Norms Affect Prospective Causal Judgments.Paul Henne, Kevin O’Neill, Paul Bello, Sangeet Khemlani & Felipe De Brigard - 2021 - Cognitive Science 45 (1):e12931.
    People more frequently select norm-violating factors, relative to norm- conforming ones, as the cause of some outcome. Until recently, this abnormal-selection effect has been studied using retrospective vignette-based paradigms. We use a novel set of video stimuli to investigate this effect for prospective causal judgments—i.e., judgments about the cause of some future outcome. Four experiments show that people more frequently select norm- violating factors, relative to norm-conforming ones, as the cause of some future outcome. We show that the abnormal-selection effects (...)
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  • Perceived Similarity of Imagined Possible Worlds Affects Judgments of Counterfactual Plausibility.Felipe De Brigard, Paul Henne & Matthew L. Stanley - 2021 - Cognition 209:104574.
    People frequently entertain counterfactual thoughts, or mental simulations about alternative ways the world could have been. But the perceived plausibility of those counterfactual thoughts varies widely. The current article interfaces research in the philosophy and semantics of counterfactual statements with the psychology of mental simulations, and it explores the role of perceived similarity in judgments of counterfactual plausibility. We report results from seven studies (N = 6405) jointly supporting three interconnected claims. First, the perceived plausibility of a counterfactual event is (...)
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  • Normality and Actual Causal Strength.Thomas Icard, Jonathan Kominsky & Joshua Knobe - 2017 - Cognition 161:80-93.
    Existing research suggests that people's judgments of actual causation can be influenced by the degree to which they regard certain events as normal. We develop an explanation for this phenomenon that draws on standard tools from the literature on graphical causal models and, in particular, on the idea of probabilistic sampling. Using these tools, we propose a new measure of actual causal strength. This measure accurately captures three effects of normality on causal judgment that have been observed in existing studies. (...)
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  • Typicality and Graded Membership in Dimensional Adjectives.Steven Verheyen & Paul Égré - 2018 - Cognitive Science 42 (7):2250-2286.
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  • What Comes to Mind?Adam Bear, Samantha Bensinger, Julian Jara-Ettinger, Joshua Knobe & Fiery Cushman - 2020 - Cognition 194:104057.
    When solving problems, like making predictions or choices, people often “sample” possibilities into mind. Here, we consider whether there is structure to the kinds of thoughts people sample by default—that is, without an explicit goal. Across three experiments we found that what comes to mind by default are samples from a probability distribution that combines what people think is likely and what they think is good. Experiment 1 found that the first quantities that come to mind for everyday behaviors and (...)
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  • The Impact of Past Behaviour Normality on Regret: Replication and Extension of Three Experiments of the Exceptionality Effect.Lucas Kutscher & Gilad Feldman - 2019 - Cognition and Emotion 33 (5):901-914.
    Norm theory (Kahneman & Miller, 1986) described a tendency for people to associate stronger regret with a negative outcome when it is a result of an exception (abnormal behavior) compared to when it is a result of routine (normal behavior). In two pre-registered studies, we conducted a replication and extension of three classic experiments on past behavior exception/routine contrasts (N = 684). We successfully replicated Kahneman and Miller’s (1986) experiments with the classic hitchhiker-scenario (Part 1) and car accident-scenario (Part 2). (...)
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  • Agent‐Regret and Accidental Agency.Rachana Kamtekar & Shaun Nichols - 2019 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43 (1):181-202.
    Midwest Studies In Philosophy, EarlyView.
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  • When and Why People Think Beliefs Are “Debunked” by Scientific Explanations of Their Origins.Dillon Plunkett, Lara Buchak & Tania Lombrozo - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (1):3-28.
    Mind &Language, Volume 35, Issue 1, Page 3-28, February 2020.
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  • Social Norms and Farm Animal Protection.Nicolas Delon - 2018 - Palgrave Communications 4:1-6.
    Social change is slow and difficult. Social change for animals is formidably slow and difficult. Advocates and scholars alike have long tried to change attitudes and convince the public that eating animals is wrong. The topic of norms and social change for animals has been neglected, which explains in part the relative failure of the animal protection movement to secure robust support reflected in social and legal norms. Moreover, animal ethics has suffered from a disproportionate focus on individual attitudes and (...)
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  • How We Know What Not To Think.Jonathan Phillips, Adam Morris & Fiery Cushman - 2019 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 23 (12):1026-1040.
  • The Essence of Essentialism.George E. Newman & Joshua Knobe - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (5):585-605.
    Over the past several decades, psychological essentialism has been an important topic of study, incorporating research from multiple areas of psychology, philosophy and linguistics. At its most basic level, essentialism is the tendency to represent certain concepts in terms of a deeper, unobservable property that is responsible for category membership. Originally, this concept was used to understand people’s reasoning about natural kind concepts, such as TIGER and WATER, but more recently, researchers have identified the emergence of essentialist-like intuitions in a (...)
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  • Recent Empirical Work on the Relationship Between Causal Judgements and Norms.Pascale Willemsen & Lara Kirfel - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (1):e12562.
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  • Subjectivity in Gradable Adjectives: The Case of Tall and Heavy.Steven Verheyen, Sabrina Dewil & Paul Égré - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (5):460-479.
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  • Vague Judgment: A Probabilistic Account.Paul Égré - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):3837-3865.
    This paper explores the idea that vague predicates like “tall”, “loud” or “expensive” are applied based on a process of analog magnitude representation, whereby magnitudes are represented with noise. I present a probabilistic account of vague judgment, inspired by early remarks from E. Borel on vagueness, and use it to model judgments about borderline cases. The model involves two main components: probabilistic magnitude representation on the one hand, and a notion of subjective criterion. The framework is used to represent judgments (...)
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