Citations of work:

George Bealer (1982). Quality and Concept.

78 found
Order:
Are we missing citations?

PhilPapers citations & references are currently in beta testing. We expect to add many more in the future.

Meanwhile, you can use our bibliography tool to import references for this or another work.

Or you can directly add citations for the above work:

1 — 50 / 78
  1. Deep Platonism.Chad Carmichael - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):307-328.
    According to the traditional bundle theory, particulars are bundles of compresent universals. I think we should reject the bundle theory for a variety of reasons. But I will argue for the thesis at the core of the bundle theory: that all the facts about particulars are grounded in facts about universals. I begin by showing how to meet the main objection to this thesis (which is also the main objection to the bundle theory): that it is inconsistent with the possibility (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  2.  19
    Prior’s Individuals.Hartley Slater - 2016 - Synthese 193 (11):3497-3506.
    Criticisms have been aired before about the fear of certain Platonic abstract objects, propositions. That criticism extends to the widespread preference for an operator analysis of expressions like ‘It is true, known, obligatory that p’ as opposed to the predicative analysis in their equivalents ‘That p is true, known, obligatory’. The criticism in the present work also concerns Prior’s attitude to Platonic entities of a certain kind: not propositions, i.e., the referents of ‘that’-clauses, but individuals, i.e., the referents of Russell’s (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Predicativity, the Russell-Myhill Paradox, and Church’s Intensional Logic.Sean Walsh - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (3):277-326.
    This paper sets out a predicative response to the Russell-Myhill paradox of propositions within the framework of Church’s intensional logic. A predicative response places restrictions on the full comprehension schema, which asserts that every formula determines a higher-order entity. In addition to motivating the restriction on the comprehension schema from intuitions about the stability of reference, this paper contains a consistency proof for the predicative response to the Russell-Myhill paradox. The models used to establish this consistency also model other axioms (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  4.  35
    Transparent Quantification Into Hyperintensional Objectual Attitudes.Bjørn Jespersen & Marie Duží - 2015 - Synthese 192 (3):635-677.
    We demonstrate how to validly quantify into hyperintensional contexts involving non-propositional attitudes like seeking, solving, calculating, worshipping, and wanting to become. We describe and apply a typed extensional logic of hyperintensions that preserves compositionality of meaning, referential transparency and substitutivity of identicals also in hyperintensional attitude contexts. We specify and prove rules for quantifying into hyperintensional contexts. These rules presuppose a rigorous method for substituting variables into hyperintensional contexts, and the method will be described. We prove the following. First, it (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  5. No Simples, No Gunk, No Nothing.Sam Cowling - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (1):246-260.
    Mereological realism holds that the world has a mereological structure – i.e. a distribution of mereological properties and relations. In this article, I defend Eleaticism about properties, according to which there are no causally inert non-logical properties. I then present an Eleatic argument for mereological anti-realism, which denies the existence of both mereological composites and mereological simples. After defending Eleaticism and mereological anti-realism, I argue that mereological anti-realism is preferable to mereological nihilism. I then conclude by examining the thesis that (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  6. Propositional or Non-Propositional Attitudes?Sean Crawford - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (1):179-210.
    Propositionalism is the view that intentional attitudes, such as belief, are relations to propositions. Propositionalists argue that propositionalism follows from the intuitive validity of certain kinds of inferences involving attitude reports. Jubien (2001) argues powerfully against propositions and sketches some interesting positive proposals, based on Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment, about how to accommodate “propositional phenomena” without appeal to propositions. This paper argues that none of Jubien’s proposals succeeds in accommodating an important range of propositional phenomena, such as the (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  7.  14
    Non‐Analytic Logic.Hartley Slater - 2014 - Philosophical Investigations 37 (3):195-207.
    A logic focusing on the analytic a priori and explicitly rejecting the synthetic a priori developed in the early decades of the 20th century, largely through the efforts of the Logical Empiricists. This group was very influenced by Wittgenstein's early work Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. But Wittgenstein himself, later on, departed from the Tractatus in significant ways that the Logical Empiricists did not follow. Wittgenstein came later to accept the synthetic a priori, and out of this insight comes a non-analytic logic that (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  8.  67
    Presentation and Content A Critical Study of Susanna Siegel. The Contents of Visual Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).John Bengson - 2013 - Noûs 47 (4):795-807.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  9.  61
    Intentionality and Compound Accounts of the Emotions.Reid D. Blackman - 2013 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):67-90.
    Most philosophers of emotion endorse a compound account of the emotions: emotions are wholes made of parts; or, as I prefer to put it, emotions are mental states that supervene on other (mental) states. The goal of this paper is to ascertain how the intentionality of these subvening members relates to the intentionality of the emotions. Towards this end, I proceed as follows. First, I discuss the problems with the account Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson offer of the intentionality of (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Internalist Foundationalism and the Sellarsian Dilemma.Ali Hasan - 2013 - Res Philosophica 90 (2):171-184.
    According to foundationalism, some beliefs are justified but do not depend for their justification on any other beliefs. According to access internalism, a subject is justified in believing some proposition only if that subject is aware of or has access to some reason to think that the proposition is true or probable. In this paper I discusses a fundamental challenge to internalist foundationalism often referred to as the Sellarsian dilemma. I consider three attempts to respond to the dilemma – phenomenal (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11.  24
    Equivalence of Problems (An Attempt at an Explication of Problem).Pavel Materna - 2013 - Axiomathes 23 (4):617-631.
    On the one hand, Pavel Tichý has shown in his Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL) that the best way of explicating meaning of the expressions of a natural language consists in identification of meanings with abstract procedures. TIL explicates objective abstract procedures as so-called constructions. Constructions that do not contain free variables and are in a well-defined sense ´normalized´ are called concepts in TIL. On the second hand, Kolmogorov in (Mathematische Zeitschrift 35: 58–65, 1932) formulated a theory of problems, using NL (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12.  19
    Simple Concepts.Pavel Materna - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (3):295-319.
    To talk about simple concepts presupposes that the notion of concept has been aptly explicated. I argue that a most adequate explication should abandon the set-theoretical paradigm and use a procedural approach. Such a procedural approach is offered by Tichý´s Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL). Some main notions and principles of TIL are briefly presented, and as a result, concepts are explicated as a kind of abstract procedure. Then it can be shown that simplicity, as applied to concepts, is well definable (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. The Fundamental Theorem of World Theory.Christopher Menzel & Edward N. Zalta - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic (2-3):1-31.
    The fundamental principle of the theory of possible worlds is that a proposition p is possible if and only if there is a possible world at which p is true. In this paper we present a valid derivation of this principle from a more general theory in which possible worlds are defined rather than taken as primitive. The general theory uses a primitive modality and axiomatizes abstract objects, properties, and propositions. We then show that this general theory has very small (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  14.  43
    Modal Property Comprehension.Ulrich Meyer - 2013 - Synthese 190 (4):693-707.
    To define new property terms, we combine already familiar ones by means of certain logical operations. Given suitable constraints, these operations may presumably include the resources of first-order logic: truth-functional sentence connectives and quantification over objects. What is far less clear is whether we can also use modal operators for this purpose. This paper clarifies what is involved in this question, and argues in favor of modal property definitions.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15.  9
    Inscriptionalism and Intensionality.David Parsons - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (2):567-585.
    Intensional contexts are typically characterised by an apparent failure of either (A) the principle of the inter-substitution of co-referring terms salva veritate, or (B) existential generalisation. The difficulties which are seen to occur do so in contexts involving either modality or the propositional attitudes. In this paper attempts are made to determine whether or not Scheffler’s inscriptional analysis can provide a viable means of accounting for the problems which are thought to occur in intensional contexts. Somewhat unexpectedly, little effort has (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. Not All Attitudes Are Propositional.Alex Grzankowski - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy (3):374-391.
    Most contemporary philosophical discussions of intentionality start and end with a treatment of the propositional attitudes. In fact, many theorists hold that all attitudes are propositional attitudes. Our folk-psychological ascriptions suggest, however, that there are non-propositional attitudes: I like Sally, my brother fears snakes, everyone loves my grandmother, and Rush Limbaugh hates Obama. I argue that things are as they appear: there are non-propositional attitudes. More specifically, I argue that there are attitudes that relate individuals to non-propositional objects and do (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  17.  38
    Recent Work on Structured Meaning and Propositional Unity.Bjørn Jespersen - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (9):620-630.
    Logical semantics includes once again structured meanings in its repertoire. The leading idea is that semantic and syntactic structure are more or less isomorphic. A key motive for reintroducing sensitivity to semantic structure is to obtain fine‐grained meanings, which are individuated more finely than in possible‐world semantics, namely up to necessary equivalence. Just getting the truth‐conditions right is deemed insufficient for a full semantic analysis of sentences. This paper surveys some of the most recent contributions to the program of structured (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  18. On Possibly Nonexistent Propositions.Jeff Speaks - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):528-562.
    Alvin Plantinga gave a reductio of the conjunction of the following three theses: Existentialism (the view that, e.g., the proposition that Socrates exists can't exist unless Socrates does), Serious Actualism (the view that nothing can have a property at a world without existing at that world) and Contingency (the view that some objects, like Socrates, exist only contingently). I sketch a view of truth at a world which enables the Existentialist to resist Plantinga's argument without giving up either Serious Actualism (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  19. Abstraction in Fitch's Basic Logic.Eric Thomas Updike - 2012 - History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (3):215-243.
    Fitch's basic logic is an untyped illative combinatory logic with unrestricted principles of abstraction effecting a type collapse between properties (or concepts) and individual elements of an abstract syntax. Fitch does not work axiomatically and the abstraction operation is not a primitive feature of the inductive clauses defining the logic. Fitch's proof that basic logic has unlimited abstraction is not clear and his proof contains a number of errors that have so far gone undetected. This paper corrects these errors and (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. A New Framework for Conceptualism.John Bengson, Enrico Grube & Daniel Z. Korman - 2011 - Noûs 45 (1):167 - 189.
    Conceptualism is the thesis that, for any perceptual experience E, (i) E has a Fregean proposition as its content and (ii) a subject of E must possess a concept for each item represented by E. We advance a framework within which conceptualism may be defended against its most serious objections (e.g., Richard Heck's argument from nonveridical experience). The framework is of independent interest for the philosophy of mind and epistemology given its implications for debates regarding transparency, relationalism and representationalism, demonstrative (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   16 citations  
  21. The Bearable Lightness of Being (Vol 20, Pg 399, 2010).Bob Hale - 2011 - Axiomathes 21 (4):597 - 597.
    How are philosophical questions about what kinds of things there are to be understood and how are they to be answered? This paper defends broadly Fregean answers to these questions. Ontological categories—such as object , property , and relation —are explained in terms of a prior logical categorization of expressions, as singular terms, predicates of varying degree and level, etc. Questions about what kinds of object, property, etc., there are are, on this approach, reduce to questions about truth and logical (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  22. Non-Conceptualism and the Problem of Perceptual Self-Knowledge.Robert Hanna & Monima Chadha - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):184-223.
    In this paper we (i) identify the notion of ‘essentially non-conceptual content’ by critically analyzing the recent and contemporary debate about non-conceptual content, (ii) work out the basics of broadly Kantian theory of essentially non-conceptual content in relation to a corresponding theory of conceptual content, and then (iii) demonstrate one effective application of the Kantian theory of essentially non-conceptual content by using this theory to provide a ‘minimalist’ solution to the problem of perceptual self-knowledge which is raised by Strong Externalism.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  23. Knowledge Representation, the World Wide Web, and the Evolution of Logic.Christopher Menzel - 2011 - Synthese 182 (2):269-295.
    It is almost universally acknowledged that first-order logic (FOL), with its clean, well-understood syntax and semantics, allows for the clear expression of philosophical arguments and ideas. Indeed, an argument or philosophical theory rendered in FOL is perhaps the cleanest example there is of “representing philosophy”. A number of prominent syntactic and semantic properties of FOL reflect metaphysical presuppositions that stem from its Fregean origins, particularly the idea of an inviolable divide between concept and object. These presuppositions, taken at face value, (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  24.  62
    Relational Order and Onto-Thematic Roles.Francesco Orilia - 2011 - Metaphysica 12 (1):1-18.
    States of affairs involving a non-symmetric relation such as loving are said to have a relational order, something that distinguishes, for instance, Romeo’s loving Juliet from Juliet’s loving Romeo. Relational order can be properly understood by appealing to o-roles, i.e., ontological counterparts of what linguists call thematic roles, e.g., agent, patient, instrument, and the like. This move allows us to meet the appropriate desiderata for a theory of relational order. In contrast, the main theories that try to do without o-roles, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  25. Paradoxes of Intensionality.Dustin Tucker & Richmond H. Thomason - 2011 - Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (3):394-411.
    We identify a class of paradoxes that is neither set-theoretical nor semantical, but that seems to depend on intensionality. In particular, these paradoxes arise out of plausible properties of propositional attitudes and their objects. We try to explain why logicians have neglected these paradoxes, and to show that, like the Russell Paradox and the direct discourse Liar Paradox, these intensional paradoxes are recalcitrant and challenge logical analysis. Indeed, when we take these paradoxes seriously, we may need to rethink the commonly (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  26. Universals.Chad Carmichael - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (3):373-389.
    In this paper, I argue that there are universals. I begin (Sect. 1) by proposing a sufficient condition for a thing’s being a universal. I then argue (Sect. 2) that some truths exist necessarily. Finally, I argue (Sects. 3 and 4) that these truths are structured entities having constituents that meet the proposed sufficient condition for being universals.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   17 citations  
  27.  58
    The Truth Predicate Vs the Truth Connective. On Taking Connectives Seriously.Kevin Mulligan - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (4):565-584.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  28.  34
    Intensionality and Paradoxes in Ramsey's 'the Foundations of Mathematics'.Dustin Tucker - 2010 - Review of Symbolic Logic 3 (1):1-25.
    In , Frank Ramsey separates paradoxes into two groups, now taken to be the logical and the semantical. But he also revises the logical system developed in Whitehead and Russellthe intensional paradoxess interest in these problems seriously, then the intensional paradoxes deserve more widespread attention than they have historically received.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  29.  88
    Focus Restored: Comments on John MacFarlane.Bob Hale & Crispin Wright - 2009 - Synthese 170 (3):457 - 482.
    In “Double Vision Two Questions about the Neo-Fregean Programme”, John MacFarlane’s raises two main questions: (1) Why is it so important to neo-Fregeans to treat expressions of the form ‘the number of Fs’ as a species of singular term? What would be lost, if anything, if they were analysed instead as a type of quantifier-phrase, as on Russell’s Theory of Definite Descriptions? and (2) Granting—at least for the sake of argument—that Hume’s Principle may be used as a means of implicitly (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  30. Recent Work on Propositions.Peter Hanks - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (3):469-486.
    Propositions, the abstract, truth-bearing contents of sentences and beliefs, continue to be the focus of healthy debates in philosophy of language and metaphysics. This article is a critical survey of work on propositions since the mid-90s, with an emphasis on newer work from the past decade. Topics to be covered include a substitution puzzle about propositional designators, two recent arguments against propositions, and two new theories about the nature of propositions.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  31.  28
    Concepts and Recipes.Pavel Materna - 2009 - Acta Analytica 24 (1):69-90.
    If concepts are explicated as abstract procedures, then we can easily show that each empirical concept is a not an effective procedure. Some, but not all empirical concepts are shown to be of a special kind: they cannot in principle guarantee that the object they identify satisfies the intended conditions.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. The Logic, Intentionality, and Phenomenology of Emotion.Michelle Montague - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):171-192.
    My concern in this paper is with the intentionality of emotions. Desires and cognitions are the traditional paradigm cases of intentional attitudes, and one very direct approach to the question of the intentionality of emotions is to treat it as sui generis—as on a par with the intentionality of desires and cognitions but in no way reducible to it. A more common approach seeks to reduce the intentionality of emotions to the intentionality of familiar intentional attitudes like desires and cognitions. (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   33 citations  
  33. Proceeding in Abstraction. From Concepts to Types and the Recent Perspective on Information.Giuseppe Primiero - 2009 - History and Philosophy of Logic 30 (3):257-282.
    This article presents an historical and conceptual overview on different approaches to logical abstraction. Two main trends concerning abstraction in the history of logic are highlighted, starting from the logical notions of concept and function. This analysis strictly relates to the philosophical discussion on the nature of abstract objects. I develop this issue further with respect to the procedure of abstraction involved by (typed) λ-systems, focusing on the crucial change about meaning and predicability. In particular, the analysis of the nature (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  34. A Repair of Frege's Theory of Thoughts.Mark Textor - 2009 - Synthese 167 (1):105 - 123.
    Frege’s writings contain arguments for the thesis (i) that a thought expressed by a sentence S is a structured object whose composition pictures the composition of S, and for the thesis (ii) that a thought is an unstructured object. I will argue that Frege’s reasons for both (i) and (ii) are strong. Frege’s explanation of the difference in sense between logically equivalent sentences rests on assumption (i), while Frege’s claim that the same thought can be decomposed differently makes (ii) plausible. (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  35.  36
    Predication and Extensionalization.Bjørn Jespersen - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (5):479 - 499.
    In his 2000 book Logical Properties Colin McGinn argues that predicates denote properties rather than sets or individuals. I support the thesis, but show that it is vulnerable to a type-incongruity objection, if properties are (modelled as) functions, unless a device for extensionalizing properties is added. Alternatively, properties may be construed as primitive intensional entities, as in George Bealer. However, I object to Bealer’s construal of predication as a primitive operation inputting two primitive entities and outputting a third primitive entity. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  36.  59
    Motivating Reductionism About Sets.Alexander Paseau - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):295 – 307.
    The paper raises some difficulties for the typical motivations behind set reductionism, the view that sets are reducible to entities identified independently of set theory.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  37. A Semantic Resolution of the Paradox of Analysis.Dennis Earl - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (3):189-205.
    The paradox of analysis has been a problem for analytic philosophers at least since Moore’s time, and it is especially significant for those who seek an account of analysis along classical lines. The present paper offers a new solution to the paradox, where a theory of analysis is given where (1) analysandum and analysans are distinct concepts, due to their failing to share the same conceptual form, yet (2) they are related in virtue of satisfying various semantic constraints on the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  38. Know-How and Concept Possession.Bengson John & Moffett Marc - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (1):31 - 57.
    We begin with a puzzle: why do some know-how attributions entail ability attributions while others do not? After rejecting the tempting response that know-how attributions are ambiguous, we argue that a satisfactory answer to the puzzle must acknowledge the connection between know-how and concept possession (specifically, reasonable conceptual mastery, or understanding). This connection appears at first to be grounded solely in the cognitive nature of certain activities. However, we show that, contra anti-intellectualists, the connection between know-how and concept possession can (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   33 citations  
  39. Against Propositionalism.Michelle Montague - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):503–518.
    'Propositionalism' is the widely held view that all intentional mental relations-all intentional attitudes-are relations to propositions or something proposition-like. Paradigmatically, to think about the mountain is ipso facto to think that it is F, for some predicate 'F'. It seems, however, many intentional attitudes are not relations to propositions at all: Mary contemplates Jonah, adores New York, misses Athens, mourns her brother. I argue, following Brentano, Husserl, Church and Montague among others, that the way things seem is the way they (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   20 citations  
  40. Resembling Particulars: What Nominalism?Matteo Morganti - 2007 - Metaphysica 8 (2):165-178.
    This paper examines a recent proposal for reviving so-called resemblance nominalism. It is argued that, although consistent, it naturally leads to trope theory upon examination for reasons having to do with the appeal of neutrality as regards certain non-trivial ontological theses.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  41. Intentionalism and Perceptual Presence.Adam Pautz - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):495-541.
    H. H. Price (1932) held that experience is essentially presentational. According to Price, when one has an experience of a tomato, nothing can be more certain than that there is something of which one is aware. Price claimed that the same applies to hallucination. In general, whenever one has a visual experience, there is something of which one is aware, according to Price. Call this thesis Item-Awareness.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   19 citations  
  42.  51
    Quantum-Mechanical Statistics and the Inclusivist Approach to the Nature of Particulars.Francesco Orilia - 2006 - Synthese 148 (1):57-77.
    There have been attempts to derive anti-haeccetistic conclusions from the fact that quantum mechanics (QM) appeals to non-standard statistics. Since in fact QM acknowledges two kinds of such statistics, Bose-Einstein and Fermi-Dirac, I argue that we could in the same vein derive the sharper anti-haeccetistic conclusion that bosons are bundles of tropes and fermions are bundles of universals. Moreover, since standard statistics is still appropriate at the macrolevel, we could also venture to say that no anti-haecceitistic conclusion is warranted for (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. Can the Physicalist Explain Colour Structure in Terms of Colour Experience?Adam Pautz - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):535 – 564.
    Physicalism about colour is the thesis that colours are identical with response-independent, physical properties of objects. I endorse the Argument from Structure against Physicalism about colour. The argument states that Physicalism cannot accommodate certain obvious facts about colour structure: for instance, that red is a unitary colour while purple is a binary colour, and that blue resembles purple more than green. I provide a detailed formulation of the argument. According to the most popular response to the argument, the Physicalist can (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  44. Sensory Awareness is Not a Wide Physical Relation: An Empirical Argument Against Externalist Intentionalism.Adam Pautz - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):205-240.
  45. The A-Theory of Time, the B-Theory of Time, and 'Taking Tense Seriously'.Dean W. Zimmerman - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (4):401–457.
    The paper has two parts: First, I describe a relatively popular thesis in the philosophy of propositional attitudes, worthy of the name “taking tense seriously”; and I distinguish it from a family of views in the metaphysics of time, namely, the A-theories (or what are sometimes called “tensed theories of time”). Once the distinction is in focus, a skeptical worry arises. Some A-theorists maintain that the difference between past, present, and future, is to be drawn in terms of what exists: (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   47 citations  
  46.  20
    Problems with the Platonist Exemplification Tie Between Located Entities and an Unlocated Entity.Jeffrey Grupp - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (3):491-498.
    Selon une ontologie platonicienne, il faut qu’une exemplification platonicienne lie des particuliers physiques et un universel non localisé pour qu’i! y ait connexion entre propriété et choses. Dans cet article, je discute du lien d’exemplification platonicien, lequel a l’intéressante faculté de lier des entités localisées à une entité non localisée et donc, pour reprendre les mots d’Armstrong, la faculté de traverser le domaine du non spatialement localisé et celui du spatialement localisé. La littérature ne contient à peu près aucune discussion (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  47.  94
    Possible-Worlds Semantics for Modal Notions Conceived as Predicates.Volker Halbach, Hannes Leitgeb & Philip Welch - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (2):179-223.
    If □ is conceived as an operator, i.e., an expression that gives applied to a formula another formula, the expressive power of the language is severely restricted when compared to a language where □ is conceived as a predicate, i.e., an expression that yields a formula if it is applied to a term. This consideration favours the predicate approach. The predicate view, however, is threatened mainly by two problems: Some obvious predicate systems are inconsistent, and possible-worlds semantics for predicates of (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  48.  33
    A Description Theory of Singular Reference.Francesco Orilia - 2003 - Dialectica 57 (1):7–40.
    According to the received view, descriptivism is a dead end in an attempt to account for singular reference by proper names, indexicals and possibly even incomplete descriptions, for they require referentialism. In contrast to this, I argue for an application of the former to all kinds of singular terms, indexicals in particular, by relying on a view of incomplete descriptions as elliptical in a pragmatic sense. I thus provide a general analysis of singular reference. The proposed approach is in line (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49.  47
    Standard Quantification Theory in the Analysis of English.Stephen Donaho - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (6):499-526.
    Standard first-order logic plus quantifiers of all finite orders ("SFOLω") faces four well-known difficulties when used to characterize the behavior of certain English quantifier phrases. All four difficulties seem to stem from the typed structure of SFOLω models. The typed structure of SFOLω models is in turn a product of an asymmetry between the meaning of names and the meaning of predicates, the element-set asymmetry. In this paper we examine a class of models in which this asymmetry of meaning is (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50.  80
    Rationality and Puzzling Beliefs.Neil Feit - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):29 - 55.
    The author presents and defends a general view about belief. and certain attributions of belief, with the intention of providing a solution to Saul Kripke’s puzzle about belief. According to the position developed in the paper, there are two senses in which one could be said to have contradictory beliefs. Just one of these senses threatens the rationality of the believer; but Kripke’s puzzle concerns only the other one. The general solution is then extended to certain variants of Kripke’s original (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
1 — 50 / 78