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  1. How Not to Be a Realist.Ioannis Votsis - 2011 - In Elaine M. Landry & Dean Rickles (eds.), Structure, Objects and Causality, , Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, vol. 77. Springer. pp. 59-76.
    When it comes to name-calling, structural realists have heard pretty much all of it. Among the many insults, they have been called ‘empiricist anti-realists’ but also ‘traditional scientific realists’. Obviously the collapse accusations that motivate these two insults cannot both be true at the same time. The aim of this paper is to defend the epistemic variety of structural realism against the accusation of collapse to traditional scientific realism. In so doing, I turn the tables on traditional scientific realists by (...)
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  • How Not to Be a Realist or Why We Ought to Make It Safe for Closet Structural Realists to Come Out.Ioannis Votsis - unknown
    When it comes to name-calling, structural realists have heard pretty much all of it. Among the many insults, they have been called ‘empiricist anti-realists’ but also ‘traditional scientific realists’. Obviously the collapse accusations that motivate these two insults cannot both be true at the same time. The aim of this paper is to defend the epistemic variety of structural realism against the accusation of collapse to traditional scientific realism. In so doing, I turn the tables on traditional scientific realists by (...)
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  • Augustine, the Origin of Evil, and the Mystery of Free Will.Adam M. Willows - 2014 - Religious Studies 50 (2):1-15.
    The question of why humanity first chose to sin is an extension to the problem of evil to which the free-will defence does not easily apply. In De libero arbitrio and elsewhere Augustine argues that as an instance of evil, the fall is necessarily inexplicable. In this article, I identify the problems with this response and attempt to construct an alternative based on Peter van Inwagen's free will . I will argue that the origin of evil is inexplicable not because (...)
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