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Nuel D. Belnap (1982). Gupta's Rule of Revision Theory of Truth.

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  1.  6
    Guest Editors’ Introduction.Riccardo Bruni & Shawn Standefer - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-9.
  2.  5
    Revision Without Revision Sequences: Self-Referential Truth.Edoardo Rivello - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-29.
    The model of self-referential truth presented in this paper, named Revision-theoretic supervaluation, aims to incorporate the philosophical insights of Gupta and Belnap’s Revision Theory of Truth into the formal framework of Kripkean fixed-point semantics. In Kripke-style theories the final set of grounded true sentences can be reached from below along a strictly increasing sequence of sets of grounded true sentences: in this sense, each stage of the construction can be viewed as an improvement on the previous ones. I want to (...)
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  3. Conditionals in Theories of Truth.Anil Gupta & Shawn Standefer - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1):27-63.
    We argue that distinct conditionals—conditionals that are governed by different logics—are needed to formalize the rules of Truth Introduction and Truth Elimination. We show that revision theory, when enriched with the new conditionals, yields an attractive theory of truth. We go on to compare this theory with one recently proposed by Hartry Field.
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  4. Contraction and Revision.Shawn Standefer - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Logic 13 (3):58-77.
    An important question for proponents of non-contractive approaches to paradox is why contraction fails. Zardini offers an answer, namely that paradoxical sentences exhibit a kind of instability. I elaborate this idea using revision theory, and I argue that while instability does motivate failures of contraction, it equally motivates failure of many principles that non-contractive theorists want to maintain.
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  5. On Artifacts and Truth-Preservation.Shawn Standefer - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Logic 12 (3):135-158.
    In Saving Truth from Paradox, Hartry Field presents and defends a theory of truth with a new conditional. In this paper, I present two criticisms of this theory, one concerning its assessments of validity and one concerning its treatment of truth-preservation claims. One way of adjusting the theory adequately responds to the truth-preservation criticism, at the cost of making the validity criticism worse. I show that in a restricted setting, Field has a way to respond to the validity criticism. I (...)
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  6.  27
    Solovay-Type Theorems for Circular Definitions.Shawn Standefer - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (3):467-487.
  7.  70
    Vagueness and Revision Sequences.C. M. Asmus - 2013 - Synthese 190 (6):953-974.
    Theories of truth and vagueness are closely connected; in this article, I draw another connection between these areas of research. Gupta and Belnap’s Revision Theory of Truth is converted into an approach to vagueness. I show how revision sequences from a general theory of definitions can be used to understand the nature of vague predicates. The revision sequences show how the meaning of vague predicates are interconnected with each other. The approach is contrasted with the similar supervaluationist approach.
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  8.  59
    Truth, Dependence and Supervaluation: Living with the Ghost.Toby Meadows - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2):221-240.
    In J Philos Logic 34:155–192, 2005, Leitgeb provides a theory of truth which is based on a theory of semantic dependence. We argue here that the conceptual thrust of this approach provides us with the best way of dealing with semantic paradoxes in a manner that is acceptable to a classical logician. However, in investigating a problem that was raised at the end of J Philos Logic 34:155–192, 2005, we discover that something is missing from Leitgeb’s original definition. Moreover, we (...)
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  9.  42
    Reference, Paradoxes and Truth.Michał Walicki - 2009 - Synthese 171 (1):195 - 226.
    We introduce a variant of pointer structures with denotational semantics and show its equivalence to systems of boolean equations: both have the same solutions. Taking paradoxes to be statements represented by systems of equations (or pointer structures) having no solutions, we thus obtain two alternative means of deciding paradoxical character of statements, one of which is the standard theory of solving boolean equations. To analyze more adequately statements involving semantic predicates, we extend propositional logic with the assertion operator and give (...)
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  10.  59
    Two Types of Deflationism.Aladdin Yaqub - 2008 - Synthese 165 (1):77-106.
    It is a fundamental intuition about truth that the conditions under which a sentence is true are given by what the sentence asserts. My aim in this paper is to show that this intuition captures the concept of truth completely and correctly. This is conceptual deflationism, for it does not go beyond what is asserted by a sentence in order to define the truth status of that sentence. This paper, hence, is a defense of deflationism as a conceptual account of (...)
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  11.  32
    The Rationale Behind Revision-Rule Semantics.Lionel Shapiro - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (3):477 - 515.
    According to Gupta and Belnap, the “extensional behavior” of ‘true’ matches that of a circularly defined predicate. Besides promising to explain semantic paradoxicality, their general theory of circular predicates significantly liberalizes the framework of truth-conditional semantics. The authors’ discussions of the rationale behind that liberalization invoke two distinct senses in which a circular predicate’s semantic behavior is explained by a “revision rule” carrying hypothetical information about its extension. Neither attempted explanation succeeds. Their theory may however be modified to employ a (...)
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  12.  32
    On Gupta-Belnap Revision Theories of Truth, Kripkean Fixed Points, and the Next Stable Set.P. D. Welch - 2001 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 7 (3):345-360.
    We consider various concepts associated with the revision theory of truth of Gupta and Belnap. We categorize the notions definable using their theory of circular definitions as those notions universally definable over the next stable set. We give a simplified account of varied revision sequences-as a generalised algorithmic theory of truth. This enables something of a unification with the Kripkean theory of truth using supervaluation schemes.
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  13.  60
    Meaning and Circular Definitions.Francesco Orilia - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (2):155-169.
    Gupta's and Belnap's Revision Theory of Truth defends the legitimacy of circular definitions. Circularity, however, forces us to reconsider our conception of meaning. A readjustment of some standard theses about meaning is here proposed, by relying on a novel version of the sense-reference distinction.
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  14.  32
    Property Theory and the Revision Theory of Definitions.Francesco Orilia - 2000 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 65 (1):212-246.
    Russell’s type theory has been the standard property theory for years, relying on rigid type distinctions at the grammatical level to circumvent the paradoxes of predication. In recent years it has been convincingly argued by Bealer, Cochiarella, Turner and others that many linguistic and ontological data are best accounted for by using a type-free property theory. In the spirit of exploring alternatives and “to have as many opportunities as possible for theory comparison”, this paper presents another type-free property theory, to (...)
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  15.  30
    Construction of Truth Predicates: Approximation Versus Revision.Juan Barba - 1998 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 4 (4):399-417.
  16.  60
    Displaying and Deciding Substructural Logics 1: Logics with Contraposition.Greg Restall - 1998 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 27 (2):179-216.
    Many logics in the relevant family can be given a proof theory in the style of Belnap's display logic. However, as originally given, the proof theory is essentially more expressive than the logics they seek to model. In this paper, we consider a modified proof theory which more closely models relevant logics. In addition, we use this proof theory to show decidability for a large range of substructural logics.
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  17.  37
    What's in a Function?Gian Aldo Antonelli - 1996 - Synthese 107 (2):167 - 204.
    In this paper we argue that Revision Rules, introduced by Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap as a tool for the analysis of the concept of truth, also provide a useful tool for defining computable functions. This also makes good on Gupta's and Belnap's claim that Revision Rules provide a general theory of definition, a claim for which they supply only the example of truth. In particular we show how Revision Rules arise naturally from relaxing and generalizing a classical construction due (...)
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  18.  45
    Non-Well-Founded Sets Via Revision Rules.Gian Aldo Antonelli - 1994 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (6):633 - 679.
  19. Annual Meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic: Notre Dame, 1993.Steven Buechler - 1994 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 59 (2):696-719.
  20.  72
    Semantics and Supervenience.Daniel Bonevac - 1991 - Synthese 87 (3):331 - 361.
  21.  16
    Solution to a Problem of Ono and Komori.John Slaney - 1989 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 18 (1):103 - 111.
  22.  26
    Sequent-Systems and Groupoid Models. I.Kosta Došen - 1988 - Studia Logica 47 (4):353 - 385.
    The purpose of this paper is to connect the proof theory and the model theory of a family of propositional logics weaker than Heyting's. This family includes systems analogous to the Lambek calculus of syntactic categories, systems of relevant logic, systems related toBCK algebras, and, finally, Johansson's and Heyting's logic. First, sequent-systems are given for these logics, and cut-elimination results are proved. In these sequent-systems the rules for the logical operations are never changed: all changes are made in the structural (...)
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  23.  25
    Four Relevant Gentzen Systems.Steve Giambrone & Aleksandar Kron - 1987 - Studia Logica 46 (1):55 - 71.
    This paper is a study of four subscripted Gentzen systems G u R +, G u T +, G u RW + and G u TW +. [16] shows that the first three are equivalent to the semilattice relevant logics u R +, u T + and u RW + and conjectures that G u TW + is, equivalent to u TW +. Here we prove Cut Theorems for these systems, and then show that modus ponens is admissible — which (...)
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  24.  91
    The Truth is Never Simple.John P. Burgess - 1986 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 51 (3):663-681.
    The complexity of the set of truths of arithmetic is determined for various theories of truth deriving from Kripke and from Gupta and Herzberger.
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  25.  26
    On Purported Gentzen Formulations of Two Positive Relevent Logics.Steve Giambrone - 1985 - Studia Logica 44 (3):233 - 236.
    [10] offers two (cut-free) subscripted Gentzen systems, G 2 T + and G 2 R +, which are claimed to be equivalent in an appropriate sense to the positive relevant logics T + and R +, respectively. In this paper we show that that claim is false. We also show that the argument in [10] for the further claim that cut and/or modus ponens is admissible in two other subscripted Gentzen systems, G 1 T + and G 1 R +, (...)
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  26.  70
    Four Valued Semantics and the Liar.Albert Visser - 1984 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 13 (2):181 - 212.