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  1. Abductive Inference Within a Pragmatic Framework.Daniele Chiffi & Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen - forthcoming - Synthese:1-17.
    This paper presents an enrichment of the Gabbay–Woods schema of Peirce’s 1903 logical form of abduction with illocutionary acts, drawing from logic for pragmatics and its resources to model justified assertions. It analyses the enriched schema and puts it into the perspective of Peirce’s logic and philosophy.
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  • Structuring Co-Constructive Logic for Proofs and Refutations.James Trafford - 2016 - Logica Universalis 10 (1):67-97.
    This paper considers a topos-theoretic structure for the interpretation of co-constructive logic for proofs and refutations following Trafford :22–40, 2015). It is notoriously tricky to define a proof-theoretic semantics for logics that adequately represent constructivity over proofs and refutations. By developing abstractions of elementary topoi, we consider an elementary topos as structure for proofs, and complement topos as structure for refutation. In doing so, it is possible to consider a dialogue structure between these topoi, and also control their relation such (...)
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  • We Don’T Know We Don’T Know: Asserting Ignorance.Massimiliano Carrara, Daniele Chiffi, Ciro De Florio & Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3565-3580.
    The pragmatic logic of assertions shows a connection between ignorance and decidability. In it, we can express pragmatic factual ignorance and first-order ignorance as well as some of their variants. We also show how some pragmatic versions of second-order ignorance and of Rumsfeld-ignorance may be formulated. A specific variant of second-order ignorance is particularly relevant. This indicates a strong pragmatic version of ignorance of ignorance, irreducible to any previous form of ignorance, which defines limits to what can justifiably be asserted (...)
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  • The Logical Burdens of Proof. Assertion and Hypothesis.Daniele Chiffi & Fabien Schang - 2017 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 26 (4):1-22.
    The paper proposes two logical analyses of (the norms of) justification. In a first, realist-minded case, truth is logically independent from justification and leads to a pragmatic logic LP including two epistemic and pragmatic operators, namely, assertion and hypothesis. In a second, antirealist-minded case, truth is not logically independent from justification and results in two logical systems of information and justification: AR4 and AR4¢, respectively, provided with a question-answer semantics. The latter proposes many more epistemic agents, each corresponding to a (...)
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  • Errata Corrige to “Pragmatic and Dialogic Interpretation of Bi-Intuitionism. Part I”.Gianluigi Bellin, Massimiliano Carrara, Daniele Chiffi & Alessandro Menti - 2016 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 25 (2).