Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Perception and Reflection.Anil Gomes - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):131-152.
    What method should we use to determine the nature of perceptual experience? My focus here is the Kantian thought that transcendental arguments can be used to determine the nature of perceptual experience. I set out a dilemma for the use of transcendental arguments in the philosophy of perception, one which turns on a comparison ofthe transcendental method with the first-personal method of early analytic philosophy, and with the empirical methods of much contemporary philosophy of mind. The transcendental method can avoid (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Hermann Lotze and the Genesis of Husserl's Early Philosophy (1886-1901).Denis Fisette - forthcoming - In Rodney Parker (ed.), The Idealism-Realism Debate in the Early Phenomenological Movement. Berlin: Springer.
    The purpose of this study is to assess Husserl’s debt to Lotze’s philosophy during the Halle period (1886-1901). I shall first track the sources of Husserl’s knowledge of Lotze’s philosophy during his studies with Brentano in Vienna and then with Stumpf in Halle. I shall then briefly comment on Husserl’s references to Lotze in his early work and research manuscripts for the second volume of his Philosophy of Arithmetic. In the third section, I examine Lotze’s influence on Husserl’s antipsychologistic turn (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Decompositions and Transformations: Conceptions of Analysis in the Early Analytic and Phenomenological Traditions.Michael Beaney - 2002 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (S1):53-99.
  • Russell and Husserl (1905–1918): The Not-So-Odd Couple.Nikolay Milkov - 2017 - In Peter Stone (ed.), Bertrand Russell’s Life and Legacy. Wilmington, DE: Vernon Press. pp. 73-96.
    Historians of philosophy commonly regard as antipodal Bertrand Russell and Edmund Husserl, the founding fathers of analytic philosophy and phenomenology. This paper, however, establishes that during a formative phase in both of their careers Russell and Husserl shared a range of seminal ideas. In particular, the essay adduces clear cases of family resemblance between Husserl’s and Russell’s philosophy during their middle period, which spanned the years 1905 through 1918. The paper thus challenges the received view of Husserl’s relation to early (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Lotze and the Early Cambridge Analytic Philosophy.Nikolay Milkov - 2000 - Prima Philosophia 13:133-53.
    Many historians of analytic philosophy consider the early philosophy of Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein as much more neo-Hegelian as once believed. At the same time, the authors who closely investigate Green, Bradley and Bosanquet find out that these have little in common with Hegel. The thesis advanced in this chapter is that what the British (ill-named) neo-Hegelians brought to the early analytic philosophers were, above all, some ideas of Lotze, not of Hegel. This is true regarding: (i) Lotze’s logical approach (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • G. E. Moore and the Greifswald Objectivists on the Given and the Beginning of Analytic Philosophy.Nikolay Milkov - 2004 - Axiomathes 14 (4):361-379.
    Shortly before G. E. Moore wrote down the formative for the early analytic philosophy lectures on Some Main Problems of Philosophy (1910–1911), he had become acquainted with two books which influenced his thought: (1) a book by Husserl's pupil August Messer and (2) a book by the Greifswald objectivist Dimitri Michaltschew. Central to Michaltschew's book was the concept of the given. In Part I, I argue that Moore elaborated his concept of sense-data in the wake of the Greifswald concept. Carnap (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • The Joint Philosophical Program of Russell and Wittgenstein and Its Demise.Nikolay Milkov - 2013 - Nordic Wittgenstein Review 2 (1):81-105.
    Between April and November 1912, Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein were engaged in a joint philosophical program. Wittgenstein‘s meeting with Gottlob Frege in December 1912 led, however, to its dissolution – the joint program was abandoned. Section 2 of this paper outlines the key points of that program, identifying what Russell and Wittgenstein each contributed to it. The third section determines precisely those features of their collaborative work that Frege criticized. Finally, building upon the evidence developed in the preceding two (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Mitä Oli Analyyttinen Filosofia.Panu Raatikainen - 2001 - Ajatus 58:189-217.
    No categories
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Kant, the Philosophy of Mind, and Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy.Anil Gomes - 2017 - In Kant and the Philosophy of Mind: Perception, Reason, and the Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    In the first part of this chapter, I summarise some of the issues in the philosophy of mind which are addressed in Kant’s Critical writings. In the second part, I chart some of the ways in which that discussion influenced twentieth-century analytic philosophy of mind and identify some of the themes which characterise Kantian approaches in the philosophy of mind.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Welfare Economics and the Welfare State in Historical Perspective.Karen Knight - manuscript
    Although the economic thought of Marshall and Pigou was united by ethical positions broadly considered utilitarian, differences in their intellectual milieu led to degrees of difference between their respective philosophical visions. This change in milieu includes the influence of the little understood period of transition from the early idealist period in Great Britain, which provided the context to Marshall’s intellectual formation, and the late British Idealist period, which provided the context to Pigou’s intellectual formation. During this latter period, the pervading (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • On Russell's Vulnerability to Russell's Paradox.James Levine - 2001 - History and Philosophy of Logic 22 (4):207-231.
    Influenced by G. E. Moore, Russell broke with Idealism towards the end of 1898; but in later years he characterized his meeting Peano in August 1900 as ?the most important event? in ?the most important year in my intellectual life?. While Russell discovered his paradox during his post-Peano period, the question arises whether he was already committed, during his pre-Peano Moorean period, to assumptions from which his paradox may be derived. Peter Hylton has argued that the pre-Peano Russell was thus (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Hermann Lotze y la génesis de la filosofía temprana de Husserl (1886-1901).Denis Fisette - 2015 - Apeiron. Estudios de Filosofia 3:13-35.
    El propósito del presente estudio es afirmar la deuda de Husserl con la filosofía de Lotze durante el período de Halle. Mi interés se centra especialmente en el pensamiento del joven Husserl desde su llegada a Halle en 1886 hasta la publicación de su Hauptwerk en 1900-1901. Primero me remontaré a las fuentes del conocimiento de la filosofía de Lotze por parte de Husserl durante sus estudios con Brentano en Viena y después con Stumpf en Halle. Luego comentaré brevemente las (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Why I Am Not an Analytic Philosopher.David Spurrett - 2008 - South African Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):153-163.
    From a certain simplistic and inaccurate, although regrettably popular, perspective philosophy, at least for the past few decades, is available only in two main flavours – analytic and continental. Some self-identified members of both camps are apt to endorse uncharitable caricatures of what the others are up to. Among the many lines of criticism that can be directed against this false dichotomy, I wish to focus on discussion of a broadly naturalistic orientation that rejects many of the commitments both of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • On the Origins of the Contemporary Notion of Propositional Content: Anti-Psychologism in Nineteenth-Century Psychology and G.E. Moore’s Early Theory of Judgment.Consuelo Preti - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (2):176-185.
    I argue that the familiar picture of the rise of analytic philosophy through the early work of G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell is incomplete and to some degree erroneous. Archival evidence suggests that a considerable influence on Moore, especially evident in his 1899 paper ‘The nature of judgment,’ comes from the literature in nineteenth-century empirical psychology rather than nineteenth-century neo-Hegelianism, as is widely believed. I argue that the conceptual influences of Moore’s paper are more likely to have had their (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Aristotelianism and Modernity: Terence Irwin on the Development of Ethics.John Skorupski - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (2):312-337.
  • Russell’s Debt to Lotze.Nikolay Milkov - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (2):186-193.
    Between 1896 and 1898 Russell’s philosophy was considerably influenced by Hermann Lotze. Lotze’s influence on Russell was especially pronounced in introducing metaphysical—anthropological, in particular—assumptions in Russell’s logic and ontology. Three steps in his work reflect this influence. (i) The first such step can be discerned in the Principle of Differentiation, which Russell accepted in the Essay (finished in October 1986); according to this Principle, the objects of human cognition are segmented complexes which have diverse parts (individuals). (ii) After Russell reread (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations