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  1. El conflicto en las emociones recalcitrantes.Laura Mesa Alvarado - 2018 - Ideas Y Valores 67:113-128.
    En general, todas las emociones comparten ciertas características que les son inherentes: tienen conductas asociadas y tienen objetos intencionales; además, en las emociones recalcitrantes el sujeto hace un juicio sobre el objeto intencional que entra en conflicto con la emoción. Un caso típico es el miedo a volar: una persona se rehúsa a volar en avión, pero juzga que no hay nada que implique peligro en esa acción. Dado que las conductas que involucra la emoción son acciones intencionales del sujeto (...)
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  • Recalcitrant Fears of Death.Kristen Hine - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (4):454-466.
    According to what I will refer to as judgmentalist approaches to the fear of death, the fear of death conforms to the structure implied by judgmentalist theories of emotion. JFD holds that fears of death are constituted in part by evaluative judgments or beliefs about one’s own death. Although many philosophers endorse JFD, there is good reason to believe that it may be problematic. For, there is a troubling objection to judgmentalist theories of emotion; if judgmentalism is false, then so (...)
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  • Trust and Belief: A Preemptive Reasons Account.Arnon Keren - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2593-2615.
    According to doxastic accounts of trust, trusting a person to \(\varPhi \) involves, among other things, holding a belief about the trusted person: either the belief that the trusted person is trustworthy or the belief that she actually will \(\varPhi \) . In recent years, several philosophers have argued against doxastic accounts of trust. They have claimed that the phenomenology of trust suggests that rather than such a belief, trust involves some kind of non-doxastic mental attitude towards the trusted person, (...)
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  • Voodoo Dolls and Angry Lions: How Emotions Explain Arational Actions.Andrea Scarantino & Michael Nielsen - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2975-2998.
    Hursthouse :57–68, 1991) argues that arational actions—e.g. kicking a door out of anger—cannot be explained by belief–desire pairs. The Humean Response to Hursthouse :25–38, 2000b) defends the Humean model from Hursthouse’s challenge. We argue that the Humean Response fails because belief–desire pairs are neither necessary nor sufficient for causing emotional actions. The Emotionist Response is to embrace Hursthouse’s conclusion that emotions provide an independent source of explanation for intentional actions. We consider Döring’s :214–230, 2003) feeling-based Emotionist account and argue that (...)
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