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John Bickle (1992). Multiple Realizability and Psychophysical Reduction.

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  1.  31
    Neuroscience as a Human Science: Integrating Phenomenology and Empiricism in the Study of Action and Consciousness. [REVIEW]Ralph D. Ellis - 2013 - Human Studies 36 (4):491-507.
    This paper considers where contemporary neuroscience leaves us in terms of how human consciousness fits into the material world, and whether consciousness is reducible to merely mechanical physical systems, or on the contrary whether consciousness is a self-organizing system that can in a sense use the brain for its own purposes. The paper discusses how phenomenology can be integrated with new findings about “neural plasticity” to yield new approaches to the mind–body problem and the place of consciousness as a causal (...)
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    Three Elements of Causation: Biconditionality, Asymmetry, and Experimental Manipulability.Ralph D. Ellis - 2001 - Philosophia 28 (1-4):103-125.
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  3. Property Dualism Without Substance Dualism?Robert Francescotti - 2001 - Philosophical Papers 30 (2):93-116.
    Substance dualism is widely rejected by philosophers of mind, but many continue to accept some form of property dualism. The assumption here is that one can consistently believe that (1) mental properties are not physical properties, while denying that (2) mental particulars are not physical particulars. But is this assumption true? This paper considers several analyses of what makes something a physical particular (as opposed to a non-physical particular), and it is argued that on any plausible analysis, accepting (1) requires (...)
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  4.  38
    Psychoneural Reduction of the Genuinely Cognitive: Some Accomplished Facts.John Bickle - 1995 - Philosophical Psychology 8 (3):265-85.
    The need for representations and computations over their contents in psychological explanations is often cited as both the mark of the genuinely cognitive and a source of skepticism about the reducibility of cognitive theories to neuroscience. A generic version of this anti-reductionist argument is rejected in this paper as unsound, since (i) current thinking about associative learning emphasizes the need for cognitivist resources in theories adequate to explain even the simplest form of this phenomena (Pavlovian conditioning), and yet (ii) the (...)
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