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Readings In Philosophy Of Psychology, V

(ed.)
Cambridge: Harvard University Press (1981)

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  1. Multiple Realization, Reduction and Mental Properties.Max Kistler - 1999 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13 (2):135 – 149.
    This paper tries to remove some obstacles standing in the way of considering mental properties as both genuine natural kinds and causally efficacious rather than epiphenomena. As the case of temperature shows, it is not justified to conclude from a property being multiply realizable to it being irreducible. Yet Kim's argument to the effect that if a property is multiply realizable with a heterogeneous reduction base then it cannot be a natural kind and possesses only derivative “epiphenomenal” causal efficacy is (...)
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  • What Do Propositions Measure in Folk Psychology?Peter Weatherall - 1996 - Philosophical Psychology 9 (3):365-80.
    In this paper I examine the analogical argument that the use that is made of propositions in folk psychology in the characterisation of propositional attitudes is no more puzzling than the use that is made of numbers in the physical sciences in the measurement of physical properties. It has been argued that the result of this analogy is that there is no need to postulate the existence of sentences in a language of thought which underpin the propositional characterisation of propositional (...)
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  • About Being a Bat.J. Christopher Maloney - 1985 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63:26.
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  • Contingencies and Rules.B. F. Skinner - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):607.
  • Negation in Skinner's System.N. E. Wetherick - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):606.
  • The Egg Revealed.William S. Verplanck - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):605.
  • Rule-Governed Behavior in Computational Psychology.Edward P. Stabler - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):604.
  • New Wine in Old Glasses?Joseph M. Scandura - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):602.
  • Response Classes, Operants, and Rules in Problem Solving.Jan G. Rein - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):602.
  • Is There Such a Thing as a Problem Situation?Kjell Raaheim - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):600.
  • Problem Solving as a Cognitive Process.Manfred Kochen - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):599.
  • Can Skinner Define a Problem?Geir Kaufmann - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):599.
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  • Contingencies, Rules, and the “Problem” of Novel Behavior.Pere Julià - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):598.
  • On Choosing the “Right” Stimulus and Rule.Robin M. Hogarth - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):596.
  • Psychology as Moral Rhetoric.Rom Harré - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):595.
  • The Microscopic Analysis of Behavior: Toward a Synthesis of Instrumental, Perceptual, and Cognitive Ideas.Stephen Grossberg - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):594.
  • Learning From Instruction.Jerome A. Feldman - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):593.
  • Can We Analyze Skinner's Problem-Solving Behavior in Operant Terms?P. C. Dodwell - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):592.
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  • On the Depth and Fit of Behaviorist Explanation.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):591.
  • An Operant Analysis of Problem Solving.B. F. Skinner - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):583.
  • Brutes Believe Not.David Martel Johnson - 1988 - Philosophical Psychology 1 (3):279-294.
    Abstract Is it plausible to claim (some) non?human animals have beliefs, on the (non?behaviourist) assumption that believing is or involves subjects? engaging in practical reasoning which takes account of meanings? Some answer Yes, on the ground that evolutionary continuities linking humans with other animals must include psychological ones. But (1) evolution does not operate?even primarily?by means of continuities. Thus species, no matter how closely related (in fact, sometimes even conspecifics) operate with very different adaptive ?tricks'; and it is plausible to (...)
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  • Questions Raised by the Reinforcement Paradigm.Anatol Rapoport - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):601-602.
  • A Case Study of How a Paper Containing Good Ideas, Presented by a Distinguished Scientist, to an Appropriate Audience, Had Almost No Influence at All.Earl Hunt - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):597-598.
  • About Being a Bat.J. Christopher Maloney - 1986 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (1):26-49.
  • Look Again: Phenomenology and Mental Imagery. [REVIEW]Evan Thompson - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):137-170.
    This paper (1) sketches a phenomenological analysis of visual mental imagery; (2) applies this analysis to the mental imagery debate in cognitive science; (3) briefly sketches a neurophenomenological approach to mental imagery; and (4) compares the results of this discussion with Dennett’s heterophenomenology.
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  • Nonconceptual Content: From Perceptual Experience to Subpersonal Computational States.José Luis Bermúdez - 1995 - Mind and Language 10 (4):333-369.
    Philosophers have often argued that ascriptions of content are appropriate only to the personal level states of folk psychology. Against this, this paper defends the view that the familiar propositional attitudes and states defined over them are part of a larger set of cognitive proceses that do not make constitutive reference to concept possession. It does this by showing that states with nonconceptual content exist both in perceptual experience and in subpersonal information-processing systems. What makes these states content-involving is their (...)
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  • Operant Analysis of Problem Solving: Answers to Questions You Probably Don't Want to Ask.Robert J. Sternberg - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):605-605.
  • John Symons and Paco Calvo (Eds): The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology. [REVIEW]Ulrike Pompe - 2011 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 42 (2):421-423.