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Christopher Bobier (2014). Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology and Divine Revelation.

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  1.  3
    Engineered Knowledge, Fragility and Virtue Epistemology.Dan O’Brien - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-18.
    There is a clean image of knowledge transmission between thinkers that involves sincere and reliable speakers, and hearers who carefully assess the epistemic credentials of the testimony that they hear. There is, however, a murkier side to testimonial exchange where deception and lies hold sway. Such mendacity leads to sceptical worries and to discussion of epistemic vice. Here, though, I explore cases where deceit and lies are involved in knowledge transmission. This may sound surprising or even incoherent since lying usually (...)
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    Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology as Religious Epistemology: A Response to Bobier.Joe Milburn - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (2):427-434.
    In a recent paper, Christopher Bobier has argued that Duncan Pritchard’s Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology cannot account for knowledge that we have through Divine Revelation. This gives philosophers who believe that Divine Revelation can be source of knowledge reason to reject ALVE. Bobier’s arguments are specifically against ALVE, but they serve as arguments against all sorts of virtue epistemologies. In this paper then, I will critically examine Bobier’s argument, and contend that virtue epistemologies are compatible with knowledge through Divine Revelation.
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