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Why self-ascriptions are difficult and develop late

In B. Malle & S. Hodges. (eds.), Other Minds: How Humans Bridge the Gap Between Self and Others. Guilford Press. pp. 190--206 (2005)

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  1. Relations between self-understanding and other-understanding: similarities and interactions.Adrianna Smurzyńska - 2020 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 11 (2).
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  • Introspection & Remembering.Josef Perner, Daniela Kloo & Elisabeth Stöttinger - 2007 - Synthese 159 (2):253 - 270.
    We argue that episodic remembering, understood as the ability to re-experience past events, requires a particular kind of introspective ability and understanding. It requires the understanding that first person experiences can represent actual events. In this respect it differs from the understanding required by the traditional false belief test for children, where a third person attribution (to others or self) of a behavior governing representation is sufficient. The understanding of first person experiences as representations is also required for problem solving (...)
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  • Pretending as imaginative rehearsal for cultural conformity.Radu Bogdan - 2005 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 5 (1-2):191-213.
    Pretend play and pretense develop in distinct phases of childhood as ontogenetically adaptive responses to pressures specific to those phases, and may have evolved in different periods of human ancestry. These are pressures to assimilate cultural artifacts, norms, roles, and behavioral scripts. The playful and creative elements in both forms of pretending are dictated by the variable, open-ended, and evolving nature and function of the cultural tasks they handle. The resulting creativity of the adult intellect is likely to be a (...)
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  • Inside loops: Developmental premises of self-ascriptions.Radu J. Bogdan - 2007 - Synthese 159 (2):235-252.
    Self-ascriptions of thoughts and attitudes depend on a sense of the intentionality of one’s own mental states, which develops later than, and independently of, the sense of the intentionality of the thoughts and attitudes of others. This sense of the self-intentionality of one’s own mental states grows initially out of executive developments that enable one to simulate one’s own actions and perceptions, as genuine off-line thoughts, and to regulate such simulations.
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  • Two Levels of Metacognition.Santiago Arango-Muñoz - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (1):71-82.
    Two main theories about metacognition are reviewed, each of which claims to provide a better explanation of this phenomenon, while discrediting the other theory as inappropriate. The paper claims that in order to do justice to the complex phenomenon of metacognition, we must distinguish two levels of this capacity—each having a different structure, a different content and a different function within the cognitive architecture. It will be shown that each of the reviewed theories has been trying to explain only one (...)
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