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Paul A. Boghossian (1997). What the Externalist Can Know A Priori.

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  1.  49
    The Structure of Content is Not Transparent.Thomas Hodgson - 2017 - Topoi:1-13.
    Sentences in context have semantic contents determined by a range of factors both internal and external to speakers. I argue against the thesis that semantic content is transparent to speakers in the sense of being immediately accessible to speakers in virtue of their linguistic competence.
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  2.  30
    Two Notions of Circularity.Jesper Kallestrup - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (5):486-512.
    Crispin Wright’s epistemic response to McKinsey’s paradox is to argue that introspective knowledge of the first premise fails to transmit across the semantic externalist entailment in the second premise to the conclusion that one has such untoward knowledge of the external world. This paper argues first that Stewart Cohen and Jonathan Vogel’s bootstrapping arguments suffer from a novel kind of epistemic circularity, which triggers failure of transmission but allows for the possibility of basic perceptual knowledge. It is then argued that (...)
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  3. Externalism and “Knowing What” One Thinks.T. Parent - 2015 - Synthese 192 (5):1337-1350.
    Some worry that semantic externalism is incompatible with knowing by introspection what content your thoughts have. In this paper, I examine one primary argument for this incompatibilist worry, the slow-switch argument. Following Goldberg , I construe the argument as attacking the conjunction of externalism and “skeptic immune” knowledge of content, where such knowledge would persist in a skeptical context. Goldberg, following Burge :649–663, 1988), attempts to reclaim such knowledge for the externalist; however, I contend that all Burge-style accounts vindicate that (...)
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  4. Self‐Knowledge and Externalism About Empty Concepts.Ted Parent - 2015 - Analytic Philosophy 56 (2):158-168.
    Several authors have argued that, assuming we have apriori knowledge of our own thought-contents, semantic externalism implies that we can know apriori contingent facts about the empirical world. After presenting the argument, I shall respond by resisting the premise that an externalist can know apriori: If s/he has the concept water, then water exists. In particular, Boghossian's Dry Earth example suggests that such thought-experiments do not provide such apriori knowledge. Boghossian himself rejects the Dry Earth experiment, however, since it would (...)
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  5. Naïve Realism, Privileged Access, and Epistemic Safety.Matthew Kennedy - 2011 - Noûs 45 (1):77-102.
    Working from a naïve-realist perspective, I examine first-person knowledge of one's perceptual experience. I outline a naive-realist theory of how subjects acquire knowledge of the nature of their experiences, and I argue that naive realism is compatible with moderate, substantial forms of first-person privileged access. A more general moral of my paper is that treating “success” states like seeing as genuine mental states does not break up the dynamics that many philosophers expect from the phenomenon of knowledge of the mind.
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  6.  68
    The Discrimination Argument Revisited.Simon Dierig - 2010 - Erkenntnis 72 (1):73-92.
    The first explicit argument for the incompatibility of externalism in the philosophy of mind and a priori self-knowledge is Boghossian’s discrimination argument. In this essay, I oppose the third premise of this argument, trying to show by means of a thought experiment that possessing the “twater thought” is not an alternative, a fortiori not a relevant alternative, to having the “water thought.” I then examine a modified version of Boghossian’s argument. The attempt is made to substantiate the claim that the (...)
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  7.  89
    First-Person Authority: Dualism, Constitutivism, and Neo-Expressivism.Dorit Bar-On - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (1):53-71.
    What I call “Rorty’s Dilemma” has us caught between the Scylla of Cartesian Dualism and the Charybdis of eliminativism about the mental. Proper recognition of what is distinctively mental requires accommodating incorrigibility about our mental states, something Rorty thinks materialists cannot do. So we must either countenance mental states over and above physical states in our ontology, or else give up altogether on the mental as a distinct category. In section 2, “Materialist Introspectionism—Independence and Epistemic Authority”, I review reasons for (...)
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  8. On the Compatibility of Epistemic Internalism and Content Externalism.B. J. C. Madison - 2009 - Acta Analytica 24 (3):173-183.
    In this paper I consider a recent argument of Timothy Williamson’s that epistemic internalism and content externalism are indeed incompatible, and since he takes content externalism to be above reproach, so much the worse for epistemic internalism. However, I argue that epistemic internalism, properly understood, remains substantially unaffected no matter which view of content turns out to be correct. What is key to the New Evil Genius thought experiment is that, given everything of which the inhabitants are consciously aware, the (...)
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  9.  68
    Wright on the McKinsey Problem.Anthony Brueckner - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):385-391.
    The McKinsey Problem concerns a puzzling implication of the doctrines of Content Externalism and Privileged Access. I provide a categorization of possible solutions to the problem. Then I discuss Crispin Wright’s work on the problem. I argue that Wright has misconceived the status of his own proferred solution to the problem.
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  10. Semantic Externalism and Psychological Externalism.Åsa Wikforss - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (1):158-181.
    Externalism is widely endorsed within contemporary philosophy of mind and language. Despite this, it is far from clear how the externalist thesis should be construed and, indeed, why we should accept it. In this entry I distinguish and examine three central types of externalism: what I call foundational externalism, externalist semantics, and psychological externalism. I suggest that the most plausible version of externalism is not in fact a very radical thesis and does not have any terribly interesting implications for philosophy (...)
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  11.  89
    How Is Descartes' Argument Against Scepticism Better Than Putnam's?Michael Jacovides - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):593 - 612.
    'If a person can think of an F, then that person has come into causal contact with an F in the right way' is a premise in an obvious reconstruction of Putnam's argument that we are not brains in vats. 'If a person can think of an F, then that person has come into causal contact with an F or with something at least as good as an F' is the only controversial premise in Descartes' argument for the existence of (...)
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  12.  37
    The Doctrine of Propositions, Internalism, and Global Supervenience.Neil Feit - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (2):447-457.
  13. Semantic Externalism and A Priori Self-Knowledge.Jussi Haukioja - 2006 - Ratio 19 (2):149-159.
    The argument known as the 'McKinsey Recipe' tries to establish the incompatibility of semantic externalism (about natural kind concepts in particular) and _a priori _self- knowledge about thoughts and concepts by deriving from the conjunction of these theses an absurd conclusion, such as that we could know _a priori _that water exists. One reply to this argument is to distinguish two different readings of 'natural kind concept': (i) a concept which _in fact _denotes a natural kind, and (ii) a concept (...)
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  14. Externalism and Self-Knowledge: Content, Use, and Expression.Dorit Bar-On - 2004 - Noûs 38 (3):430-55.
    Suppose, as I stare at a glass in front of me, I say or think: There.
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  15.  33
    Against Absence-Dependent Thoughts.P. Noonan - 2004 - Analysis 64 (1):92-93.
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  16. Outsmarting the McKinsey-Brown Argument?Paul Noordhof - 2004 - Analysis 64 (1):48-56.
    Externalists about mental content are supposed to face the following dilemma. Either they must give up the claim that we have privileged access to our own mental states or they must allow that we have privileged access to the world. The dilemma is posed in its most precise form through the McKinsey-Brown argument (McKinsey 1991; Brown 1995). Over the years since it was ?rst published in 1991, our understanding of the precise character of the premisses which constitute the argument has (...)
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  17. McDowell on Reasons, Externalism and Scepticism.Duncan Pritchard - 2003 - European Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):273-294.
    At the very least, externalists about content will accept something like the following claim.
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  18. Sufficient Absences.S. Sawyer - 2003 - Analysis 63 (3):202-208.
  19. How Can We Know That We 'Re Not Brains in Vats?'.Keith DeRose - 2000 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (S1):121-148.
    This should be fairly close to the text of this paper as it appears in The Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2000), Spindel Conference Supplement: 121-148.
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  20. Self-Knowledge and the "Inner Eye".Cynthia Macdonald - 1998 - Philosophical Explorations 1 (2):83-106.
    What is knowledge of one's own current, consciously entertained intentional states a form of inner awareness? If so, what form? In this paper I explore the prospects for a quasi-observational account of a certain class of cases where subjects appear to have self-knowledge, namely, the so-called cogito-like cases. In section one I provide a rationale for the claim that we need an epistemology of self-knowledge, and specifically, an epistemology of the cogito-like cases. In section two I argue that contentful properties (...)
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  21. Privileged Access to the World.Sarah Sawyer - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (4):523-533.