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  1. Ownership, Agency, and Defeat.Daniel S. Breyer - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (2):253-256.
    In this article, I respond to Jennifer Duke-Yonge’s (2012) discussion of my article ‘Reflective Luck and Belief Ownership’ (Breyer, Acta Analytica, 25:133–154, 2010) and defend my Taking Responsibility account of belief ownership against her insightful criticisms.
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  • In Defence of Modest Doxasticism About Delusions.Lisa Bortolotti - 2012 - Neuroethics 5 (1):39-53.
    Here I reply to the main points raised by the commentators on the arguments put forward in my Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs (OUP, 2009). My response is aimed at defending a modest doxastic account of clinical delusions, and is articulated in three sections. First, I consider the view that delusions are inbetween perceptual and doxastic states, defended by Jacob Hohwy and Vivek Rajan, and the view that delusions are failed attempts at believing or not-quitebeliefs, proposed by Eric Schwitzgebel and (...)
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  • Ownership, Authorship and External Justification.Jennifer Duke-Yonge - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (2):237-252.
    Some of the most well-known arguments against epistemic externalism come in the form of thought experiments involving subjects who acquire beliefs through anomolous means such as clairvoyance. These thought experiments purport to provide counterexamples to the reliabilist conception of justification: their subjects are intuitively epistemically unjustified, yet meet reliabilist externalist criteria for justification. In this article, I address a recent defence of externalism due to Daniel Breyer, who argues that externalists need not consider such subjects justified, since they fail to (...)
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  • Schizophrenia and the Estranged Self.Jordi Fernández & Suzanne Bliss - 2016 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 22 (4):615-621.
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  • Epistemic Injustice in Assessment of Delusions.Abdi Sanati & Michalis Kyratsous - 2015 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 21 (3):479-485.
  • Monothematic Delusion: A Case of Innocence From Experience.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (6):920-947.
    ABSTRACTEmpiricists about monothematic delusion formation agree that anomalous experience is a factor in the formation of these attitudes, but disagree markedly on which further factors need to be specified. I argue that epistemic innocence may be a unifying feature of monothematic delusions, insofar as a judgment of epistemic innocence to this class of attitudes is one that opposing empiricist accounts can make. The notion of epistemic innocence allows us to tell a richer story when investigating the epistemic status of monothematic (...)
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  • Narrative Truth and Cases of Delusion.Annemarie Kalis - 2012 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 3 (4):87-89.
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  • Affective Dimensions of the Phenomenon of Double Bookkeeping in Delusions.Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome - 2012 - Emotion Review 4 (2):187-191.
    It has been argued that schizophrenic delusions are “behaviourally inert.” This is evidence for the phenomenon of “double bookkeeping,” according to which people are not consistent in their commitment to the content of their delusions. The traditional explanation for the phenomenon is that people do not genuinely believe the content of their delusions. In the article, we resist the traditional explanation and offer an alternative hypothesis: people with delusions often fail to acquire or to maintain the motivation to act on (...)
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  • Delusions and Dispositionalism About Belief.Maura Tumulty - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (5):596-628.
    The imperviousness of delusions to counter-evidence makes it tempting to classify them as imaginings. Bayne and Pacherie argue that adopting a dispositional account of belief can secure the doxastic status of delusions. But dispositionalism can only secure genuinely doxastic status for mental states by giving folk-psychological norms a significant role in the individuation of attitudes. When such norms individuate belief, deluded subjects will not count as believing their delusions. In general, dispositionalism won't confer genuinely doxastic status more often than do (...)
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