Citations of work:

Alban Bouvier (2004). Individual Beliefs and Collective Beliefs in Sciences and Philosophy: The Plural Subject and the Polyphonic Subject Accounts: Case Studies.

10 found
Order:
Are we missing citations?

PhilPapers citations & references are currently in beta testing. We expect to add many more in the future.

Meanwhile, you can use our bibliography tool to import references for this or another work.

Or you can directly add citations for the above work:

  1.  12
    Which Groups Have Scientific Knowledge? Wray Vs. Rolin.Chris Dragos - 2016 - Social Epistemology 30 (5-6):611-623.
    Kristina Rolin and Brad Wray agree with an increasing number of epistemologists that knowledge can sometimes be attributed to a group and to none of its individual members. That is, collective knowledge sometimes obtains. However, Rolin charges Wray with being too restrictive about the kinds of groups to which he attributes collective knowledge. She rejects Wray’s claim that only scientific research teams can know while the general scientific community cannot. Rolin forwards a ‘default and challenge’ account of epistemic justification toward (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  73
    Values in Science: The Case of Scientific Collaboration.Kristina Rolin - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (2):157-177.
    Much of the literature on values in science is limited in its perspective because it focuses on the role of values in individual scientists’ decision making, thereby ignoring the context of scientific collaboration. I examine the epistemic structure of scientific collaboration and argue that it gives rise to two arguments showing that moral and social values can legitimately play a role in scientists’ decision to accept something as scientific knowledge. In the case of scientific collaboration some moral and social values (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  3. In What Sense Is Scientific Knowledge Collective Knowledge?Hyundeuk Cheon - 2014 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44 (4):407-423.
    By taking the collective character of scientific research seriously, some philosophers have claimed that scientific knowledge is indeed collective knowledge. However, there is little clarity on what exactly is meant by collective knowledge. In this article, I argue that there are two notions of collective knowledge that have not been well distinguished: irreducibly collective knowledge (ICK) and jointly committed knowledge (JCK). The two notions provide different conditions under which it is justified to ascribe knowledge to a group. It is argued (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  4.  65
    Epistemic Dependence in Interdisciplinary Groups.Hanne Andersen & Susann Wagenknecht - 2013 - Synthese 190 (11):1881-1898.
    In interdisciplinary research scientists have to share and integrate knowledge between people and across disciplinary boundaries. An important issue for philosophy of science is to understand how scientists who work in these kinds of environments exchange knowledge and develop new concepts and theories across diverging fields. There is a substantial literature within social epistemology that discusses the social aspects of scientific knowledge, but so far few attempts have been made to apply these resources to the analysis of interdisciplinary science. Further, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  5.  30
    Collective Scientific Knowledge.Melinda Fagan - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (12):821-831.
    Philosophical debates about collective scientific knowledge concern two distinct theses: groups are necessary to produce scientific knowledge, and groups have scientific knowledge in their own right. Thesis has strong support. Groups are required, in many cases of scientific inquiry, to satisfy methodological norms, to develop theoretical concepts, or to validate the results of inquiry as scientific knowledge. So scientific knowledge‐production is collective in at least three respects. However, support for is more equivocal. Though some examples suggest that groups have scientific (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  6.  44
    Passive Consensus and Active Commitment in the Sciences.Alban Bouvier - 2010 - Episteme 7 (3):185-197.
    Gilbert (2000) examined the issue of collective intentionality in science. Her paper consisted of a conceptual analysis of the negative role of collective belief, consensus, and joint commitment in science, with a brief discussion of a case study investigated by Thagard (1998a, 1998b). I argue that Gilbert's concepts have to be refined to be empirically more relevant. Specifically, I distinguish between different kinds of joint commitments. I base my analysis on a close examination of Thagard's example, the discovery of Helicobacter (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7.  43
    Introduction: Collective Knowledge and Science.K. Brad Wray - 2010 - Episteme 7 (3):181-184.
  8.  57
    Group Justification in Science.Kristina Rolin - 2010 - Episteme 7 (3):215-231.
    An analysis of group justification enables us to understand what it means to say that a research group is justified in making a claim on the basis of evidence. I defend Frederick Schmitt's (1994) joint account of group justification by arguing against a simple summative account of group justification. Also, I respond to two objections to the joint account, one claiming that social epistemologists should always prefer the epistemic value of making true judgments to the epistemic value of maintaining consistency, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  9.  42
    Explaining Economic Crises: Are There Collective Representations?Paul Thagard - 2010 - Episteme 7 (3):266-283.
    This paper uses the economic crisis of 2008 as a case study to examine the explanatory validity of collective mental representations. Distinguished economists such as Paul Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz attribute collective beliefs, desires, intentions, and emotions to organizations such as banks and governments. I argue that the most plausible interpretation of these attributions is that they are metaphorical pointers to a complex of multilevel social, psychological, and neural mechanisms. This interpretation also applies to collective knowledge in science: scientific communities (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  10. Evidential Collaborations: Epistemic and Pragmatic Considerations in "Group Belief".Kent W. Staley - 2007 - Social Epistemology 21 (3):321 – 335.
    This paper examines the role of evidential considerations in relation to pragmatic concerns in statements of group belief, focusing on scientific collaborations that are constituted in part by the aim of evaluating the evidence for scientific claims (evidential collaborations). Drawing upon a case study in high energy particle physics, I seek to show how pragmatic factors that enter into the decision to issue a group statement contribute positively to the epistemic functioning of such groups, contrary to the implications of much (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations