- Self-Knowledge, Choice Blindness, and Confabulation.Hayley F. Webster - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherstdetails
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Mental agency and rational subjectivity.Lucy Campbell & Alexander Greenberg - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):224-245.details
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Mental agency and rational subjectivity.Lucy Campbell & Alexander Greenberg - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):224-245.details
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What reasoning might be.Markos Valaris - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6).details
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Reasoning and Deducing.Markos Valaris - 2018 - Mind 128 (511):861-885.details
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Groups with Minds of Their Own Making.Leo Townsend - 2019 - Journal of Social Philosophy 51 (1):129-151.details
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Reasons Wrong and Right.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (3):371-399.details
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Epistemic agency: Some doubts.Kieran Setiya - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):179-198.details
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Why Decision-making Capacity Matters.Ben Schwan - 2021 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 19 (5):447-473.details
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Aesthetic Insight and Mental Agency.Christopher Prodoehl - 2023 - British Journal of Aesthetics 63 (4):537-552.details
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How to judge intentionally.Antonia Peacocke - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):330-339.details
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Reasoning and Presuppositions.Carlotta Pavese - 2021 - Philosophical Topics 49 (2):203-224.details
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The courage of conviction.Sarah K. Paul - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5-6):1-23.details
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Doxastic responsibility, guidance control, and ownership of belief.Robert Carry Osborne - 2021 - Episteme 18 (1):82-98.details
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Against a descriptive vindication of doxastic voluntarism.Nikolaj Nottelmann - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2721-2744.details
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Why is Epistemic Evaluation Prescriptive?Kate Nolfi - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):97-121.details
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Which Mental States Are Rationally Evaluable, And Why?Kate Nolfi - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):41-63.details
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The Normativity of Belief.Conor McHugh & Daniel Whiting - 2014 - Analysis 74 (4):698-713.details
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Epistemic responsibility and doxastic agency.Conor McHugh - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):132-157.details
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Responding to Skepticism About Doxastic Agency.Miriam Schleifer McCormick - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (4):627-645.details
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Activity, Passivity, and Normative Avowal.Andrew McAninch - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):2-24.details
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To Believe is to Know that You Believe.Eric Marcus - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (3):375-405.details
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'Belief' and Belief.Eric Marcus - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.details
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Asymmetry arguments.Berislav Marušić - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1081-1102.details
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Epistemic agency and the self-knowledge of reason: on the contemporary relevance of Kant’s method of faculty analysis.Thomas Land - 2021 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 13):3137-3154.details
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Belief as an act of reason.Nicholas Koziolek - 2018 - Manuscrito 41 (4):287-318.details
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Transparent emotions? A critical analysis of Moran's transparency claim.Naomi Kloosterboer - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):246-258.details
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Inference and the taking condition.Christian Kietzmann - 2018 - Ratio 31 (3):294-302.details
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Inference Is Not a Process.Christian Kietzmann - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (3):539-549.details
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Does intention involve belief?Christian Kietzmann - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):426-440.details
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The capacity to know and perception.Andrea Kern - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):159-171.details
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The transparency method and knowing our reasons.Sophie Keeling - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):613-621.details
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Knowing our Reasons: Distinctive Self‐Knowledge of Why We Hold Our Attitudes and Perform Actions.Sophie Keeling - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2):318-341.details
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Controlling our Reasons.Sophie Keeling - 2023 - Noûs 57 (4):832-849.details
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Confabulation and rational obligations for self-knowledge.Sophie Keeling - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (8):1215-1238.details
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Believing for a Reason is (at least) Nearly Self-Intimating.Sophie Keeling - 2022 - Erkenntnis.details
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The Value of Transparent Self-Knowledge.Fleur Jongepier - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (1):65-86.details
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The Role of Judgment in Doxastic Agency.David Jenkins - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):12-19.details
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The metaphysics of responsible believing.David Hunter - 2018 - Manuscrito 41 (4):255-285.details
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Answerability without Answers.Graham Hubbs - 2013 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (3):1-15.details
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How Reasoning Aims at Truth.David Horst - 2021 - Noûs 55 (1):221-241.details
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The relations between agency, identification, and alienation.Alec Hinshelwood - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (3):243-258.details
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XIII—Self‐Knowledge, Transparency, and Self‐Authorship.Sacha Golob - 2015 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3pt3):235-253.details
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Belief’s minimal rationality.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3263-3282.details
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Practical cognition as volition.Jeremy David Fix - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):1077-1091.details
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The possibility of epistemic responsibility.Miguel Ángel Fernández - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):109-131.details
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The Attitudes We Can Have.Daniel Drucker - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (4):591-642.details
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Epistemological Disjunctivism and Anti-luminosity Arguments.David de Bruijn - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.details
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The matter of motivating reasons.J. J. Cunningham - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1563-1589.details
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Is believing for a normative reason a composite condition?J. J. Cunningham - 2019 - Synthese 196 (9):3889-3910.details
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