Set aside fanciful doomsday speculations about AI. Even lower-level AIs, while otherwise friendly and providing us a universal basic income, would be able to do all our jobs. Also, we would over-rely upon AI assistants even in our personal lives. Thus, John Danaher argues that a human crisis of moral passivity would result However, I argue firstly that if AIs are posited to lack the potential to become unfriendly, they may not be intelligent enough to replace us in all our (...) jobs. If instead they are intelligent enough to replace us, the risk they become unfriendly increases, given that they would not need us and humans would just compete for valuable resources. Their hostility will not promote our moral passivity. Secondly, the use of AI assistants in our personal lives will become a problem only if we rely on them for almost all our decision-making and motivation. But such a (maximally) pervasive level of dependence raises the question of whether humans would accept it, and consequently whether the crisis of passivity will arise. (shrink)

This article argues that an artificial superintelligence (ASI) emerging in a world where war is still normalised constitutes a catastrophic existential risk, either because the ASI might be employed by a nation–state to war for global domination, i.e., ASI-enabled warfare, or because the ASI wars on behalf of itself to establish global domination, i.e., ASI-directed warfare. Presently, few states declare war or even war on each other, in part due to the 1945 UN Charter, which states Member States should “refrain (...) in their international relations from the threat or use of force”, while allowing for UN Security Council-endorsed military measures and self-defense. As UN Member States no longer declare war on each other, instead, only ‘international armed conflicts’ occur. However, costly interstate conflicts, both hot and cold and tantamount to wars, still take place. Further, a New Cold War between AI superpowers looms. An ASI-directed/enabled future conflict could trigger total war, including nuclear conflict, and is therefore high risk. Via conforming instrumentalism, an international relations theory, we advocate risk reduction by optimising peace through a Universal Global Peace Treaty (UGPT), contributing towards the ending of existing wars and prevention of future wars, as well as a Cyberweapons and Artificial Intelligence Convention. This strategy could influence state actors, including those developing ASIs, or an agential ASI, particularly if it values conforming instrumentalism and peace. (shrink)

The potential use, relevance, and application of AI and other technologies in the democratic process may be obvious to some. However, technological innovation and, even, its consideration may face an intuitive push-back in the form of algorithm aversion (Dietvorst et al. J Exp Psychol 144(1):114–126, 2015). In this paper, I confront this intuition and suggest that a more ‘extreme’ form of technological change in the democratic process does not necessarily result in a worse outcome in terms of the fundamental concepts (...) of democracy and the Rule of Law. To provoke further consideration and illustrate that initial intuitions regarding democratic innovation may not always be accurate, I pose and explore four ways that AI and other forms of technology could be used to augment the representative democratic process. The augmentations range from voting online to the wholesale replacement of the legislature’s human representatives with algorithms. After first noting the intuition that less invasive forms of augmented democracy may be less objectionable than more extreme forms, I go on to critically assess whether the augmentation of existing systems satisfies or enhances ideas associated with democracy and the Rule of Law (provided by Dahl and Fuller). By imagining a (not too far-fetched) future in a (not too far-removed) democratic society, my conclusion is that, when it comes to democracy and the Rule of Law, intuitions regarding technology may lead us astray. (shrink)