Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Group Agents: Persons, Mobs, or Zombies?Cathal O’Madagain - 2012 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (2):271-287.
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Volume 20, Issue 2, Page 271-287, May 2012.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Individuals, Social Groups and Ontological Priority.Zhaohui Wen - manuscript
    This inquiry primarily concerns a group-coming-first metaphysical picture, that groups are ontologically prior to individuals. To better characterize such a relation, I advance a proposal called Group Grounding Middleism, whereupon I identify and individuate groups, and then I suggest a new conception about individual existence. In passing, deploying techniques of Group Grounding Middleism, I also develop an account of group action and a theory of group responsibility, which arguably proves advantageous in practice. I eventually conclude with a prospect of our (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Explaining Action.Kieran Setiya - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (3):339-393.
    Argues that, in acting for a reason, one takes that reason to explain one's action, not to justify it: reasons for acting need not be seen "under the guise of the good". The argument turns on the need to explain the place of "practical knowledge" - knowing what one is doing - in intentional action. A revised and expanded version of this material appears in Part One of "Reasons without Rationalism" (Princeton, 2007).
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   47 citations  
  • Avatars of the Collective: A Realist Theory of Collective Subjectivities.Frédéric Vandenberghe - 2007 - Sociological Theory 25 (4):295-324.
    Let it be a network of voices... A network of voices that not only speak, but also struggle and resist for humanity.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • The Shared Perception of Social Contexts and Its Conditions for Possibility.Alessio Lo Giudice - 2009 - Ratio Juris 22 (3):395-415.
    Pragmatist reinterpretations of both deliberative-communicative theory and legal positivism point out the mentalist fallacy entailed by these prevalent models. I argue that pragmatist approaches imply analogous erroneous beliefs since they presuppose as given the shared perception of social contexts. Therefore they take for granted the shared interpretation of social problems and shared selection of common goals. Hence I advance the necessity of inquiring into the possibility conditions for a shared perception of social contexts. This would entail the organization of institutional (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • On What We Can Expect From One Another: Reciprocity in Families, Clubs, and Corporations.Laura Wildemann Kane - 2021 - Journal of Social Philosophy 52 (3):310-327.
    Prominent accounts of collective intentional activity explain the nature of social groups by virtue of a specific criterion: goal-directedness. In doing so, these accounts offer little in the way of determining whether there are any differences among social groups. In this paper, I propose a refined framework of collective intentional activity that can distinguish among social groups better than alternative accounts, and which has revisionary but nevertheless plausible implications for the nature of the family: specifically, that certain friendship relationships may (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Uses of Argument in Communicative Contexts.Robert C. Pinto - 2003 - Argumentation 24 (2):227-252.
    This paper challenges the view that arguments are (by definition, as it were) attempts to persuade or convince an audience to accept (or reject) a point of view by presenting reasons for (or against) that point of view. I maintain, first, that an arguer need not intend any effect beyond that of making it manifest to readers or hearers that there is a reason for doing some particular thing (e.g., for believing a certain proposition, or alternatively for rejecting it), and (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • Collective (Telic) Virtue Epistemology.J. Adam Carter - 2020 - In Mark Alfano, Jeroen de Ridder & Colin Klein (eds.), Social Virtue Epistemology. London: Routledge.
    A new way to transpose the virtue epistemologist’s ‘knowledge = apt belief’ template to the collective level, as a thesis about group knowledge, is developed. In particular, it is shown how specifically judgmental belief can be realised at the collective level in a way that is structurally analogous, on a telic theory of epistemic normativity (e.g., Sosa 2020), to how it is realised at the individual level—viz., through a (collective) intentional attempt to get it right aptly (whether p) by alethically (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • The Singular Plurality of Social Goods / La singolare pluralità dei beni sociali.Marco Emilio - 2022 - Dissertation, Université de Neuchâtel
    According to some philosophers and social scientists, mainstream economic theories currently play an unprecedented role in shaping human societies. This phenomenon can be linked to the dissemination of methodological individualism, where common goods are interpreted as reducible to aggregates of individuals' well-being. Nonetheless, some emergent difficulties of economics in coping with global institutional issues have encouraged some authors to revise that paradigm. In the last three decades, there has been a parallel growing philosophical interest in investigating social sciences' epistemological and (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The ‘Meeting of Bodies’: Empathy and Basic Forms of Shared Experiences.Anna Ciaunica - 2019 - Topoi 38 (1):185-195.
    In recent years there has been an increasing focus on a crucial aspect of the ‘meeting of minds’ problem :160–165, 2013), namely the ability that human beings have for sharing different types of mental states such as emotions, intentions, and perceptual experiences. In this paper I examine what counts as basic forms of ‘shared experiences’ and focus on a relatively overlooked aspect of human embodiment, namely the fact that we start our journey into our experiential life within the experiencing body (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • We 'Re All in This Together: Responsibility of Collective Agents and Their Members'.Kay Mathiesen - 2006 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):240–255.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Motivation in Agents.Christian Miller - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):222–266.
    The Humean theory of motivation remains the default position in much of the contemporary literature in meta-ethics, moral psychology, and action theory. Yet despite its widespread support, the theory is implausible as a view about what motivates agents to act. More specifically, my reasons for dissatisfaction with the Humean theory stem from its incompatibility with what I take to be a compelling model of the role of motivating reasons in first-person practical deliberation and third-person action explanations. So after first introducing (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • Plural Agents.Bennett W. Helm - 2008 - Noûs 42 (1):17–49.
    Genuine agents are able to engage in activity because they find it worth pursuing—because they care about it. In this respect, they differ from what might be called “mere intentional systems”: systems like chess-playing computers that exhibit merely goal-directed behavior mediated by instrumental rationality, without caring. A parallel distinction can be made in the domain of social activity: plural agents must be distinguished from plural intentional systems in that plural agents have cares and engage in activity because of those cares. (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  • Is an Agreement an Exchange of Intentions?Joe Mintoff - 2004 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (1):44–67.
    Margaret Gilbert has argued that an agreement is not exchange of promises, since no such exchange plays all the roles she claims are distinctive of agreements. After briefly discussing the notion of intention and the principles governing intentions, I argue that a certain type of exchange of intentions — in which one person forms a conditional intention to act if the other does, and the other forms an unconditional intention to act on the presumption that the first will do what (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Why Reasons Skepticism is Not Self‐Defeating.Stan Husi - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (3):424-449.
    : Radical meta-normative skepticism is the view that no standard, norm, or principle has objective authority or normative force. It does not deny that there are norms, standards of correctness, and principles of various kinds that render it possible that we succeed or fail in measuring up to their prerogatives. Rather, it denies that any norm has the status of commanding with objective authority, of giving rise to normative reasons to take seriously and follow its demands. Two powerful transcendental arguments (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • Hybrid Collective Intentionality.Thomas Brouwer, Roberta Ferrario & Daniele Porello - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3367-3403.
    The theory of collective agency and intentionality is a flourishing field of research, and our understanding of these phenomena has arguably increased greatly in recent years. Extant theories, however, are still ill-equipped to explain certain aspects of collective intentionality. In this article we draw attention to two such underappreciated aspects: the failure of the intentional states of collectives to supervene on the intentional states of their members, and the role of non-human factors in collective agency and intentionality. We propose a (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Collective Action and Social Ontology in Thomas Aquinas.Joshua Harris - 2021 - Journal of Social Ontology 7 (1):119-141.
    In this paper I argue that there are resources in the work of Thomas Aquinas that amount to a unique approach to what David P. Schweikard and Hans Bernhard Schmid’s call the “Central Problem” facing theorists of collective intentionality and action. That is to say, Aquinas can be said to affirm both the “Individual Ownership Claim” and the “Irreducibility Claim,” coherently and compellingly. Regarding the Individual Ownership Claim, I argue that Aquinas’s concept of “general virtue” buttresses an account of the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Advancing the ‘We’ Through Narrative.Shaun Gallagher & Deborah Tollefsen - 2019 - Topoi 38 (1):211-219.
    Narrative is rarely mentioned in philosophical discussions of collective intentionality and group identity despite the fact that narratives are often thought important for the formation of action intentions and self-identity in individuals. We argue that the concept of the ‘we-narrative’ can solve several problems in regard to defining the status of the we. It provides the typical format for the attribution of joint agency; it contributes to the formation of group identity; and it generates group stability.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Why the Extended Mind is Nothing Special but is Central.Giulio Ongaro, Doug Hardman & Ivan Deschenaux - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-23.
    The extended mind thesis states that the mind is not brain-bound but extends into the physical world. The philosophical debate around the thesis has mostly focused on extension towards epistemic artefacts, treating the phenomenon as a special capacity of the human organism to recruit external physical resources to solve individual tasks. This paper argues that if the mind extends to artefacts in the pursuit of individual tasks, it extends to other humans in the pursuit of collective tasks. Mind extension to (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Los problemas de la percepción.Susanna Siegel & Laura Perez Leon - 2018 - Enciclopedia de Filosofía SEFA.
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Shared Intentionality and the Representation of Groups; or, How to Build a Socially Adept Robot.Ben Phillips - 2022 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 45.
    Pietraszewski provides a compelling case that representations of certain interaction-types are the “cognitive primitives” that allow all tokens of group-in-conflict to be represented within the mind. Here, I argue that the folk concept GROUP encodes shared intentions and goals as more central than these interaction-types, and that providing a computational theory of social groups will be more difficult than Pietraszewski envisages.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Action.George Wilson - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    If a person's head moves, she may or may not have moved her head, and, if she did move it, she may have actively performed the movement of her head or merely, by doing something else, caused a passive movement. And, if she performed the movement, she might have done so intentionally or not. This short array of contrasts (and others like them) has motivated questions about the nature, variety, and identity of action. Beyond the matter of her moving, when (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Collective Responsibility.Marion Smiley - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    This essay discusses the nature of collective responsibility and explores various controversies associated with its possibility and normative value.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  • Belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   127 citations  
  • Collective Intentionality.David P. Schweikard & Hans Bernhard Schmid - 2012 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  • Shared Agency.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Sometimes individuals act together, and sometimes each acts on his or her own. It's a distinction that often matters to us. Undertaking a difficult task collectively can be comforting, even if only for the solidarity it may engender. Or, to take a very different case, the realization (or delusion) that the many bits of rudeness one has been suffering of late are part of a concerted effort can be of significance in identifying what one is up against: the accumulation of (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • Compatibilism.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   61 citations  
  • Friendship.Bennett W. Helm - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Friendship, as understood here, is a distinctively personal relationship that is grounded in a concern on the part of each friend for the welfare of the other, for the other's sake, and that involves some degree of intimacy. As such, friendship is undoubtedly central to our lives, in part because the special concern we have for our friends must have a place within a broader set of concerns, including moral concerns, and in part because our friends can help shape who (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • Personal Autonomy.Sarah Buss - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    To be autonomous is to be a law to oneself; autonomous agents are self-governing agents. Most of us want to be autonomous because we want to be accountable for what we do, and because it seems that if we are not the ones calling the shots, then we cannot be accountable. More importantly, perhaps, the value of autonomy is tied to the value of self-integration. We don't want to be alien to, or at war with, ourselves; and it seems that (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   56 citations  
  • Looking Through Whiteness: Objectivity, Racism, Method, and Responsibility.Philip Mack - unknown
    Does a white philosopher have anything of value to offer to the philosophy of race and racism? If this philosophical subfield must embrace subjective experience, why should we value the perspective of white philosophers whose racial identity is often occluded by racial normativity and who lack substantive experiences of being on the receiving end of racism? Further, if we should be committed to experience, in what sense can the philosophy of race and racism be “objective”? What should that word mean?Tackling (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • What Do We Know When We Learn the Meaning of Words?Antonio Scarafone - 2018 - Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio 12 (2):111-123.
    In this paper I will argue that, contrary to what most scholars are inclined to believe, there are important tensions between the later Wittgenstein’s views on language and Michael Tomasello’s usage-based theory of language acquisition. On one hand, Wittgenstein characterises the first steps into the acquisition of a first language as a matter of acquiring practical abilities, which, in an anti-intellectualistic vein, do not require any kind of knowledge. On the other hand, Tomasello employs a Gricean model of communication to (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Gricean Communication and Cognitive Development.Richard Moore - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (267):pqw049.
    On standard readings of Grice, Gricean communication requires (a) possession of a concept of belief, (b) the ability to make complex inferences about others’ goal-directed behaviour, and (c) the ability to entertain fourth order meta-representations. To the extent that these abilities are pre-requisites of Gricean communication they are inconsistent with the view that Gricean communication could play a role in their development. In this paper, I argue that a class of ‘minimally Gricean acts’ satisfy the intentional structure described by Grice, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Group Virtue Epistemology.Jesper Kallestrup - 2020 - Synthese 197 (12):5233-5251.
    According to Sosa, knowledge is apt belief, where a belief is apt when accurate because adroit. Sosa :465–475, 2010; Judgment and agency, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015) adds to his triple-A analysis of knowledge, a triple-S analysis of competence, where a complete competence combines its seat, shape and situation. Much of Sosa’s influential work assumes that epistemic agents are individuals who acquire knowledge when they hit the truth through exercising their own individual skills in appropriate shapes and situations. This paper (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason.Ruth Chang - 1997 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard.
    Can quite different values be rationally weighed against one another? Can the value of one thing always be ranked as greater than, equal to, or less than the value of something else? If not, when do we find commensurability and comparability unavailable? What are the moral and legal implications? In this book, philosophers address these questions.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   73 citations  
  • Demystifying the Deep Self View.August Gorman - forthcoming - Journal of Moral Philosophy:1-22.
    Deep Self views of moral responsibility have been criticized for positing mysterious concepts, making nearly paradoxical claims about ownership of one’s mental states, and promoting self-deceptive moral evasion. I defend Deep Self views from these pervasive forms of skepticism by arguing that some criticism is hasty and stems from epistemic injustice regarding testimony of experiences of alienation, while other criticism targets contingent features of Deep Self views that ought to be abandoned. To aid in this project, I provide original naturalistic (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology.Herman Cappelen, Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford University Press.
    This is the most comprehensive book ever published on philosophical methodology. A team of thirty-eight of the world's leading philosophers present original essays on various aspects of how philosophy should be and is done. The first part is devoted to broad traditions and approaches to philosophical methodology. The entries in the second part address topics in philosophical methodology, such as intuitions, conceptual analysis, and transcendental arguments. The third part of the book is devoted to essays about the interconnections between philosophy (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Normativity in Reasoning.John Broome - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (4):622-633.
    Reasoning is a process through which premise-attitudes give rise to a conclusion-attitude. When you reason actively you operate on the propositions that are the contents of your premise-attitudes, following a rule, to derive a new proposition that is the content of your conclusion-attitude. It may seem that, when you follow a rule, you must, at least implicitly, have the normative belief that you ought to comply with the rule, which guides you to comply. But I argue that to follow a (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Environmental Law and Youth Protests: Future Generations Between Speech Acts and Political Representation.Luigi D. A. Corrias - forthcoming - International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique:1-14.
    This article aims to provide a semiotic analysis of environmental law and youth protests. More precisely, drawing on speech act theory this article regards both as types of communication and teases out the inherent voice and message, specifically with regard to the interests of future generations. The argument unfolds in three steps. First, the article looks into speaker and speech of environmental law and argues that it speaks, as legislation does, in the first-person plural voice of a ‘we’. Second, the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Moral Responsibility for Distant Collective Harms.David Zoller - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (5):995-1010.
    While it is well recognized that many everyday consumer behaviors, such as purchases of sweatshop goods, come at a cost to the global poor, it has proven difficult to argue that even knowing, repeat contributors are somehow morally complicit in those outcomes. Some recent approaches contend that marginal contributions to distant harms are consequences that consumers straightforwardly should have born in mind, which would make consumers seem reckless or negligent. Critics reasonably reply that the bad luck that my innocent purchase (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Interconnected Blameworthiness.Stephanie Collins & Niels de Haan - 2021 - The Monist 104 (2):195-209.
    This paper investigates agents’ blameworthiness when they are part of a group that does harm. We analyse three factors that affect the scope of an agent’s blameworthiness in these cases: shared intentionality, interpersonal influence, and common knowledge. Each factor involves circumstantial luck. The more each factor is present, the greater is the scope of each agent’s vicarious blameworthiness for the other agents’ contributions to the harm. We then consider an agent’s degree of blameworthiness, as distinct from her scope of blameworthiness. (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Joint Actions and Group Agents.Philip Pettit & David Schweikard - 2006 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (1):18-39.
    University of Cologne, Germany Joint action and group agency have emerged as focuses of attention in recent social theory and philosophy but they have rarely been connected with one another. The argument of this article is that whereas joint action involves people acting together to achieve any sort of result, group agency requires them to act together for the achievement of one result in particular: the construction of a centre of attitude and agency that satisfies the usual constraints of consistency (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   91 citations  
  • Institutional Facts and Principles of Global Political Legitimacy.Terry Macdonald - 2016 - Journal of International Political Theory 12 (2):134-151.
    How should the content and justification of action-guiding normative ‘principles’ in political life be responsive to social ‘facts’? In this article, I answer this question by sketching a contextualist methodology for identifying and justifying principles for guiding international institutional action, which is based on an original account of the regulative role and conceptual structure of principles of political legitimacy. I develop my argument for this approach in three steps. First, I argue that a special non-utopian category of normative political principles (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Imperative Inference and Practical Rationality.Daniel W. Harris - 2021 - Philosophical Studies (4):1065-1090.
    Some arguments include imperative clauses. For example: ‘Buy me a drink; you can’t buy me that drink unless you go to the bar; so, go to the bar!’ How should we build a logic that predicts which of these arguments are good? Because imperatives aren’t truth apt and so don’t stand in relations of truth preservation, this technical question gives rise to a foundational one: What would be the subject matter of this logic? I argue that declaratives are used to (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • What is It Like to Be a Group Agent?Christian List - 2016 - Noûs:295-319.
    The existence of group agents is relatively widely accepted. Examples are corporations, courts, NGOs, and even entire states. But should we also accept that there is such a thing as group consciousness? I give an overview of some of the key issues in this debate and sketch a tentative argument for the view that group agents lack phenomenal consciousness. In developing my argument, I draw on integrated information theory, a much-discussed theory of consciousness. I conclude by pointing out an implication (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   41 citations  
  • The Planning Theory of Law I: The Nature of Legal Institutions.David Plunkett - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (2):149-158.
    This paper and its companion provide a general introduction to Scott Shapiro’s Planning Theory of Law as developed in his recent book Legality. The Planning Theory encompasses both an account of the nature of legal institutions and an account of the nature of legal norms. This first paper concerns the account of legal institutions. The second concerns the account of legal norms.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • A Simple Theory of Promising.David Owens - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (1):51-77.
    Why do human beings make and accept promises? What human interest is served by this procedure? Many hold that promising serves what I shall call an information interest, an interest in information about what will happen. And they hold that human beings ought to keep their promises because breaches of promise threaten this interest. On this view human beings take promises seriously because we want correct information about how other human beings are going to act. Some such view is taken (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   50 citations  
  • String Theory, Non-Empirical Theory Assessment, and the Context of Pursuit.Frank Cabrera - 2021 - Synthese 198:3671–3699.
    In this paper, I offer an analysis of the radical disagreement over the adequacy of string theory. The prominence of string theory despite its notorious lack of empirical support is sometimes explained as a troubling case of science gone awry, driven largely by sociological mechanisms such as groupthink (e.g. Smolin 2006). Others, such as Dawid (2013), explain the controversy by positing a methodological revolution of sorts, according to which string theorists have quietly turned to nonempirical methods of theory assessment given (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Pick the Sugar.Seamus Bradley - manuscript
    This paper presents a decision problem called the holiday puzzle. The decision problem is one that involves incommensurable goods and sequences of choices. This puzzle points to a tension between three prima facie plausible, but jointly incompatible claims. I present a way out of the trilemma which demonstrates that it is possible for agents to have incomplete preferences and to be dynamically rational. The solution also suggests that the relationship between preference and rational permission is more subtle than standardly assumed.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Guise of the Good.Francesco Orsi - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (10):714-724.
    According to the doctrine of the guise of the good, all that is desired is seen by the subject as good to some extent. As a claim about action, the idea is that intentional action, or acting for a reason, is action that is seen as good by the agent. I explore the thesis' main attractions: it provides an account of intentional behavior as something that makes sense to the agent, it paves the way for various views in meta-ethics and (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Evolving Resolve.Walter Veit & David Spurrett - 2021 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 44.
    The broad spectrum revolution brought greater dependence on skill and knowledge, and more demanding, often social, choices. We adopt Sterelny's account of how cooperative foraging paid the costs associated with longer dependency, and transformed the problem of skill learning. Scaffolded learning can facilitate cognitive control including suppression, whereas scaffolded exchange and trade, including inter-temporal exchange, can help develop resolve.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation