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  1. On Contradictory Christology: A Reply to McCall’s ‘Doctrinal Orthodoxy and Philosophical Heresy’.Jc Beall - 2019 - Journal of Analytic Theology 7 (1):488-507.
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  • Complete Symposium on Jc Beall's Christ – A Contradiction: A Defense of Contradictory Christology.Jc Beall, Timothy Pawl, Thomas McCall, A. J. Cotnoir & Sara L. Uckelman - 2019 - Journal of Analytic Theology 7 (1):400-577.
    The fundamental problem of Christology is the apparent contradiction of Christ as recorded at Chalcedon. Christ is human and Christ is divine. Being divine entails being immutable. Being human entails being mutable. Were Christ two different persons there’d be no apparent contradiction. But Chalcedon rules as much out. Were Christ only partly human or only partly divine there’d be no apparent contradiction. But Chalcedon rules as much out. Were the very meaning of ‘mutable’ and/or ‘immutable’ other than what they are, (...)
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  • The Logic of Viewpoints.Antti Hautamäki - 1983 - Studia Logica 42 (2-3):187 - 196.
    In this paper a propositional logic of viewpoints is presented. The language of this logic consists of the usual modal operatorsL (of necessity) andM (of possibility) as well as of two new operatorsA andR. The intuitive interpretations ofA andR are from all viewpoints and from some viewpoint, respectively. Semantically the language is interpreted by using Kripke models augmented with sets of viewpoints and with a new alternativeness relation for the operatorA. Truth values of formulas are evaluated with respect to a (...)
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  • Distinctly Human Umwelt?Floyd Merrell - 2001 - Semiotica 2001 (134).
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  • Inconsistency and Interpretation.Lisa Bortolotti - 2003 - Philosophical Explorations 6 (2):109-123.
    Abstract In this paper I discuss one apparent counterexample to the rationality constraint on belief ascription. The fact that there are inconsistent believers does not seem compatible with the idea that only rational creatures can be ascribed beliefs. I consider Davidson's explanation of the possibility of inconsistent believers and claim that it involves a reformulation of the rationality constraint in terms of the believers' subscription to norms of rationality. I shall argue that Davidson's strategy is partially successful, but that the (...)
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  • Access Denied to Zombies.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):81-93.
    I argue that metaphysicians of mind have not done justice to the notion of accessibility between possible worlds. Once accessibility is given its due, physicalism must be reformulated and conceivability arguments must be reevaluated. To reach these conclusions, I explore a novel way of assessing the zombie conceivability argument. I accept that zombies are possible and ask whether that possibility is accessible from our world in the sense of ‘accessible’ used in possible world semantics. It turns out that the question (...)
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  • Possible Worlds Semantics and Fiction.Diane Proudfoot - 2006 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 35:9-40.
    The canonical version of possible worlds semantics for story prefixes is due to David Lewis. This paper reassesses Lewis's theory and draws attention to some novel problems for his account.
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  • Supervaluationism and Its Logics.Achille C. Varzi - 2007 - Mind 116 (463):633-676.
    What sort of logic do we get if we adopt a supervaluational semantics for vagueness? As it turns out, the answer depends crucially on how the standard notion of validity as truth preservation is recasted. There are several ways of doing that within a supervaluational framework, the main alternative being between “global” construals (e.g., an argument is valid iff it preserves truth-under-all-precisifications) and “local” construals (an argument is valid iff, under all precisifications, it preserves truth). The former alternative is by (...)
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  • Can Deflationists Be Dialetheists?Bradley Armour-Garb & J. C. Beall - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (6):593-608.
    Philosophical work on truth covers two streams of inquiry, one concerning the nature (if any) of truth, the other concerning truth-related paradox, especially the Liar. For the most part these streams have proceeded fairly independently of each other. In his "Deflationary Truth and the Liar" (JPL 28:455-488, 1999) Keith Simmons argues that the two streams bear on one another in an important way; specifically, the Liar poses a greater problem for deflationary conceptions of truth than it does for inflationist conceptions. (...)
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  • Dialectical Contradictions and Classical Formal Logic.Inoue Kazumi - 2014 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 28 (2):113-132.
    A dialectical contradiction can be appropriately described within the framework of classical formal logic. It is in harmony with the law of noncontradiction. According to our definition, two theories make up a dialectical contradiction if each of them is consistent and their union is inconsistent. It can happen that each of these two theories has an intended model. Plenty of examples are to be found in the history of science.
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  • Keeping Track of Individuals: Brandom's Analysis of Kripke's Puzzle and the Content of Belief.Carlo Penco - 2005 - Pragmatics and Cognition 13 (1):177-201.
    This paper gives attention to a special point in Brandom.
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  • A Hyperintensional Account of Metaphysical Equivalence.Kristie Miller - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (269):772-793.
    This paper argues for a particular view about in what metaphysical equivalence consists: namely, that any two metaphysical theories are metaphysically equivalent if and only if those theories are strongly hyperintensionally equivalent. It is consistent with this characterisation that said theories are weakly hyperintensionally distinct, thus affording us the resources to model the content of propositional attitudes directed towards metaphysically equivalent theories in such a way that non-ideal agents can bear different propositional attitudes towards metaphysically equivalent theories.
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  • Substructural Epistemic Logics.Igor Sedlár - 2015 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 25 (3):256-285.
    The article introduces substructural epistemic logics of belief supported by evidence. The logics combine normal modal epistemic logics with distributive substructural logics. Pieces of evidence are represented by points in substructural models and availability of evidence is modelled by a function on the point set. The main technical result is a general completeness theorem. Axiomatisations are provided by means of two-sorted Hilbert-style calculi. It is also shown that the framework presents a natural solution to the problem of logical omniscience.
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  • What Are Impossible Worlds?Barak Krakauer - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):989-1007.
    In this paper, I argue for a particular conception of impossible worlds. Possible worlds, as traditionally understood, can be used in the analysis of propositions, the content of belief, the truth of counterfactuals, and so on. Yet possible worlds are not capable of differentiating propositions that are necessarily equivalent, making sense of the beliefs of agents who are not ideally rational, or giving truth values to counterfactuals with necessarily false antecedents. The addition of impossible worlds addresses these issues. The kinds (...)
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  • Intentional Identity and the Attitudes.Walter Edelberg - 1992 - Linguistics and Philosophy 15 (6):561 - 596.
  • Logic and the Consistency of the World.Joseph Wayne Smith - 1986 - Erkenntnis 24 (2):105 - 114.
    The claim that nature is self-consistent has recently been contested by a number of paraconsistent logicians. In this paper I will survey the arguments which paraconsistent logicians have presented for the thesis that nature is actually inconsistent. My conclusion is that these arguments all fail.The paraconsistency programme has to date been concerned primarily with outlining the philosophical inadequacy of classical logic, and detailed discussions of issues bearing upon the philosophical adequacy of the paraconsistency position itself are not to be found (...)
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  • Quantified Logic of Awareness and Impossible Possible Worlds.Giacomo Sillari - 2008 - Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (4):514-529.
    Among the many possible approaches to dealing with logical omniscience, I consider here awareness and impossible worlds structures. The former approach, pioneered by Fagin and Halpern, distinguishes between implicit and explicit knowledge, and avoids logical omniscience with respect to explicit knowledge. The latter, developed by Rantala and by Hintikka, allows for the existence of logically impossible worlds to which the agents are taken to have access; since such worlds need not behave consistently, the agents’ knowledge is fallible relative to logical (...)
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  • Coherence as an Ideal of Rationality.Lyle Zynda - 1996 - Synthese 109 (2):175 - 216.
    Probabilistic coherence is not an absolute requirement of rationality; nevertheless, it is an ideal of rationality with substantive normative import. An idealized rational agent who avoided making implicit logical errors in forming his preferences would be coherent. In response to the challenge, recently made by epistemologists such as Foley and Plantinga, that appeals to ideal rationality render probabilism either irrelevant or implausible, I argue that idealized requirements can be normatively relevant even when the ideals are unattainable, so long as they (...)
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  • Phenomenology, Possible Worlds and Negation.Wojciech Krysztofiak - 1991 - Husserl Studies 8 (3):205-220.
  • Wilson on Relativism and Teaching.Jim Mackenzie - 1987 - Philosophy of Education 21 (1):119-130.
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  • Wilson on Relativism and Teaching.Jim Mackenzie - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 21 (1):119–130.
  • Access Denied to Zombies.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2008 - Unpublished:1-13.
    According to the zombie conceivability argument, phenomenal zombies are conceivable, and hence possible, and hence physicalism is false. Critics of the conceivability argument have responded by denying either that zombies are conceivable or that they are possible. Much of the controversy hinges on how to establish and understand what is conceivable, what is possible, and the link between the two—matters that are at least as obscure and controversial as whether consciousness is physical. Because of this, the debate over physicalism is (...)
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