This paper will deal with the relationship between 'life' (Leben) and the 'life-world' (Lebenswelt) 1 as we find these concepts in the writings of Husserl's last years. The emphasis will be upon elucidating this relation- ship from the transcendental point of view. It is well known that Husserl initially introduced the concept of the life-world into his philosophy in connection with the problem of founding the sciences: accordingly, most studies up to date have dealt with the concept within this context (...) - that is, as part of the program for founding the sciences. However, it is important to remember that the life-world is also, for Husserl, a 'way to the transcendental reduction', and as such, can be ultimately clari- fied only by following this way to its end, and by comprehending it in its relationship to transcendental subjectivity. In his later years, Husserl came to think of the 'way of being' (Seinsweise) of transcendental sub- jectivity as 'world-experiencing-life' (welterfahrendes Leben). Thus it is my view that the problem of the 'life-world' is intimately related to that of 'life', and must necessarily be treated in the context of that rela- tionship. (shrink)

Mi objetivo es dar algunas orientaciones sobre las revisiones que Husserl hizo de la epojé que había expuesto en las Ideas I. Este objetivo se enmarca en dos proyectos básicos, primero, la necesidad de hacer una lectura teleológica de Husserl; y, segundo, reivindicar lo que ahora se llama el “nuevo” Husserl. Para ello me centraré en algunas correcciones significativas introducidas por Husserl en Ideas I en los años 20, pero sobre todo en ciertos textos, algunos inéditos en 1972 cuando escribí (...) mi tesis de doctorado, pero ahora publicados. Me centraré especialmente en tres, dos de Erste Philosophie II, y otro de Hua XXXIV. Todo ello sirve como homenaje a Antonio Zirión por la traducción del tomo III de Husserliana que ha puesto a nuestro alcance en castellano.The aim of this paper is to provide a guide on the revisions Husserl made about the Epoché such as it was exposed in Ideas I. This goal falls into two basic projects, first, the need for a teleological reading of Husserl, and second, the claim of the now called “new” Husserl. To do this I will focus on some significant corrections made by Husserl in Ideas I in the twenties, but especially in certain texts, some unpublished in 1972 when I wrote my dissertation, but now published. I will focus especially on three, two of Erste Philosophie II, and other now published in Hua XXXIV. All this serves as a tribute to Antonio Zirión for the translation of Volume III of Husserliana that he has recently published in Spanish. (shrink)

This paper thematizes the operative kinaesthetic style of world-experiencing life by turning to the ongoing how of our habitual bodily comportment: to our deeply sedimented way(s) of making a body; to schematic inner vectors or tendencies toward movement that persist as bodily ghost gestures even if one is not making the larger, visible gestures they imply; and to inadvertent isometrics, i.e., persisting patterns of trying, bracing, freezing, etc. All such micromovements witness to our sociality insofar as they are not only (...) socially shaped, but perpetuate certain styles of intercorporeal interaction and sustain certain modes of responsivity. Reactivating the sediment -- retrieving the tacit choreography of everyday life from its anonymity and sensing our ongoing ways of living out the legacy of our communal body -- not only allows one''s individual bodily style to shift, but can open new possibilities for healthy interkinaesthetic comportment. Such work can thus contribute to an embodied ethics in both theory and practice. (shrink)

This is the first book-length philosophical study of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and Freud’s theory of the unconscious. The book investigates the possibility for Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology to clarify Freud’s concept of the unconscious with a focus on the theory of repression as its centre. Repression is the unconscious activity of pushing something away from consciousness, while making sure that it remains active as something foreign within us. How this is possible is the main problem addressed in the work. Unlike previous (...) literature (including Ricœur, Merleau-Ponty and Derrida) this book makes full use of the resources of genetic phenomenology and passivity in the attempt to clarify the Freudian unconscious. The central argument developed is that the structure of the lebendige Gegenwart as the core of Husserl’s theory of passivity consists of preliminary forms of bodily kinaesthesia, feelings and drives in a constantly ongoing process where repression occurs as a necessary part of all constitution. The clarification of Freudian repression thus takes place by showing how it presupposes a broad conception of consciousness such as that presented by Husserl’s genetic phenomenology. By arguing that “repression” is central to any philosophical account of subjectivity, this book takes on the most distinct challenge to philosophy posed by Freud. (shrink)