Sentences containing the scalar term “some”, such as “The pig carried some of his rocks”, are usually interpreted as conveying the scalar inference that the pig did not carry all of his rocks. Previous research has reported that when interpreting such sentences, children tend to derive fewer of these scalar inferences than adults ; Papafragou & Musolino ; Guasti et al., among others). One approach to explaining these results contends that children have difficulties accessing the alternative sentences involved in the (...) derivation of such scalar inferences. This ‘Alternatives-based’ approach raises the possibility that children’s performance may improve if certain scalar terms are presented together in the same sentence, for example, if a sentence contains both an existential quantifier and a universal quantifier, as in “Every pig carried some of his rocks”. Such ‘EverySome’ sentences have been associated with the inference that not every pig carried all of his rocks, as well as the stronger inference that none of the pigs carried all of his rocks, among others). We present two experiments that explore the possibility that children might more readily derive scalar inferences from sentences containing such a combination of scalar terms. Experiment 1 investigates children’s interpretation of sentences containing only the quantifier some and replicates the previously established finding of fewer inference-based interpretations by children compared to adults. Experiment 2 explores children’s interpretation of sentences in which “some” is embedded under “every”, and reveals that adults and children access inference-based interpretations of such sentences at similar rates. Moreover, adults and children appear to differ with regards to which of the two possible inferences their interpretations are based on. We discuss the implications of the experimental results for our understanding of children’s acquisition of scalar inferences and for proposals that attempt to capture differences between adults’ and children’s interpretive preferences. (shrink)

Breheny et al. argue against the structural approach to alternatives. The empirical force of their argument comes mostly from challenges raised against Trinh and Haida. This paper aims to respond to these challenges, showing how they can be met by a natural refinement of Trinh and Haida’s proposal which turns out to capture additional facts previously not accounted for. Another aim of this paper is to recount the debate with enough precision and explicitness in order to enhance understanding and facilitate (...) future discussions. (shrink)

In recent work, Fox has argued, on the basis of both empirical and conceptual considerations, that relevance is closed under speaker belief: if $\phi $ is relevant, then it’s also relevant whether the speaker believes $\phi $. We provide a formally explicit implementation of this idea and explore its theoretical consequences and empirical predictions. As Fox already observes, one consequence is that ignorance inferences can only be derived in grammar, via a covert belief operator of the sort proposed by Meyer. (...) We show, further, that the maxim of quantity no longer enriches the meaning of an utterance, per se, but rather acts as a filter on what can be relevant in an utterance context. In particular, certain alternatives are shown to be incapable of being relevant in any context where the maxim of quantity is active — a property we dub obligatory irrelevance. We show that the resulting system predicts a quite restricted range of interpretations for sentences with the scalar item some, as compared to both neo-Gricean and grammatical theories of scalar implicature, and we argue that these predictions seem largely on the right track. (shrink)

Disjunctions in the scope of possibility modals give rise to a conjunctive inference, generally referred to as ‘free choice.’ For example, Emma can take Spanish or Calculus suggests that Emma can take Spanish and can take Calculus. This inference is not valid on standard semantics for modals in combination with a Boolean semantics for disjunction. Hence free choice has sparked a whole industry of theories in philosophy of language and semantics. This paper investigates free choice in sentences involving a non-monotonic (...) modified numeral, under which we embed a possibility modal scoping over disjunction. One example is Exactly one student can take Spanish or Calculus. As we point out, the presence of certain readings of these sentences is a key test for a prominent approach, which analyzes free choice as a kind of scalar implicature. We report on two experiments investigating the readings of such sentences, using an inferential task. Our results are challenging for the implicature approach. We sketch two possible solutions within this approach, either adopting a different recent implicature algorithm, or exploring a different meaning for modified numerals with exactly. Both of them suffer from a variety of problems. We then discuss a third solution, which exploits a recent account of free choice based on homogeneity. This approach can account for our results, in combination with plausible assumptions about homogeneity projection, though it too has open issues with related cases. Regardless of which solution is chosen, non-monotonic contexts turn out to be an important test case for theories of free choice, implicature, and modified numerals. (shrink)

We investigate the interactions between scalar implicatures and presuppositions in sentences containing both a scalar item and presupposition trigger. We first critically discuss Gajewski and Sharvit’s previous approach. We then closely examine two ways of integrating an exhaustivity-based theory of scalar implicatures with a trivalent approach to presuppositions. The empirical side of our discussion focuses on two novel observations: the interactions between prosody and monotonicity, and what we call presupposed ignorance. In order to account for these observations, our final proposal (...) relies on two mechanisms of scalar strengthening, the Presupposed Ignorance Principle and an exhaustivity operator which lets the presuppositions of negated alternatives project. (shrink)

We offer a solution to a puzzle in the number interpretation of nominals in Buriat. Buriat has a two-way number opposition in morphology, but semantically, both forms may be number neutral. We show that even though the number neutrality of unmarked nominals is heavily restricted, it does not boil down to incorporation. Our proposal is that unmarked nominals can be either singular or numberless. In case they are singular, they are semantically strictly atomic, but when there are numberless they are (...) truly number neutral, just like the plurals. The plurality inferences of plurals and the consistent number neutrality of numberless nouns are accounted for in a Katzirian system with structurally defined alternatives. (shrink)